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Resumo 
Contributos para uma abordagem de identidade social à conformidade e à diferenciação 
intragrupal 
No presente trabalho, pretendemos obter evidência para o carácter implícito da 
influência informacional de referência (e.g., Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner, 1987; 1991) 
e da diferenciação normativa intragrupal visando o estabelecimento de uma identidade 
social positiva, a Dinâmica de Grupos Subjectiva (e.g., Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998; 
Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001). No primeiro estudo empírico, examinamos a 
conformidade às normas implícitas dos grupos em função da sua credibilidade. Na 
primeira experiência, os participantes (n = 26), depois de observarem a selecção de 
imagens de um júri de peritos, caracterizada por uma norma implícita, avaliaram outras 
imagens semelhantes ou às aprovadas ou às rejeitadas pelo júri. Os resultados sugerem 
que a norma implícita do júri afectou as avaliações subsequentes dos participantes. A 
segunda experiência (n = 35) mostrou que apenas os estudantes das áreas de Letras mas 
não os de Ciências, estereotipicamente considerados, respectivamente, credível e não 
credível na apreciação estética, se conformaram mais à norma implícita do endogrupo 
que à do exogrupo. Na terceira experiência, os participantes (n = 37), foram 
categorizados num de dois grupos artificiais, respectivamente, credível e não credível na 
tarefa. Os resultados mostraram que a conformidade explícita, a identificação ao grupo 
e a percepção de credibilidade dos grupos estavam correlacionadas, particularmente 
quando o grupo era credível. Na quarta experiência (n = 57) replicámos os resultados 
anteriores, e verificámos ainda que a conformidade explícita e a implícita diferiam em 
magnitude mas não nas normas endossadas. Globalmente, os resultados são consistentes 
com o modelo da Influência Informacional da Referência. O segundo estudo examina a 
possibilidade de diferenciação normativa implícita. Na primeira experiência, os 
participantes (n = 31) categorizados em dois grupos artificiais, sobreavaliaram os 
membros do endogrupo relativamente aos do exogrupo não os membros que adoptavam 
as normas implícitas do endogrupo sobre os que adoptavam as do exogrupo. Na 
segunda experiência (n = 25), focada nas normas, obtivemos uma sobreavaliação dos 
membros que adoptaram a norma endogrupal implícita relativamente aos que adoptaram 
a norma exogrupal. Os resultados das duas experiências são discutidos à luz do modelo 
da Dinâmica de Grupos Subjectiva. 
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Résumé 
Contributions à l’approche d’identité sociale à la conformité et à la différentiation 
intragroupe  
Dans le présent travail, on vise obtenir évidence pour le caractère implicite de 
l’influence informationnelle de référence (e.g., Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner, 1987; 
1991) et de la différentiation normative intragroupe destinée à réussir une identité 
sociale positive, la Dynamique des Groupes Subjective (e.g., Marques, Páez & Abrams, 
1998; Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001). Dans la première étude, on examine la 
conformité endogroupale implicite en fonction de sa crédibilité. Dans la première 
expérience, les participants (n = 26), après avoir observé la sélection d’images d’un jury 
de experts, caractérisée par une norme implicite, ont jugé des images similaires ou aux 
approuvées ou aux rejetées par le jury. Les résultats suggèrent que la norme implicite du 
jury a affecté les jugements subséquents des participants. La seconde expérience (n = 
35) a montré que les étudiants d’Humanités, mais non ceux de Sciences, 
stéréotypiquement considérés, respectivement, crédibles et non crédibles à 
l’appréciation esthétique, se sont conformé plus à la norme implicite de l’endogroupe 
qu’à celle de l’exogroupe. Dans la troisième expérience, les participants (n = 37), ont 
été catégorisés en un de deux groupes artificiels, respectivement, crédible et non 
crédible à la tâche. Les résultats ont montrés que la conformité explicite, l’identification 
au groupe et la perception de crédibilité des groupes étaient associées, particulièrement 
quand le groupe était crédible. Dans la quatrième expérience (n = 57) on a répliqués les 
résultats antérieurs et on a encore vérifié que la conformité explicite et celle implicite 
différait en intensité mais non aux normes soutenues. Globalement, les résultats sont 
consistent avec le modèle de l’Influence Informationnelle de Référence. La seconde 
étude examine la possibilité de différentiation normative implicite. Dans la première 
expérience, les participants (n = 31) catégorisés en deux groupes artificiels, ont 
surévalué des membres endogroupales relativement aux membres exogroupales mais 
pas les membres qui adoptaient la norme implicite de l’endogroupe sur ceux qui 
adoptaient celle de l’exogroupe. Dans la seconde expérience (n = 25), on a obtenue une 
surévaluation des membres qui adoptaient la norme implicite endogroupale relativement 
à ceux qui adoptaient la norme exogroupale. Les résultats des deux expériences sont 
discutés en base du modèle de la Dynamique des Groupes Subjective. 
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Abstract 
Contributions to the Social Identity Approach to Conformity and Intragroup 
Differentiation  
In the present work, we aim to obtain evidence for the implicit character of 
referent informational influence (e.g., Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner, 1987; 1991) and of 
normative intragroup differentiation aimed to achieve a positive social identity, 
Subjective Group Dynamics (e.g., Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998; Marques, Abrams & 
Serôdio, 2001). In the first study, we examined conformity to implicit group norms as a 
function of their credibility. In the first experiment, participants (n = 26), after 
observing the selection of abstract pictures made by a jury of experts, characterized by 
an implicit norm, judged other pictures similar to either the ones approved or rejected 
by the jury. The results suggest that the implicit norm of the jury affected participants’ 
subsequent evaluations. The second experience (n = 35) showed that Arts students, but 
not Sciences students, stereotypically considered, respectively, credible or non-credible 
in esthetical appreciation, conformed more to the implicit norm of the in-group than to 
that of the out-group. In the third experience, participants (n = 37), were categorized in 
one of two group artificial groups, respectively, credible and non-credible in the task. 
The results showed that explicit conformity, group identification and perception of 
groups’ credibility were correlated, particularly when the group was credible. In the 
fourth experience (n = 57), we replicated the previous findings, and confirmed that 
explicit and implicit conformity differed in degree but not in the endorsed norms. In the 
whole, the results are consistent with the Referent Informational Influence model. The 
second study focused on the possibility of implicit normative differentiation. In the first 
experiment, participants (n = 31) categorized in two artificial groups upgraded in-group 
over out-group members, but not members that endorsed the implicit norm of the in-
group over those that endorsed that of the outgroup. In the second experience (n = 25), 
focused on the norms, we found an upgrading of members that adopted the implicit in-
group norm relatively to members that adopted the equivalent out-group norm. The 
results of the two experiments are discussed at the light of Subjective Group Dynamics.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Sometimes, groups make their norms explicit and formal so that members know 
exactly what it is expected from them. Other times, norms are simply there, and 
members cannot articulate immediately the codes by which they regulate. In the present 
work, we explore the relations of social identity processes to these implicit forms of 
group behavior.  
The social identity approach developed from the principles of Social Identity 
Theory (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and Self-Categorization Theory (Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1988), and constitutes, presently, an influential perspective 
in Social Psychology (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1999; Spears, Oakes, Ellemers & Haslam, 
1997; Hogg, 2001b; 2001c; 2003; Hogg & Abrams, 2003; Robinson, 1996). Recently, 
some social identity processes were examined using research methods that circumvent 
participants’ conscious control. The associations between the self and the in-group 
representations (e.g., Onorato & Turner, 2004; Smith & Henry, 1996) or between 
positive attributes and the in-group and its members (e.g., Otten & Wentura, 1999; 
Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman & Tyler, 1990) are examples of this research. The results 
obtained, suggesting that social identity processes operate also at an implicit level, 
reaffirm the role of social identity in the determination of individual behavior. In the 
present work, we extend the application of non-controlled methods to examine in-group 
conformity and normative intragroup differentiation.  
Group influence and intragroup differentiation are important fields of research in 
Social Psychology. Group influence relates to phenomena such as conformity, 
polarization, leadership or minority influence. Normative intragroup differentiation 
relates to aspects such as social attractiveness, popularity and deviance. Traditional 
approaches to these phenomena have favored interindividual relations occurring within 
small interactive groups rather than group-based relations. The focus on the individual 
rather than on the group has led, in the case of group influence, to the distinction 
between personal motives to conform generating different forms of acceptance of 
norms. Group influence is associated to others’ coercion and pressures to comply with 
the group standards rather than to normative references of collective behavior. In the 
case of intragroup differentiation, the traditional approach has focused on the dynamics 
of small groups such as work and sport teams, committees, task forces, etc.  
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The social identity approach has provided a new look on the above phenomena 
emphasizing the distinct characteristics of group behavior as regards interpersonal 
behavior. This perspective stresses the importance of group identity for members 
namely its impact on their self-definition and esteem. Group processes are considered in 
the larger context of intergroup relations. In this perspective, group influence operates 
as a single process rather than several processes. The social identity perspective also 
provided insights on intragroup differentiation processes, particularly on those related 
with members’ contributions to a clear and positive social identity. Phenomena such as 
social attraction to prototypical group members or extreme derogation of in-group 
deviant members are viewed as intrinsically related to categorization and identification 
processes.  
The Structure of the Present Work 
We begin with an extended reference to the social identity approach, which 
constitutes the theoretical background of our empirical studies. Chapter 1 is thus 
dedicated to reviewing the principles and concepts of Social Identity Theory and Self-
Categorization Theory. We begin with a brief reference to the metatheoretical 
underpinnings of the social identity approach. We then focus on major aspects of Social 
Identity Theory, namely, the relationship between social categorization, social identity 
and social comparison processes, and the need for positive group differentiation. Within 
Self-Categorization Theory, we shall address the hierarchical model of the self and the 
concept of prototypicality. We then address the dynamic relationship between the self 
and the social context, the salience mechanisms and the activation of self-categories. 
We conclude the chapter with a detailed reference to the phenomenological outcome of 
social self-categorization, depersonalization.  
Given that we address two distinct fields of research, we decided to address each 
field separately in every respect. We shall present first the review of relevant literature 
concerning group influence followed by the respective empirical study, and then, we 
shall present the same contents concerning intragroup differentiation. In Chapter 2, we 
refer to classic investigations on conformity to provide the background in which the 
traditional approach to group influence developed (Asch, 1951; Festinger, Schachter & 
Back, 1950; Sherif, 1936). A critical review of this traditional perspective is provided: 
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the distinction between informational and normative influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 
1955), the dependence versus independence of the individual as regards the group, and 
the particular conceptions of uncertainty and credibility. We then review the social 
identity approach to group influence processes forming the Referent Informational 
Influence model (e.g., Hogg & Turner, 1988; Turner, 1991). The Referent Informational 
Influence model postulates that uncertainty and consensual validation are intimately 
related to self-categorization and views conformity as the assimilation of the self to the 
in-group representation. A core difference from the traditional view is that group 
influence is conceived as a single process encompassing both normative and 
informational components. We shall review the major principles of the model and its 
explanation of group processes such as minority influence or group polarization.  
In Chapter 3, we review previous research on social identity using non-
controlled methods. After a comparison of these methodologies, we present our first 
study beginning with the methodology used in our experiments. The method consists of 
the implicit learning of group norms and its unnoticed influence in the receiver’s 
judgments of related stimuli. We shall then present our four-experiment study 
addressing the issue of implicit group conformity. The study confronts two hypotheses 
concerning the nature of group influence: The traditional hypothesis arguing for two 
forms of group influence and the social identity hypothesis arguing for a single process 
of group influence. First, we tested the idea that informational influences are implicitly 
accepted. To achieve this goal, in the first experiment, participants are exposed to the 
imperceptible criterion of a jury of experts before reporting their own preferences for 
identical abstract pictures. In the second experiment, we tested our hypotheses by 
assessing conformity to the implicit esthetical norms of credible or non-credible in-
group and out-group sources, using natural groups. In the third experiment, we used 
artificial groups and manipulated the ascribed credibility of the in-group in the 
esthetical task. This experiment was aimed to check on the cognitive-motivational 
mechanisms that underlie controlled in-group conformity, namely, its relationships with 
in-group identification and perceived credibility. The fourth experiment aims to 
replicate the previous results and to address directly the differences between implicit 
and explicit group conformity. As a whole, the results supported our hypothesis that 
normative influences, similar to informational influences, are implicitly accepted 
14 
suggesting that group influence consists of a single process, as claimed by social 
identity approaches to social influence.  
Chapter 4 is dedicated to intragroup differentiation. We briefly introduce the 
topic with a mention to classical experiments such as Festinger, Schachter and 
colleagues’ on group reactions to deviance (e.g., Festinger, 1950; Festinger et al, 1950; 
Schachter, 1951), Hollander’s on idiosyncratic credit (e.g., 1958; 1960), or Moscovici 
and colleagues’ on reactions to minorities (e.g., Moscovici, 1976; 1985, Moscovici et al, 
1969; 1972). We then concentrate on the models issuing from a social identity 
perspective. We review the research of Hogg and colleagues on differentiation based on 
members’ prototypicality, in social attractiveness (e.g., Hogg & Hains, 1991) and 
leadership endorsement (e.g., Hains, Hogg & Duck, 1997). Finally, we address the 
research of Marques and colleagues on the black-sheep effect (e.g., Marques & Páez, 
1994) and the Subjective Group Dynamics model (Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998) 
whose analysis of intragroup differentiation processes takes into account the need for a 
positive social identity. Finally, we present our second empirical study aiming to check 
on the implicit character of implicit normative differentiation. The study addresses the 
idea that members may be differentiated as a function of their implicit normative or 
deviant behavior and that this differentiation is more extreme in the in-group than in the 
out-group, as predicted by the Subjective Group Dynamics model. The first experiment 
showed a marked tendency to differentiate between groups rather than differentiation 
between members that endorse in-group implicit norms and members that endorse out-
group norms. In the second experiment, several changes to the procedure and material 
were introduced to induce participants’ focus on the norms. The results showed that 
members endorsing implicit in-group norms were upgraded relatively to those 
endorsing out-group norms. However, there was mixed evidence relative to 
participants’ sensitivity to the initial intergroup context, which precluded a full test of 
the general hypothesis. The study ends with the discussion of possible reasons for the 
obtained results. 
In the final chapter, we recapitulate our major results and their respective 
theoretical implications. We highlight the aspects that need further clarification and 
propose some guidelines for future research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE SOCIAL IDENTITY APPROACH 
The concept of social identity was introduced by Tajfel (1972) when studying 
the relationships between social categorization and intergroup behavior (e.g., Tajfel, 
1969; 1970; Tajfel, Flament, Billig & Bundy, 1971; Tajfel, Sheikh & Gardner, 1964; 
Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) 
results from this initial research. Together with Self-Categorization Theory (Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) which is a development of its principles, it 
represents a distinct approach to group processes in Social Psychology (e.g., Abrams & 
Hogg, 1988; Hogg, 2001b). The social identity approach is the theoretical background 
of our empirical work; therefore, in the first chapter, we shall review its major concepts 
and principles.  
Metatheoretical Conceptions 
Group processes have been studied in Social Psychology under two paradigms: 
the individualistic and the interactionist paradigms (cf. Turner & Oakes, 1986). In the 
individualistic paradigm,  
“[…] the individual is the sole psychological and/or social reality, that 
the distinctive reality of the group and society is fiction or fallacy, that nothing 
‘emerges’ in social interaction, […] that social psychology is merely the 
application of general (i.e. individual) psychological principles to the more 
complex stimulus conditions of the social environment.” (Turner & Oakes, 1986, 
p. 238) 
A representative author of this paradigm, Floyd Allport (1924), claimed that, 
“there is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of 
individuals”. In this perspective, the group is a ‘nominal fallacy’ useful to apprehend 
collective action. Group actions are not more than the sum of the individual actions of 
the members. This conception emphasizes individuals’ unique characteristics that 
differentiate them from other individuals (cf. Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 
1994). The emphasis on the individual is patent on conceptions of the self as a relatively 
stable structure, such as that of Markus and colleagues (Markus, 1977; Markus & 
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Kunda, 1986). The emphasis on the individual is also visible on approaches to social 
phenomena focusing the interpersonal dimension of social relationships (for critic 
perspectives, cf., e.g., Doise, 1986; Hogg, 1992; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). 
The interactionist paradigm. The interactionist paradigm emphasizes the 
dynamic nature of the self and the idea that individuals’ self-conception, and, 
consequently, their opinions, judgments and behavior change in the course of social 
interaction. The content of the mind is the product of social interaction, a socialization 
process during which individuals internalize symbols, meanings, values and norms (cf., 
e.g., Mead, 1934). Thinking and meaningful action are possible only to the use of these 
tools, the social contents of the mind. As Vigotsky (1925) emphasized, 
“All higher mental functions are the essence of internalized relations of a 
social order, a basis for the social structure of the individual. Their composition, 
genetic structure, method of action – in a word, their entire nature – is social; 
even in being transformed into mental processes, they remain quasisocial. Man 
as an individual maintains the functions of socializing.” (p.106) 
It is, thus, impossible to dissociate individuals from the social groups to which 
they belong.  
“Individuals in their multiplicity cannot be opposed to or in reality 
distinguished from society: individuals are society and society is the natural 
form of being of human individuals. […] The fallacy that the individual may be 
opposed to society arises from a legitimate but different contrast between a 
particular individual and others, resulting in the idea of uniqueness or 
individuality […] There is no such thing as the pre-social, asocial, purely 
biological, ‘as if isolated’ individual except as analytic, fictional abstraction.” 
(Asch, 1952, p. 239) 
The object of Social Psychology. For the interactionist paradigm, the object of 
Social Psychology is not that of the individual Psychology or that of Sociology, but the 
mental representations and processes produced by social interaction.  
“The task of Social Psychology, as a part of psychology (the science of 
the individual mental processes), is not to provide social explanations of 
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behavior (this can be left to sociology, politics, etc.), nor to provide 
‘psychological explanations’ of, i.e. ‘to psychologize’ social behavior, but to 
explain the psychological aspects of society. This equates with understanding the 
structures and processes whereby society is psychologically represented in and 
mediated by individuals’ minds.”(Turner & Oakes, 1986, pp. 239-240) 
More specifically, the object of Social Psychology is the “socially mediated 
cognition, phenomenologically experienced as the perception of a shared, public, 
objective world”, the “psychological representations of the interaction, interactors, 
setting etc. shared by the interactors”, and the “intersubjective world of shared social 
meanings.” (Turner & Oakes, 1986, p. 240).  
Concepts of group. The two metatheories result in different conceptions of 
group. According to Turner (1987), the two conceptions derive from a fundamentally 
different meaning attributed to interdependence. In the interaccionist approach, from 
Lewin (1947) to Sherif (1967), or Asch (1952), interdependence is considered “in the 
sense of ‘functional unity’, or ‘dynamic system’, or ‘mutual psychological field’” 
(Turner, 1987, p. 20). Interdependence refers thus to the proprieties of the group, as a 
functional whole, and their effect on the members.  
In the individualistic metatheory, group interdependence refers to individuals’ 
dependence on others to satisfy their individual needs.  
“In recent years the emphasis has been on forms of interdependence 
related to or assumed to be related to the satisfaction of individuals’ needs or, 
which is the same thing theoretically, the achievement of rewarding outcomes, 
i.e., motivational interdependence. By motivational interdependence is meant the 
idea that actions and characteristics of others relevant to the satisfaction of one’s 
needs are functionally related by the structure of the situation to actions and 
characteristics of one’s own relevant to their needs. Thus, at one extreme, people 
may co-operate to achieve some otherwise unattainable goal; at the other, they 
may associate simply because they find each other’s company mutually 
rewarding.” (Turner, 1987, p. 20) 
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In the individualistic conception of interdependence, the group is the result of 
the interpersonal relationships among members (e.g., Hogg, 1992; 1993; Hogg & 
Turner, 1985a; 1985b; 1987; Turner, 1984; Turner et al, 1987).  
“The group whole, the social norm, is assumed to be exactly the sum of 
its parts, the members’ individual opinions – there is no gain or loss in collective 
wisdom […] A group is merely the product of interpersonal relations and 
processes or, more precisely, the same thing as relatively stable relations of 
interpersonal co-operation, attraction and influence between people” (Turner, 
1987, p. 25). 
In contrast, for the interactionist approach, the group is a meaningful entity 
relatively independent from its individual components, possessing different proprieties 
from individuals (Asch, 1952; Lewin, 1947; Sherif, 1967). Both Social Identity Theory 
and Self-Category Theory reject the individualistic metatheory and assume the 
principles of the interactionist approach to social phenomena.  
Social Identity Theory 
Social Identity Theory (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 1986; Tajfel, 19781; 1981; 
1982; Turner, 1975) proposes three basic processes to understand group behavior: social 
categorization, social identification and social comparison (cf. Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel, 
1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
Social Categorization 
Categorization is a pervasive phenomenon that fulfills a basic individual need: 
the perception of clear and predictable environments (cf. Bruner, 1957). It simplifies 
and systematizes the environment, ordering it in a manner that makes sense for the 
individual, thus helping to structure its causal understanding (Tajfel, 1978). 
Inductive and deductive aspects of categorization. To achieve a clear perception 
of the environment, the cognitive system processes stimuli inferentially. Two aspects of 
inferential processing are crucial to achieve a simplification of the environment: the 
 
1 In the present chapter, the reference Tajfel (1978) stands for Tajfel’s Introduction and three chapters in 
the edited book “Differentiation between social groups”. 
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inductive and the deductive aspects. The inductive aspect consists in recognizing shared 
attributes in a number of objects in order to form a category. The deductive aspect 
consists in associating the category attributes to the attributes recognized in an object.  
The inferential processing of stimuli implies the modification of the environment 
because it is based on the omission, as well as, over- attribution of features to the 
objects and events so that they may be integrated in the pre-existing structures. In 
Bruner’s (1957) terms, “perceptual categorization of an object or events permits one to 
‘go beyond’ the proprieties of the object or event” (p. 129). By making the environment 
a predictable world, categorization allows action to can take place expediently, without 
a prior time- and energy-consuming interpretation of the objects and circumstances 
involved (cf. Tajfel, 1972).  
As an illustration of the deductive transformation of stimuli, Tajfel and Wilkes 
(1963) asked their participants to judge the length of each line in various series of eight 
lines whose length progressed geometrically. The series were either classified, i.e., 
labeled A or B, so that the shorter lines belonged to category A and the longer ones 
belonged to category B; classified randomly, i.e., the categories A and B assigned to 
each line were not correlated to the lines’ length; or unclassified. The results showed 
that participants in the criteria categorization condition exaggerated the differences in 
length between the two categories. Moreover, these participants also tended to judge the 
lines within each category to be more similar to one another, than the participants in the 
other conditions did. Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) dubbed the accentuation of intra-
categorical similarities and of inter-categorical differences, the accentuation effect.  
The Accentuation Effect in Social Categories 
The categorization of physical objects and the categorization of people in 
continuous dimensions – defining attributes such as traits or personality characteristics – 
follow identical rules (e.g., Doise, 1976). However, the structuring of social 
environment differs, in several aspects, from the categorization of the physical 
environment (cf. Deschamps, 1984; Doise, Deschamps & Meyer, 1978; Doise & 
Sinclair, 1973; Eiser & Stroebe, 1972; Tajfel, Sheik & Gardner, 1964).  
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For instance, there is often higher involvement of the perceiver in social 
categorization (cf. Tajfel, 1969; 1970; 1972). Burris and Branscombe (2005) provide a 
recent illustration of the effect of self-relevance on the accentuation of intercategorical 
differences. The authors found that the distances between the city of the respondent and 
another city in the same country (U.S.A.) were estimated as smaller than that to a city 
situated in a neighboring country (Canada or Mexico), even when the former distances 
were objectively larger than the latter. Similar to any categorization, the notion of 
countries entails an accentuation effect of the distance between the cities of different 
countries, what the authors dubbed the border effect. Most significantly, the authors also 
found that when estimating the distances between two cities located in two foreign 
countries (Mexico and El Salvador), the border effect disappeared. As the authors 
concluded, “crossing the psychological boundary between self and not-self creates a 
visual illusion that distorts on-line distance estimates” (p. 305).  
The accentuation of intercategorical similarities is also affected by the 
involvement of self. For instance, Simon (1993) claims that when the in-group is 
relevant for the self, individuals are more to accentuate the similarities within the in-
group than within out-groups. The author and his colleagues (e.g., Simon & Brown, 
1987; Simon & Mummendey, 1990; Simon & Pettigrew, 1990) found that the minority 
group members accentuate the similarities within the in-group whereas majority group 
members accentuate the similarities within the out-group (cf. Chapter 4). The results are 
explained by the higher relevance of the minority in-group membership for the self as 
regards that of the majority (cf. Brewer, 1991, 1993).  
In sum, the involvement of the self in social categorization confer it distinct 
characteristics as regards categorization of objects. Social values also play a major role 
in the structuring of social environment (e.g., Maass & Schaller, 1991; Oakes, Haslam 
& Turner, 1994; Tajfel & Forgas, 1981), although the categorization of objects is also 
affected by the social value ascribed to them (e.g., Bruner & Goodman, 1947).  
The Value Dimension of Social Categorization 
As Tajfel and Forgas (1981) put it, “no social domain of any importance is 
classified in a completely value-free manner, as currently prevalent cognitive-
individualistic research would lead us to believe” (p. 126). Social categories are always, 
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to some extent, charged with an evaluative connotation. In fact, the evaluative 
dimension seems to precede the descriptive dimension in the formation of categories. 
As Tajfel and Forgas (1981) claim, “categorizations of people, groups of people and 
social events in terms of value differentials are probably one of the earliest and most 
basic forms of social categorization” (p. 119). For instance, Tajfel and Jahoda (1966) 
asked British 6-7 years old children to indicate among plastic squares of different sizes, 
which matched the surface of America, France, Germany, and Soviet Union; then, the 
authors asked the same children to indicate their preferences for each of these four 
countries. Children were more consensual in preferring America and France to 
Germany and Soviet Union than to say that America and Soviet Union are larger than 
France and Germany. In sum, the four countries were distinguished based on the 
associated value more than through their objective attribute. As the authors claimed, a 
consensus on the relative value of the nations is likely to confer as much legitimacy to 
the differentiation between the four countries, as a descriptive attribute such as size. As 
Tajfel (1969, p. 87) remarks, “[…] ‘bad’ and ‘good’ even ‘liked’ or ‘disliked’ become 
incontrovertible statements of fact not different in their mode of assimilation from, for 
example, ‘large’ or ‘small’”.  
Above, we mentioned the effects of self-involvement in social perception. We 
shall now address how social categories affect self-perception by becoming meaningful 
aspects of individual identity. The categorized perception of the social environment and 
the value associated to social categories affects both how individuals perceive others as 
belonging to social categories and how they perceive themselves in relation to others. 
As Tajfel (1972) puts it, the categorization of social environment provides a system that 
creates and defines the particular place of the individual in the society, his/her social 
identities.  
Social Identity and Social Comparison 
Social identity consists of those aspects of “an individual’s self-image that 
derive from social categories to which he perceives himself as belonging” (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979, p. 40). If it is true that, “the image or concept that an individual has of 
himself or herself is infinitely more complex, both in its contents and its derivations, 
than social identity as defined and circumscribed here” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63), it is also 
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true that some aspects of that image are the result of membership of certain social 
groups and categories, and that some of these aspects will determine individual’s 
behavior in the course of his/her life. 
Cognitive, evaluative and emotional components of social identity. Social 
identity comprises three components, 
“[…] a cognitive component, in the sense of knowledge that one belongs 
to a group; an evaluative one, in the sense that the notion of group and/or of 
one’s membership of it may have a positive or negative value connotation; and 
an emotional component in the sense that the cognitive and evaluative aspects of 
the group and one’s membership of it may be accompanied by emotions (such as 
hatred, like or dislike) directed towards one’s own group and towards others 
which stand in certain relations to it.” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 28) 
Both the cognitive and evaluative dimensions of social identity are established in 
comparison to out-groups. In fact, social identifications “are to a very large extent 
relational and comparative: they define the individual as similar to or different from, as 
“better” or “worse” than, members of other groups” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 40). 
Intergroup comparisons are thus an inevitable outcome of social identity.  
Intergroup and Interpersonal Comparisons 
Intergroup comparison is similar to social comparison as described by Festinger 
(1954). However, in intergroup comparison, individuals compare with others not as 
individuals but as members of groups (cf. Tajfel, 1978). The hypothesis of a drive to 
evaluate one’s abilities is seen in terms of individuals need to evaluate themselves as 
members of a group. Furthermore, intergroup comparison resembles interpersonal 
comparison only in what refers to comparison of abilities, not opinions (cf. Turner, 
1975). According to Festinger (1954), individuals are motivated to ascertain the 
accuracy of their opinions, but when comparing abilities, they are motivated to achieve 
positive positions. As Turner (1975) remarks, more than achieving a precise position of 
the in-group as regards the out-group, individuals are motivated to achieve a positive 
social comparison, “the important comparative dimensions for social identity parallel 
those of abilities rather than opinions, i.e., they are value-laden […] the need to evaluate 
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himself in society is more correctly expressed as a need to make a favorable or positive 
evaluation of the individual in society.” (p. 9).  
Intergroup and Interpersonal Behavior 
The behavioral outcome of social identity is intergroup behavior. Tajfel (1978) 
defines intergroup behavior as “all behavior of two or more individuals towards each 
other [that] is determined by their membership of different social groups or categories.” 
(p. 41). For Tajfel (1978), during a limited social interaction, intergroup behavior 
appears combined with interpersonal behavior in a varying degree depending on 
individuals’ perception of the situation. The author proposes a continuum of 
interindividual behavior – intergroup behavior, in which the interpersonal pole refers to 
‘any social encounter between two or more people in which all the interaction that takes 
place is determined by the personal relationships between the individuals and their 
respective individual characteristics’; and the intergroup pole refers to ‘all behavior of 
two or more individuals towards each other determined by their group membership of 
different social group or categories’ (p. 41). The variability of social interactions along 
the continuum predicts that, with few exceptions, social situations fall between the two 
extremes and, depending on the pole they tend to, the situation may be classified as 
having more an intergroup or an interpersonal character.  
Variability–uniformity continuum. Intergroup behavior is characterized by less 
variability in the relations with other persons.  
“The nearer is a social situation (as interpreted by members of a group) to 
the intergroup extreme of the interpersonal-intergroup continuum, the more 
uniformity will the individual members of the groups concerned show in their 
behavior towards members of out-groups. Conversely, the nearer is the situation 
to the interpersonal end, the more variability will be shown in behavior towards 
members of out-groups” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 44-45) 
The uniformity of intergroup behavior is associated with the perceptual 
accentuation of the differences between in-group and out-group and of the similarities 
among their respective members (cf. above). “The nearer is a social situation to the 
intergroup extreme, the stronger tendency will there be for members of the in-group to 
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treat members of the out-group as undifferentiated items in an unified social category, 
i.e., independently of the individual differences between them.” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 45).  
Social Categorization and Intergroup Differentiation 
Social identification implies that members compare with other groups motivated 
to achieve a distinct and positive position of the in-group. A consequence of the need 
for positive group differentiation is the establishment of competitive intergroup 
relations. In their seminal study, Tajfel, Flament, Billig and Bundy (1971) showed that 
this process emerged even in minimal laboratory conditions whose goal was “to 
establish minimal conditions in which an individual will, in his behavior, distinguish 
between in-group and out-group” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 77).  
Tajfel and colleagues (1971; Experiment 1) categorized the participants 
allegedly as a function of their over- or under-estimation of number of projected dots. 
Subsequently, without being given the opportunity to interact among them, participants, 
individually and anonymously, awarded amounts of money to three pairs of recipients 
based solely on their group membership. 
The analysis of the intergroup choices in matrices presenting members of the 
two groups showed that participants awarded significantly more points to in-group than 
to out-group recipients. The mere categorization of the participants was enough to 
produce a discriminatory intergroup behavior. The result is more significant when 
compared with the results of the same group choices in which both the recipients were 
either in-group or out-group members. In these sequences, participants used a more fair 
strategy.  
In Experiment 2, participants were randomly assigned to one of the two groups, 
based on their alleged preference for the abstract paintings of Klee and Kandinsky. The 
results showed that, similar to the intergroup choices in the previous experiment, the 
majority of the participants favored in-group recipients. As the authors put it,  
 “[…] in a situation devoid of the usual trappings of in-group 
membership and of all the vagaries of interacting with the out-group, the Ss still 
act in terms of their group membership and of in-group categorization. Their 
actions are unambiguously directed at favoring the members of their in-group as 
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against the members of the out-group. This happens despite the fact that an 
alternative strategy – acting in terms of the greatest common good – is clearly 
open to them at a relatively small cost of advantages that would accrue to 
members of the in-group.” (p. 173) 
Although fairness was also an important strategy, suggesting that participants’ 
responses were affected by an equalitarian social norm, the achievement of positive in-
group differentiation was a major directive for their responses. The tendency to favor 
the in-group over the out-group in evaluations and behavior was later dubbed in-group 
bias, “the laboratory analog of real-world ethnocentrism” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 
38). As the authors remarked, “not only are incompatible group interests not always 
sufficient to generate conflict [but] these conditions are not always necessary for the 
development of competition and discrimination between groups” (p. 38). 
Tajfel and colleagues’ (1971) results are of major importance in the development 
of Social Identity Theory (cf. Tajfel, 1972; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). They are at the 
origin of a whole line of research aimed to understand the minimal conditions for group 
behavior (e.g., Diehl, 1990). Early relevant research addressed the assumption of 
interpersonal similarities and differences in minimal groups (cf., e.g., Allen & Wilder, 
1975; Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Diehl, 1988) or the involvement of the self in intergroup 
differentiation (cf. Turner, 1975; 1978). More recently, Otten, Mummendey and Blanz 
(1996), found that when allocating negative outcomes (lists of meaningless syllables to 
memorize), did not discriminated out-group members in the same way as when 
allocating positive outcomes (money). Participants in the negative outcome conditions 
used fairer intergroup strategies, except when the value of group membership was 
threatened; in this case, participants reacted favoring the in-group over the out-group in 
the allocation of both positive and negative outcomes. 
Strategies for Positive Group Differentiation 
Tajfel and colleagues’ (1971) experiments depicted the strategies adopted in 
laboratory groups. In the real world, the strategies for positive group differentiation vary 
as a function of the status of the in-group and might not involve competitive intergroup 
relations. The social values ascribed to each group in the social system, affects the way 
the respective members experience their social identity (Tajfel, 1972; Tajfel & Turner, 
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1979). Whereas high-status groups contribute to a positive identity of their members, 
low-status group contribute to a negative identity with the correspondent effects on 
members’ self-esteem (cf. Branscombe, 1998; Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Ellemers, 
van Knippenberg, de Vries & Wilke, 1988; Mullen, Brown & Smith, 1992). Therefore, 
members of high-status and low-status groups engage in different strategies of positive 
group differentiation. 
Beliefs on social stratification. The strategies members of high-status and low-
status groups adopt may be collective or individual, generating or not intergroup 
behavior, depending on the beliefs on social stratification. These beliefs may be 
represented in a social mobility–social change continuum (cf. Tajfel, 1978; 1981). The 
more social stratification is perceived nearer the social mobility extreme, the more 
individuals perceive group boundaries illegitimate and/or unstable and thus flexible and 
permeable. Conversely, the more social stratification is perceived nearer the social 
change extreme, the more the boundaries are perceived as legitimate and stable and, 
thus, rigid and impenetrable. We shall elaborate more in these different strategies aimed 
to achieve positive social identity. 
Strategies of Low-Status Group Members. The belief on a flexible social 
stratification is more predictive of individual strategies in low-status group members 
because they may attempt to differentiate from the group and move to higher status 
groups. Conversely, the belief on a impenetrable social stratification is more predictive 
of intergroup behavior because the low-status group member will tend to develop the 
idea that,  
“[…] he cannot move on his own into another group in order to improve 
or change his position or his conditions of life; and that therefore the only way 
for him to change these conditions […] is together with his group as a whole, as 
a member of it rather than as someone who leaves it, or, who can act in a variety 
of relevant situations as an individual independently of his group membership.” 
(Tajfel, 1978, p. 53) 
When social stratification is assumed impenetrable, several collective strategies 
may emerge, such as, social creativity in the creation or re-recreation of valued 
attributes of the group. Social creativity may entail: the enhancement of the group 
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characteristics so that they “become more like the superior group”; the reinterpretation 
of the inferior characteristics of the group “so that they not appear as inferior but 
acquire a positively valued distinctiveness from the superior group”; and/or, the creation 
and diffusion of “new ‘ideologies’, new group characteristics which have a positively 
valued distinctiveness from the superior group” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 94; cf. also, Ellemers, 
van Knippenberg, de Vries & Wilke, 1988; Lemaine, Kastersztein & Personnaz, 1978; 
Turner & Brown, 1978).  
Strategies of High-Status Group Members. High status group may resort to 
social creativity in order to reestablish the group superiority. This strategy occurs, for 
instance, when the threat to the group superiority is internal, i.e., members feel that their 
group superiority is unwarranted, based on “unfair advantages, various forms of 
injustice, exploitation, illegitimate use of force, etc.” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 89). In this 
conflict of values, members may engage in collective strategies to restore the group 
superiority (e.g., Mummendey & Schreiber, 1983; 1984; Mummendey & Simon, 1989; 
Turner & Brown, 1978).  
Internal conflicts of values deriving from the perception of in-group illegitimate 
superiority may also lead to leave the group either psychologically or materially. 
Groups may also accept the fact that they exploited other groups to achieve their status. 
For instance, research on collective guilt suggests that members of advantaged groups, 
feeling that their advantage is built on the exploitation or victimization of other social 
groups, may present collective and public apologies to the victimized out-group and 
compensate it for the past damages (cf. Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Branscombe, 
Slugoski & Kappen, 2004). 
Social Identity Theory launched the bases for the social identity approach both at 
the cognitive and motivational levels and focused on the macro-social aspects of 
intergroup behavior. Self-Categorization Theory contributed to the social identity 
approach elaborating on the cognitive processes of social categorization and on the 
implications of these processes in intragroup phenomena. We shall focus now on the 
assumptions of Self-Categorization Theory. 
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Self-Categorization Theory 
Building on the concepts and ideas outlined by Social Identity Theory, Self-
Categorization Theory (Turner et al, 1987) specified the cognitive processes by which 
relevant social categories affect individuals’ self-concept and how this relates to various 
forms of intragroup behavior (e.g. Hogg, 2000; Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner, 1991).  
The Hierarchical Model of the Self 
Self-Categorization Theory is essentially a theory of structure and function of 
the self-concept. According to the theory, the self-concept comprises many components, 
cognitive representations of the self, or self-categorizations. Self-categorizations are 
hierarchically organized in three basic levels of abstraction. The most inclusive level 
includes all kinds of human social groups, “the common features shared with other 
members of the human species in contrast to other forms of life”. The intermediate level 
of in-group / out-group categorization is “based on social similarities and differences 
between human beings that define one as a member of certain social groups and not 
others”, and includes distinctions such as between male and female, races, nationalities, 
occupations, etc. Finally, the lowest level of differentiation is established “between 
oneself, as a unique individual, and other in-group members that define one as a specific 
individual person” (Turner et al, 1987, p. 45). This latter level includes all the 
idiosyncratic features of the person that distinguishes him or her from other persons.  
Relationships among Self-Categorizations  
Self-categorizations are articulated with each other in the vertical and in the 
horizontal dimensions. One of the implications of the hierarchical model is that 
inclusive classes provide the frame of comparison to establish the differences among 
subordinate categories. Consistently, personal self-categorizations are defined in the 
context of the in-group, that is, the variation within the in-group provides the frame of 
reference to establish the differences between self and others. Thus, personal self-
categorizations, i.e., identities that differentiate the self from the in-group defining 
attributes may also vary, depending on the group context.  
Functional antagonism. In the vertical dimension, the theory postulates a 
functional antagonism between levels of self-categorization: the more one level is 
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activated, the more the other level is inhibited. Self-perception may thus be represented 
by a continuum. 
 “Social self-perception tends to vary along a continuum from the 
perception of the self as a unique person (maximum intra-personal identity and 
maximum difference perceived between self and in-group members) to the 
perception of the self as an in-group category (maximum similarity to in-group 
members and difference from out-group members).” (Turner et al, 1987, p. 49) 
Prototypicality and meta-contrast. The hierarchical model of self-categorization 
has also implications in what concerns the horizontal dimension. Specifically, the theory 
postulates that categories are formed in reference to categories of the same level 
following the meta-contrast principle: 
“Within any given frame of reference (in any situation comprising some 
definite pool of psychologically significant stimuli), any collection of stimuli is 
more likely to be categorized as an entity (i.e., grouped as identical) to the 
degree that the differences between those stimuli on relevant dimensions of 
comparison (intra-class differences) are perceived as less than the differences 
between that collection and other stimuli (inter-class differences).” (Turner et al, 
1987, p. 47) 
The category meta-contrast ratio is obtained by dividing the average difference 
perceived between members of the category and the other stimuli (the mean inter-
category difference) by the average difference perceived between members within the 
category (the mean intra-category difference). The higher the mean inter-category 
difference and the lower the mean intra-category difference, the higher will be the 
category meta-contrast ratio. 
The meta-contrast ratio of a category member is called prototypicality. The 
concept is similar to that of Rosch’s (1978) categorical prototypicality and is defined as 
the extent into which a constituent part is perceived as representative of the category. 
Members’ prototypicality is obtained dividing the mean perceived difference between 
the target member and the out-group members by the mean perceived difference 
between the target member and the other in-group members. The higher the member’s 
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prototypicality, the more similar s/he is to the other category members and the more 
different from members of other categories. The higher the member’s prototypicality 
the more s/he is representative of his/her group. 
The Salience of Group Memberships 
The theory bases on Bruner’s (1957) functional account of category activation to 
describe the conditions in which self-categorizations are activated. 
Accessibility and fit. Categorical salience is produced by two mechanisms: 
accessibility and fit. Accessibility refers to the category’s readiness to be activated. The 
more accessible a category, the fewer attributes a stimulus requires to be recognized as 
belonging to the category. Therefore, highly accessible categories are more likely to 
affect persistently individuals’ perception of self and others. Category’s readiness or 
accessibility depends on the expectations concerning the environment, which, in turn, 
depend on individuals’ experience, and on individuals’ current motives. Fit is the extent 
into which the stimulus characteristics match the features of a given category. The more 
characteristics matching the category a stimulus has, the more likely it will be 
recognized as belonging to the category.  
The interaction of accessibility and fit is responsible for the activation of the 
category more adequate to perceive the current situation. As Oakes (1987) puts it, 
“Whilst accessibility thus ensures that perception is appropriately selective gearing 
categorization to the demands imposed by changing motives and circumstances, fit – the 
match between actual stimulus characteristics and category specifications – ties it firmly 
to reality.” (p. 128).  
Comparative fit and normative fit. In the context of social categories, Oakes 
(1987) distinguishes between comparative and normative fit. Comparative fit is the 
cognitive-structural aspect of fit. Similar to Rosch’s (1978) concept of ‘cue validity’, it 
is defined by the extent to which the defining attributes of a category are common to 
category members but not shared by members of the other categories. Normative fit is 
the extent into which a member presents the behavior expected in his/her category.  
 “[…] perceived structural fit always depends upon the contrast of 
differences between categories with differences within categories for individuals 
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and behavior currently under consideration. Similarly, the normative fit between 
a given characteristic or action and a given categorization depends on the 
intergroup comparison being made and on context: what is normatively relevant 
to one category membership in one context may be irrelevant, or relevant to a 
different membership, in another context.” (Oakes, 1987, p. 131)  
As an illustration of the distinction between comparative and normative fit, 
Oakes, Turner and Haslam (1991) found that participants perceived a male target as 
possessing more the male stereotypical attributes when included in a three male group 
that disagreed with a three female group than when the target disagreed with a group of 
two males and three females, a five female group, or when he disagreed together with 
two females with another three female group. The results suggest that the target was 
perceived to be more typical of his gender category, when he had both comparative and 
normative fit than when his behavior was not consistent with the gender categorization 
(disagreeing with out-group members is more expected than disagreeing with in-group 
members and out-group members).  
Flexibility versus stability of the self-concept. By establishing that the self-
concept is also determined by contextual aspects, the theory emphasizes its flexible 
nature (cf. Oakes, 1987; Turner et al, 1994). This view contrasts to other views arguing 
for the stable nature of the self. For instance, Markus (1977) proposes that there are 
cognitive structures, self-schemata, which ensure some stability in the way individuals 
self-conceive. Self-schemata are “cognitive generalizations about the self, derived from 
past experience, that organize and guide the processing of self-related information”. 
Self-schemata represent the background knowledge about the self, obtained by the 
observation of one’s repeated responses to particular stimulus. They allow one to make 
inferences from little information about one’s feelings and behavior. With this self-
knowledge, we make inferences from little information and interpret complex sequences 
of events (cf. also, Markus & Kunda, 1986).  
On their turn, Turner and colleagues (e.g., Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 
1994; Onorato & Turner, 2004) reject the notion of a central structure responsible for 
the relative stability of thought and behavior. The authors admit that personal 
characteristics are determining in the activation of self-categorizations, “the concepts of 
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perceiver readiness and normative fit – reflecting an individual’s motives, desires, 
memories, knowledge, habits and so forth – provide definite internal psychological 
constraints on self-category variation” (Turner et al, 1944, pp. 459-60). However, the 
alleged stability of the self derives more from the relative invariability of the social 
contexts in which individual normally interact than from the predominance of personal 
aspects. The relatively stable set of roles occupied by individuals in their social 
network, and the recurrent social contexts in which individuals move, lead to the 
frequent activation of some self-categories in detriment of others. However, this is due 
to the stability of the social context rather than to the stability of cognitive structures. 
Depersonalization 
Depersonalization is the phenomenological outcome of social self-
categorization. An inclusive level of self-categorization implies that there is a 
perceptual amplification of the similarities between the self and the categorical 
attributes (the prototype) and a perceptual reduction of the differences from these 
attributes (cf., e.g., Haslam & Turner, 1992; Simon, Pantaleo & Mummendey, 1995).  
“Just as categorizing others causes us to perceive others stereotypically, 
categorization of the self causes us to perceive ourselves stereotypically. It is in 
this way that the individual comes to describe the self in terms of the group’s 
defining characteristics, experience the feelings and emotions of the group, and 
to acquire the goals and needs of other group members.” (Hogg & Turner, 1987, 
p. 149) 
Depersonalization and deindividuation. Depersonalization is conceptually 
different from deindividuation, which corresponds to a psychological process of 
reduced self-awareness (e.g., Diener, 1980; Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1982). Self-
awareness includes attention to aspects, such as one’s attitudes and norms and increases 
the capacity for self-regulation. Deindividuation is thus associated with anti-normative 
and disinhibited behavior (but, cf. Reicher, 1987).  
“[Depersonalization] is not a loss of individual identity, nor a loss or 
submergence of the self in the group, and nor any kind of regression to a more 
primitive or unconscious form of identity. It is the change from the personal to 
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the social level of identity, a change in the nature and content of the self-concept 
corresponding to the functioning of self-perception at a more inclusive level of 
abstraction.” (Turner et al, 1987, p. 51) 
The salience of a self-category does not imply self-attention in the same way that 
self-attention does not necessarily imply a shift to the personal self. As Abrams and 
colleagues (e.g., Abrams, 1994; 1999; Abrams & Masser, 1998) argue, the two 
processes correspond to different and independent dimensions of the self. The shift to a 
social self-categorization and depersonalization is an adaptive response to changes in 
the context (e.g., Turner et al, 1994), and individuals are generally not aware of the 
process. However, this does not mean that we cannot be self-conscious when acting as 
group members. Planned and strategic group behavior, for instance, requires a focus on 
the collective rather than on the personal self (Abrams, 1999). 
Social Attraction 
A consequence of depersonalized perception of self and others are the positive 
feelings towards other in-group members, a phenomenon that Hogg and colleagues 
(e.g., Hogg, 1987; 1992; 1993; Hogg & Turner, 1985a; 1985b) dubbed social attraction: 
“a complex of positive feelings, a positive attitude, towards fellow group members, 
which is accentuated under circumstances that enhance one’s sense of belonging to the 
group” (Hogg, 1992, p. 100). 
 Social attraction and interpersonal attraction. Social attraction is different from 
interpersonal attraction, although both entail positive feelings towards other individuals. 
Personal attraction is specific of interpersonal relationships. It is a positive feeling 
generated by distinct personal traits and other personal characteristics that do not relate 
to any significant social category. In contrast, social attraction is a positive feeling that 
emerges among individuals that define themselves as members of the same group. In 
fact, as Hogg (1992) put it, social attraction “is actually attraction to the group as that 
group is embodied by specific group members, so that the object of positive attitude and 
feelings is not actually the unique individual person, but the prototype that s/he 
embodies.” (p. 100). As Hogg (1992) remarks, personal and social attraction may 
coexist. For instance, in small interactive groups (as groups of friends or work teams), 
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in which members interact repeatedly, people may feel attracted to each other based on 
common group membership and based on each other’s distinctive traits.  
Group cohesiveness. The above distinction is important to analyze group 
cohesiveness. Traditionally, group cohesiveness was measured by the number of 
friendships and other interpersonal relationships among members (e.g., Lott & Lott, 
1955; Festinger, Schachter & Back, 1950). In contrast, Hogg (e.g., 1987; 1992) argues 
that group cohesiveness is generated by attraction to the group as a whole, not by 
interpersonal attraction among members. Group cohesiveness is a group propriety, 
which is related with social identity. This view explains why large social groups as 
nations, parties or religious sects may also be evaluated in terms of cohesiveness.  
Empirical evidence. Hogg and Turner (1985a) provided empirical support for the 
distinction between interpersonal and social attraction. The authors categorized or not 
participants allegedly according to their similarity with other members in personality 
traits that were mostly attractive or unattractive. The results showed that, independently 
of the attractiveness of the traits that defined the groups, participants were more 
attracted to in-group than to out-group members. Most significantly, categorized 
participants considered themselves similar to in-group attractive members but not to 
equivalent out-group attractive members, whereas non-categorized participants 
considered themselves similar to both in-group and out-group attractive members (cf. 
also, Hogg, Cooper-Shaw & Holzworth, 1993; Hogg & Hardie, 991; Hogg, Hardie & 
Reynolds, 1995).  
In sum, social attraction is motivated by a salient common group membership 
leading to the depersonalized perception of self and others. People feel attracted to each 
other because they have a general feeling of sharing the same social and moral 
standards, the same assumptions about social reality, about the values that should rule 
one’s life, etc. Social attraction is thus an outcome of self-categorization and of 
depersonalized perception of self and others. We shall elaborate more on social 
attraction in Chapter 4 while addressing the issue of intragroup differentiation. 
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Motives for Self-Categorization 
What motives lead individuals to self-categorize? As seen above, individuals 
attempt to achieve positive social differentiation of the in-group as regards out-groups 
(Tajfel, 1978). Individuals strive for a clear perception of the in-group boundaries and 
for a positive intergroup comparison. The motives invoked for self-categorization are 
thus associated with the need for self-enhancement (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hogg 
& Abrams, 1990) and with the need for uncertainty reduction (e.g., Hogg & Abrams, 
1993; Hogg, 2000). Brewer (1991; 1993) proposes another relevant motive for self-
categorization the achievement of optimal distinctiveness. 
Self-esteem motive. The first hypothesis raised was the motivation for positive 
self-esteem. According to Abrams and Hogg (1988; Hogg & Abrams, 1990), the self-
esteem hypothesis has two corollaries: Low self-esteem can motivate people to identify 
with groups that raise self-esteem, or it can improve the evaluation of groups to which 
they belong. However, the relationship between self-esteem and self-categorization or 
social identification has proven difficult to establish empirically (Abrams & Hogg, 
1988; Hogg & Abrams, 1990, 1993). Social identification is only one of the ways in 
which positive self-esteem can be achieved and despite the attempts to operationalized 
self-esteem associated with the collective self separated from self-esteem associated 
with the personal self (e.g., Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990), it has been difficult to measure 
the distinct impact of collective self-esteem in self-categorization (e.g., Rubin & 
Hewstone, 1998). 
Uncertainty Reduction Motive 
The uncertainty reduction hypothesis refers to the epistemic need for perceptual 
clarity. This need refers to subjective certainty, about one’s perceptions and beliefs (cf. 
Festinger, 1950; 1954) and about one’s position in the social environment (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). Certainty about ourselves in each situation enables us to know how to 
think, feel and behave. According to the uncertainty-reduction model (Hogg, 2000; 
2001; Grieve & Hogg, 1999; Hogg & Mullin, 1999), self-categorization and 
depersonalization entails that “individuality and concomitant unshared cognitions, 
feelings, and behaviors are replaced by an in-group prototype that prescribes shared 
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cognitions, feelings, and behaviors” (p. 92). Through self-categorization, we become 
certain about our cognitions, feelings, and behaviors. 
Empirical evidence. As evidence for the uncertainty reduction hypothesis, 
Grieve and Hogg (1999) found that participants reported less uncertainty, than in the 
pre-test, when they were categorized into minimal groups and allocating points to in-
group and out-group members in Tajfel and colleagues’ (1971) matrices. Participants in 
the non-categorized condition did not show such uncertainty reduction (cf. also, Mullin 
& Hogg, 1998).  
Hogg and Mullin (1999) further manipulated uncertainty orthogonally to topic 
relevance and categorization. Specifically, participants were asked to give their opinion 
about topics highly relevant to the self such as, career, family and success, or low 
relevant to the self such as, using always the same toothpaste brand, and were given the 
idea that those opinions could be either more or less correct or subjective. The authors 
found higher in-group identification in high importance than low importance condition 
and more need for in-group validation of their opinions in high uncertainty than in low 
uncertainty conditions, particularly, in high importance conditions.  
Optimal Distinctiveness Motive 
Brewer (1991; 1993) proposes that individuals identify with groups because they 
wish to avoid isolation and stigmatization, and to maintain social ties with other 
individuals (the need for assimilation and belonging). However, they also wish to 
maintain some level of distinctiveness to avoid anonymity and depersonalization (the 
need for differentiation; e.g., Codol, 1984; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). The existence of 
these two opposed needs of self-assimilation to and differentiation from others 
determines that individuals will identify more with groups that satisfy both needs in 
simultaneous. Optimal social identity corresponds to a balance between inclusion and 
differentiation, where the need for assimilation is satisfied within the group, and the 
need for distinctiveness is satisfied through intergroup comparisons. A corollary of this 
hypothesis is that optimal distinctiveness is achieved in mid-size groups but not in large 
or in too small groups. As evidence for this idea, Lau (1989) obtained a U-shaped 
relationship between the demographic density of Black individuals in the United States, 
and their reported identification with the Black race. In parts of the country where the 
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number of Afro-Americans is very low, a raise of density is associated with an increase 
of identification. Conversely, where density of Afro-Americans is very high, the 
increase of density corresponds to a decrease of identification.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we briefly reviewed Social Identity Theory and Self-
Categorization Theory. Both theories issue from a metatheoretical background that 
stresses the social dimension of cognitive and emotional processes. A basic distinction 
is established between group and interpersonal behavior ensuing from social and 
personal identities, respectively.  
The categorized perception of the social environment, the comparisons between 
social categories, and the resulting evaluations and associated emotions are the 
underpinnings of social identities. Social identities are as important as personal 
identities in determining individuals’ attitudes, judgments, and behavior.  
Social identities, or social self-categories, are activated in a dynamic interaction 
between the individual’s and contextual characteristics. The self-concept is thus a 
flexible structure that shifts from personal to social self-categories. Depersonalization is 
the perceptual outcome of the shift to a social self-concept. This shift implicates that 
thinking, feeling, and judging are regulated against the defining standards and norms of 
the salient in-group, the group prototype. Social self-categorization implies that 
individuals are more attracted to in-group than to out-group members independently of 
their attractiveness at an interpersonal level. 
The motives for social identification are likely to be related to different 
individual needs, such as the need for a clear perception of reality and the reduction of 
uncertainty about it, the need for associated positive self-esteem and the balance 
between the needs for assimilation and individuality. 
The social identity approach, including Social Identity Theory and Self-
Categorization Theory, presents an alternative view on several phenomena, among 
which, group influence, the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
GROUP INFLUENCE AND CONFORMITY 
In this chapter, we shall focus first on early contributes and on the traditional 
approach to group influence. After a perspective on the metatheoretical underpinnings 
of the traditional approach, we shall focus on the social identity perspective on the 
topic.  
The literature on group influence has two major references: the studies of Sherif 
(1936) on the formation of social norms and Asch’s (1951) study on conformity. 
Festinger’s (1950) theory of Informal Social Communication is among the former 
attempts to theorize on group influence. These early references were the basis for 
Deutsch and Gerard’s (1955) distinction between informational and normative 
influences, an important model in the traditional literature on group influence. Two 
other fields of research are central in group influence literature: minority influence and 
group polarization. We shall begin by briefly reviewing these theories and research. 
Sherif’s (1936) Studies on the Formation of Norms  
In his studies, Sherif (1936) investigates the processes through which norms 
become an objective reference for individuals’ perceptions and judgments.  
“Once frames of reference are established and incorporated in the 
individual, they enter as important factors to determine or modify his reactions 
to the situations that he will face later – social, and even non social at times, 
especially if the stimulus field is not well structured.” (Sherif, 1936, p. 86) 
Sherif (1936) used the autokinetic effect, a perceptual illusion in which a 
stationary light appears to move erratically in the darkness. In this situation, there is no 
objective reference to estimate the light movement. In several sessions occurring in 
successive days, participants were asked to make, alone, an estimate of the movement 
from the point in which the light appeared to the point in which it disappeared. The 
results showed that participants developed a standard estimate, a personal norm, and 
that their subsequent judgments oscillated around this norm. As Sherif remarks, when 
no references are available to base their judgments, individuals establish their own 
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standards, “the general psychological tendency to experience things in relation to some 
frame of reference” (p. 81).  
In subsequent group sessions, participants made their judgments in groups of 
two or three. The results showed that participants’ estimates gradually converged to a 
common estimate, the group norm, in a process of reciprocal influence that evolved 
with the participants’ interactions. For the other half of participants, the order of 
sessions was reversed. First, they were included in groups and then, in subsequent 
sessions, they made their judgments alone. These participants quickly developed a 
group norm, which was kept, with negligible variations, in the subsequent individual 
sessions.  
Variations of the procedure. The variations to Sherif’s paradigmatic study are 
innumerous attempting to check several aspects of group influence. We shall mention 
only a few that are representative for the present purposes. For instance, Sherif (1936) 
asked a confederate to maintained his position in the exchange of estimates. Because of 
his reluctance to change, the other participants gradually converged to the confederate’s 
estimate indicating that the group norm is not the simple average of individuals’ 
personal norms. Other variations tested the endurance of the group norms. Rohrer, 
Baron, Hoffman and Swander (1954; see also Bovard, 1948) replicated Sherif’s (1936) 
procedure in two moments, the latter one year after the former. In the second moment, 
judgments were always made individually. The results showed that group norms had 
preponderance over personal norms on these later judgments. In another variation of the 
procedure, McNeil and Sherif (1976) showed that the persistence of a norm depends on 
its arbitrariness. In group sessions, participants made their estimates with three 
confederates that made either moderate or extreme estimates.  Participants in the 
extreme estimates condition, initially conformed to the group but gradually, abandoned 
the group norm, moderating their estimates.  
In sum, Sherif and colleagues’ studies revealed that social phenomena, such as 
norms, have characteristics of their own that cannot be explained by individual 
processes. Norms are the product of social interaction rather than the average of 
individual opinions. Some individual have more influence than others do; however to be 
influential, their opinions have to be considered acceptable by the group. Norms have 
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lasting effects on the members’ opinions because, as Sherif puts it, they “[…] have a 
reality of their own, independent of this or that individual member of society; and this 
immediate reality may be verified easily by the resistance one meets when he deviates 
considerably from the well-established norms of his time” (1936, p. 58).  
Asch’s (1951) Studies on Conformity 
In Asch’s (1951) experiments, participants were placed in a situation in which 
the group consensus differed from their own perceptions aiming to “study the social and 
personal conditions leading individuals to resist or submit to collective pressures when 
these are contrary to reality” (Asch, 1951, p. 231). Specifically, the group consisting of 
a naïve participant and seven confederates was instructed to compare a stimulus line 
with three other lines with different length in 18 trials. Only one line had the same 
length as the stimulus line. Participants were told to voice their judgments of which line 
of the set of three had the same length as the stimulus line, in order so that the naïve 
participant responded always in last. Confederates were instructed to emit unanimously 
erroneous judgments. Conformity was measured by the amount of participant’s 
incorrect judgments.  In the end of the session, participants were interviewed, checking 
on their opinion about the reasons for yielding or not to the group. In a control 
condition, participants made their judgments alone.  
The results showed that whereas in the control condition, participants gave, in 
average, less than one error in all trials, in the group condition, 32% of participants 
made judgments consistent with the majority’s erroneous judgments in half or more 
than half of trials. One fourth of participants made correct judgments in all trials.  
The post-hoc interviews revealed that participants conformed for different 
reasons. A small number of participants reported, what was called perceptive 
deformation, i.e., they perceived the group’s consensus as correct. The majority of 
conformers reported lack of confidence on their own judgments as regards the group 
consensus (judgment deformation). The remaining conformers reported that they were 
conscious that they were responding erroneously but could not bear to appear different 
from the group (action deformation). 
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Experimental variations. Asch (1956) conducted several variations concerning 
the support to non-conformity. In one case, the author instructed one confederate placed 
in the fourth position of the group to respond always correctly. The frequency of errors 
decreased to 5.5%. In another variation, one confederate was instructed to respond first 
correctly and, in the middle of the session, to join the group consensus. The errors’ 
proportion rose to 28.5%. In a third variation, a confederate was instructed to leave the 
majority, near the end of the experiment, and start making correct judgments. 
Conformity decreased to 8.7%. In a fourth variation, one confederate was instructed to 
respond in an intermediate point between the majority’s judgments and correct 
judgments. Errors’ frequency decreased and most errors were moderate. In another 
condition of the experiment, in which confederates made extreme errors unanimously, 
most errors were extreme.  
Asch (1956) also varied the size of the majority to 2, 3, 4, 8, 16 confederates. 
With two confederates, conformity rises to 12.8%. Majorities of 4, 8 and 16 did not 
induce conformity more than a majority of 3. In another variation, conditions were 
reversed. With one confederate only, conformity is negligible. One confederate was 
instructed to give extreme errors in a majority of 16 naïve participants. The majority 
rejected and mocked at his responses. 
Asch’s (1951) seminal study is paradigmatic in conformity research and 
originated innumerous variations. The reinterpretation of the results (cf. Moscovici & 
Faucheux, 1972) originated another line of research, minority influence, which we shall 
address below in the text.  
Theory of Informal Social Communication 
Festinger’s (1950) theory of Informal Social Communication is a leading theory 
of group influence and an important reference of the traditional approach. The theory 
focuses on the pressures the group exerts on its members towards uniformity of 
opinions within the group. Pressures towards uniformity have two functions: to 
ascertain social reality and to facilitate group locomotion.  
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Social Reality 
Festinger (1950) claims that individuals search validity for their opinions, beliefs 
and attitudes. Subjective validity, that is, confidence in one’s opinions, beliefs and 
attitudes, is obtained in different ways depending on the reality about which they are 
formed. The author proposes a continuum of opinions and beliefs varying from 
complete to none dependence on others. In the physical reality pole of the continuum, 
beliefs are validated by individuals’ own means and they are not subject to social 
influence. On the social reality pole of the continuum, the subjective validity of beliefs, 
attitudes or opinions is dependent on the agreement with others: “An opinion, a belief, 
an attitude is ‘correct’, ‘valid’, and ‘proper’ to the extent that it is anchored in a group of 
people with similar beliefs, opinions and attitudes” (Festinger, 1950, p. 119).  
There are two fundamental aspects in Festinger’s (1950) theory, concerning the 
function of groups in the validation of social reality. First, the validation of beliefs on 
social reality is obtained only among similar individuals, the individual’s reference 
group: “It is clearly not necessary for the validity of someone’s opinion that everyone 
else in the world think the way he does. It is only necessary that the members of that 
group to which he refers this opinion or attitude think the way he does.” (pp. 119-120). 
Second, the dependence on the group decreases as the possibility of the physical reality 
test increases. The more tests of physical reality the individual can make, the less 
important is the agreement with similar others to validate beliefs. 
Group Locomotion 
Festinger (1950) hypothesizes that the pressures towards uniformity operate 
similarly, independent of their origin: social reality or group locomotion. The function 
of group locomotion refers to the idea that pressures towards uniformity are motivated 
by the perception that uniformity is indispensable for the group to achieve some goal 
(group locomotion means the group movement towards some goal). The author 
hypothesizes that the magnitude of group pressures increases as the members (a) 
consider that the movement of the group will be facilitated by uniformity and that (b) 
they are interdependent to reach that goal. 
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The Achievement of Uniformity 
Festinger (1950) considers that uniformity may be achieved by three ways: the 
change of the deviant’s opinion, the change of the group’s opinion, and the rejection of 
the deviant. However, the theory concerns mainly the achievement of group consensus 
through the coercion exerted on deviants to achieve uniformity of opinions. Pressures 
towards uniformity increase with (1) the degree of discrepancy or disagreement within 
the group, (2) the degree of relevance of the discrepancy to the functioning of the group, 
and (3) the group cohesiveness. The latter is an essential aspect of Festinger’s (1950) 
theory of group influence. The author hypothesizes that the higher conformity found in 
cohesive groups relatively to non-cohesive groups is the result of stronger pressures to 
uniformity. In their field study, Festinger, Schachter and Back (1950) obtained 
supporting evidence for this assumption. The authors measured the cohesiveness of 
each building occupants and their agreement with a recently formed local Association. 
Each occupant was questioned about the three persons with whom s/he had more 
contact. This information was used to make a cohesiveness index of each building, that 
is, the attraction to members of their own building was compared with the attraction to 
members of other buildings. The attitudes towards the Association were relatively 
homogeneous within each building but differed between buildings. The results showed 
a close relationship between the building’s cohesiveness and the favorability towards 
the Association. The authors also measured the proportion of deviant members defined 
as occupants that did not participated in the building collective activities and had 
negative attitudes towards the Association. The cohesiveness index was negatively 
correlated with the proportion of deviants.  
Back (1951) established the causal relationship between conformity to the group 
norm and group cohesiveness by manipulating the latter variable in laboratory groups. 
The author told pairs of unacquainted participants that they had been competent or non-
competent in the performance of a previous task, that they would receive or not a bonus 
for a good story, or that they were similar to or dissimilar from each other, to induce 
pairs’ cohesiveness or non-cohesiveness, respectively, by three different means. Before 
forming the pairs, each participant had written a story about three characters that, 
without participants’ knowledge, varied slightly between participants. The pairs then 
compared and discussed their stories and finally wrote their final version. The influence 
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within the pairs was measured by the amount of verbal interaction and by the changes 
from the first to the final version of the stories. The results showed that there were more 
mutual influences and changes on their initial stories in cohesive than in non-cohesive 
pairs. Members of non-cohesive pairs resisted more to partners’ attempt of influence. 
The three forms of inducing cohesiveness did not produced significantly different 
results but led to slightly different patterns of interaction. 
Moscovici’s (1976) critical analysis. Several of Festinger’s (1950) postulates 
were later questioned. For instance, Moscovici (1976; cf. also, Turner, 1991) argues that 
the distinction between two realities, physical and social, entails the assumption that the 
individual means to obtain subjective validity has the preponderance over the social 
means; other’s opinions are but a substitute to apprehend reality when individual means 
fail. The notion of social reality also conveys the idea that individuals depend on groups 
to validate their beliefs. The idea of informational dependence (see also, Jones & 
Gerard, 1967), drawing a clear distinction between two entities, individuals and groups, 
reinforces the individualistic standpoint of the theory (cf. also Turner, 1991, for a 
similar analysis). Moscovici (1976) also remarks that social influence, conceived as 
pressures on deviants towards the group opinion, conveys the idea that the sole goal of 
social influence is to reinforce the majority beliefs. As seen below, the author argues 
that social influence, when exerted by minorities, may also function as a mechanism of 
social innovation.  
We briefly reviewed Sherif’s (1936), Asch’s (1951) pioneering experiments and 
Festinger’s (1950) theory of group influence. We shall now review Deutsch and 
Gerard’s (1955) model, which provided the conceptual bases for the traditional 
distinction between components or forms of group influence. 
The Distinction between Normative and Informational Influences 
An influential development in the theory of group influence was Deutsch and 
Gerard’s (1955) model. The authors distinguish two forms of group influence, 
informational and normative influences. According to the authors, despite their co-
occurrence, the two forms are conceptually separable. For instance, the influence 
operating in Sherif’s (1936) experiments is essentially of the informational kind, 
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whereas the influence operating in Asch’s (1951) experiments is essential of the 
normative kind. 
Normative influence is defined as the result of the tendency to conform to the 
others’ expectations. Conforming to others’ expectations induces others to feel 
positively about us. In this process, conformity is motivated by the desire to please 
others, to gain social approval and avoid rejection. It is the type of conformity more 
associated with groups. It increases with the interdependence of members to achieve 
some common goal and with others’ surveillance.   
Informational influence occurs when it is considered evidence about objective 
reality. Individuals use others as a measuring tool that produces reliable information 
about reality (similar to Festinger’s test of social reality). In this process, the motivation 
is to form an accurate view about reality and to act effectively. Conformity increases 
with uncertainty about one’s ability to perceive correctly the stimulus or with the 
ambiguity of the stimulus per se. Opposite to normative influence, it has private 
acceptance and is internalized. In Deutsch & Gerard’s (1955) model, informational 
influence is considered the true influence. 
Deutsch and Gerard’s (1955) Experiment  
To test their theoretical distinction, Deutsch and Gerard (1955) designed a series 
of variations to the Asch’s (1951) experimental paradigm. The first hypothesis was that 
conformity would increase when participants strove for a common goal in competition 
with other groups (group condition), as compared to when there were no common goal 
and competition context (non-group condition). The second hypothesis was that 
conformity would increase when three confederates were present (public condition), as 
compared to when participants were isolated (anonymous condition). The third 
hypothesis was that conformity would increase when the stimulus lines were removed 
before the presentation of the critical line (memory condition), as compared to when 
stimulus and critical line were presented in simultaneous (visual condition).  
The results confirmed the hypotheses. The group vs. non-group result was 
attributed to the fact that a common goal enhances the cohesiveness of the group and 
consequently increases the importance of the individual’s association with the group. 
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The public vs. anonymous result was attributed to the physical presence of other 
respondents in public conditions acting as a pressure to conform. The third memory vs. 
visual result was explained by uncertainty. In the two former results, normative 
influences predominated whereas in the latter result, informational influence 
predominated.   
Limitations of the experiment. As Turner (1991) points out, the evidence 
obtained by Deutsch and Gerard (1955) do not actually support the assumptions of their 
model. What is obtained is more or less conformity to group consensus but there is no 
evidence for the underlying motivations or the kind of conformity produced in the 
different contexts. For instance, the model assumes that in public and group contexts 
individuals conform because they are motivated to meet others’ expectations whereas in 
uncertain contexts they conform because they are motivated to achieve certainty. 
However, the results do not inform about the underlying motivations of the participants. 
The model also assumes that conformity in group or in public contexts is temporary 
whereas conformity under uncertainty has a more lasting effect. However, results do not 
inform about the different impact of the group in these conditions.  
Furthermore, some of the results are inconsistent with the model. For instance, 
the results showing that the difference between errors in the memory and in the visual 
condition increased from the group to the aggregate conditions, even if responding 
anonymously, indicates that normative influences were also operative when the 
participants were highly uncertain about the stimuli and even if they did not feel the 
pressures of the group. Deutsch and Gerard (1955) also found that the error rate of 
participants in their anonymous condition was higher than the error rate of participants 
in a control condition, in which participants did not previously hear the confederates’ 
incorrect consensus. This result suggests that participants privately accepted the group’s 
information even when this information was incorrect. This result emerged even though 
no additional information was presented that could enhance the credibility of the 
confederates beside the one spontaneously ascribed to them by participants. These 
aspects reveal the inconsistencies between the model proposed and the evidence 
presented. 
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Minority Influence 
Another influential theory of group influence was that of minority influence. The 
minority influence theory (cf. Moscovici, 1976) challenged the dominant views on 
group influence. According to the dominant model, represented on Asch’s (1951) 
experimental paradigm and Festinger’s (1950) theory, individuals tend to conform to 
majorities, which provide large consensus and reduce uncertainty. This notion entails 
that the function of group norms is primarily the maintenance of the status quo. 
Minority influence research showed that the influence of groups is also responsible for 
social change.  
According to the theory of minority influence, whereas the influence of majority 
affects only public behavior, dubbed direct influence or compliance, the influence of 
minorities affects individuals’ core beliefs more deeply, extending its effect to private 
thoughts, a form influence dubbed indirect influence or conversion (e.g., Moscovici, 
1980; 1985). In their classic experiment, Moscovici, Lage and Naffrechoux (1969) 
provided evidence for this distinction. The authors asked participants to judge the color 
of a series of slides showing disks of blue color. Participants were included in groups of 
six with two confederates that, on the critical trials, consistently named “green” the 
color of the disks. Results show that, contrary to the control group where only 0.25% of 
the responses were “green” (only one in average), in the experimental group, 8.42 % of 
the responses were green (more than four responses in average). About one third of the 
participants changed their responses in nearly half of the groups, suggesting that the 
proportion of individuals influenced by minorities is similar to that of majorities (cf. 
Asch, 1951).  
However, the above results represented the direct influence of the minority. To 
assess its indirect influence, Moscovici, Lage and Naffrechoux (1969) used an indirect 
method in the second part of their experiment. In a allegedly different experiment, 
participants were asked to repeatedly judge in private the green or blue color of color 
disks ranging from clearly blue to clearly green. Given that the judgmental task was 
related but not the same as the task where influence was exerted, the effects on the 
responses could be attributed to indirect influence. The results showed that the threshold 
of green color perception was higher in the experimental than in the control group. That 
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is, participants that were exposed to the minority opinion were more likely to name 
green the intermediary blue-green disks than participants that were not exposed to the 
minority opinion. Moreover, participants that did not yield to the minority’s direct 
influence were more likely to yield to its indirect influence than those that had yielded 
to the minority’s direct influence.  
Minority influence: Normative or informational? The theory is not clear on 
whether minority influence entails normative or informational influence. For instance, 
Mugny and Papastamou (1980) presented evidence for the idea that when the majority 
members’ attention is focused on the (minority) source’s characteristics, influence 
decreases as regards to when they are focused only in their arguments. In addition, 
evidence suggests that consistent minorities exert more influence than inconsistent 
minorities (e.g., Mugny, 1982). As Maass and Clark (1984) argue, consistent positions 
are associated with informational influence because they convey the impression of 
confidence and certainty leading to the attributions of credibility and competence to the 
source. Together, these results indicate that minorities exert mainly informational 
influence. 
However, other research shows that the perception of minority as holding 
idiosyncratic opinions decreases substantially their persuasiveness (cf. Papastamou, 
1986; Moscovici & Lage, 1976). These results indicate that minority influence depends 
also on the perception of a consensual point of view, and consequently, of a normative 
opinion (cf. Mugny & Pérez, 1991). As Moscovici (1976) put it, minority voices “call 
attention to the existence of a coherent point of view, to something powerful and, of 
course, to a norm. In a word, it forcefully indicates the nomic quality of an individual or 
group” (p. 139).  
The processing of indirect influence. According to the theory (cf. Moscovici & 
Personnaz, 1991), minorities’ indirect influence results from a combination of 
systematic information processing and unintentional acceptance. Whereas majorities’ 
sources are, from the outset, validated by consensus and do not motivate a systematic 
analysis of their arguments and opinions, minorities, because they do not benefit from 
consensual validation, induce a thorough analysis of the message content. According to 
Moscovici and Personnaz (1991), the cognitive conflict generated by the influential 
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message, is solved differently depending on whether the source is a majority or a 
minority. In the case of a majority source, individuals solve the conflict immediately by 
complying with the source. When the source is a minority, no such solution is available 
because the source has no normative impact over receivers. Consequently, individuals 
feel uncertain and unable to decide whether to yield or not to the source. According to 
the authors, the conflict is solved unconsciously by adopting the source’s opinion. As 
Moscovici (1980) put it,  
“The more intense the pressure, the greater the effects obtained [by the 
majority] on the direct, overt level, in short, on the level of the most superficial 
acceptance, and [by the minority] on the indirect, latent level, leading on the 
whole to an acceptance that may be so deep that the subject is not even aware of 
it.” (p. 216) 
Tests to the Conversion Model 
The assumptions about the difference nature of minority influence as regards 
majority influence have not obtained consistent empirical support (e.g., Doms & van 
Avermaet, 1980; 1985; Kruglansky & Mackie, 1990; Mackie, 1987; Martin, 1995, 
1998; Sorrentino, King & Leo, 1980; Wolf, 1985). Both majorities and minorities seem 
to be able, in certain circumstances, to exert their influence through normative and 
informational influences. In fact, several models emphasize the similarities rather than 
the differences between minority and majority influences and reject the idea of two 
modes of processing group influence (cf. Latané & Wolf, 1981; Tanford & Penrod, 
1984; Kruglansky & Mackie, 1990). Recently, Wood, Lundgren, Ouellete, Busceme 
and Blackstone (1994) used different methods to meta-analyze minority vs. majority 
studies, including direct and indirect methods of assessing private acceptance. The 
authors concluded that whereas according to some methods, majority and minority 
sources generated approximately the same amount of private indirect change, with other 
methods of analysis, minority influence generated substantially more private indirect 
change than majority influence, suggesting that the effect “proved fragile and easily 
muted by a variety of not well-understood moderating factors” (Wood et al, 1994, 
p.336).  
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Despite the above-mentioned theoretical problems, research on minority 
influence showed that the influence of groups is more complex than was traditionally 
depicted (cf. Levine, 1980; Wood, 1999). It challenged the traditional assumption that 
individuals are motivated to reduce uncertainty about reality at all costs even if pressing 
deviant members towards the group consensus (Festinger, 1950).  
Another phenomenon associated with the influence of groups is group 
polarization. Consistent with the distinction between two processes of group influence, 
the traditional explanations of group polarization emphasize either the normative or the 
informational aspects of conformity. 
Group Polarization 
Group polarization can be defined as the tendency for group discussion to 
strengthen the prevailing response tendency within a group. More precisely, if we 
compare individuals’ opinions after group discussion to their opinions before group 
discussion, “the average postgroup response will tend to be more extreme in the same 
direction as the average of the pregroup responses” (Myers & Lamm, 1976, p. 603). 
Polarization increases when there is a need for the group to reach a consensus, as 
compared to when there is no need for consensus, and to when people are merely 
exposed to others’ opinions. The magnitude of polarization is negligible when there is 
no initial dominant position, i.e., when the average opinion is neither negative nor 
positive. As such, the direction and magnitude of the shift may be predicted by the 
prediscussion average. In any case, the prediscussion and postdiscussion average 
opinions are generally highly correlated (cf. Myers, 1982).  
Value theory. One of the traditional explanations of group polarization, called 
value theory (cf. Turner, 1991), emphasizes the social value ascribed to one pole over 
the other, so that people polarize in the more socially desirable direction. For instance, 
Baron and Roper (1976), in an experiment using Sherif’s (1936) paradigm, found larger 
estimations when the experimenter previously defined large estimations as a sign of 
intelligence. The model stresses the social comparison nature of group polarization. 
Individuals adopt moderate initial opinions because they underestimate the positions of 
other members of the group. After finding that others hold more extreme positions than 
their own, they polarize in order to recover their personal self-esteem.  
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Persuasive arguments theory. Another model of group polarization, the 
persuasive arguments theory, explains the phenomenon through informational processes 
(e.g., Burnstein & Vinokur, 1973; 1975; 1977). The basic assumption is that when 
asked to express their opinion in some issue, individuals draw on pro and con 
arguments to form their opinion. Pro and con arguments derive from a cultural pool 
shared by most individuals. The more arguments favor one direction, the more opinions 
shift in that direction. Group discussion results in extreme opinions because individuals 
exchange their respective arguments and reinforce the validity of their initial opinions. 
For instance, Burnstein and Vinokur (1975) found that individuals polarized only when 
they had not been experimentally distracted and could think on others’ arguments. The 
authors argue that distraction prevented the possibility of considering the new 
arguments as a reinforcement of their initial position. The model also focus on the 
persuasive characteristics of the arguments - the more the arguments are original, 
consistent and valid, the larger the polarization they produce.  
Problems in the traditional approaches. Both models of group polarization have 
not obtained clear empirical support. The two alternative explanations of the 
phenomenon have invalidated each other because evidence for one model generally 
invalidates the other model. For instance, Burnstein and Vinokur (1973) obtained 
polarization in a situation where social comparison was prevented: participants 
polarized after arguing, by request of the experimenter, against their own initial 
positions. Also, merely reading the arguments substituted group discussion in polarizing 
participants’ initial positions. In turn, Blascovich, Ginsburg and Veach (1975) showed 
that the exchange of arguments is not necessary for group polarization. The authors 
asked participants to make 20 successive bets of blackjack, alone or in group. In the 
group condition, they could discuss or not discuss the bets after each hand. There was a 
shift to riskier bets in the group relative to the individual conditions, but the extent of 
the risk was not higher from the discussion to the non-discussion condition. Group 
discussion added nothing to the comparison between own and others bets.  
Theoretical critiques. The two models have also been contested in theoretical 
grounds. In what regards value theory, one problem is that polarization is considered an 
individual strategy of self-presentation and the interactive context of the group is not 
accounted for. As Whetherell (1987) contends, the ascription of one of the two opposed 
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positions is seen as issuing from abstract social values rather than an emergent norm of 
the group. In what regards persuasive arguments theory, the assumptions about 
arguments’ persuasiveness are conceptually biased. Persuasiveness is defined as an 
inherent quality of the arguments rather than an attribute obtained in the context of the 
group. As Whetherell (1987) remarks, “Properties of arguments such as validity, 
triviality, or even originality do not exist in the abstract […] A message from a group 
one supports and identifies with will be perceived quite differently than similar 
messages from a rival out-group to which one is strongly opposed” (p. 148).  
The explanations of group polarization are centered either in individual 
strategies to convey a positive self-image or in the informational influence of others in 
reinforcing a personal opinion. However, the group context in which polarization occurs 
is never accounted for in these explanations. Moreover, the evidence presented suggests 
the operation of a single process of influence encompassing social comparison and 
informational aspects. 
We shall now focus on commonalties of the above reviewed perspectives on 
group influence, and address some of the limitations of the traditional approach as a 
whole. 
The Traditional Model of Social Influence 
As seen above, the distinction of different forms of group influence has been a 
prevailing tendency in traditional research (e.g., Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Wood, 1999). 
This tendency is visible in the explanation of conformity, minority influence or group  
polarization phenomena. Turner (1991) dubbed this theoretical tradition, ‘the dual-
process model’2.  
The dual-process model. Deutsch and Gerard (1955) distinction between 
processes of conformity is paradigmatic of the dual-process model. In their model, 
 
2 The dual-process model is congruent with other theories: Kelley’s (1952) distinction between the 
comparative and normative functions of reference groups; Thibaut and Strickland’s (1956) distinction 
between task set where others’ are ‘mediators of fact’ and group set where the individual is motivated to 
achieve and maintain membership; Jones and Gerard’s (1967) distinction between informational 
dependence leading to comparative appraisal (i.e., self-evaluation through comparison with others), and 
outcome dependence leading to reflected appraisal (i.e., inferences about others evaluate the self based on 
their reactions). 
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informational influence is considered true influence leading to private acceptance and 
internalization, and to lasting opinion and attitude change. This influence is 
informational in essence: messages are influential to the extent that they provide 
evidence on reality; the others are informative to the extent that they are reliable and 
credible sources; the underlying motive is the desire to be correct and attain subjective 
validity to beliefs. 
The process has the following causal structure: the ambiguous nature of the 
stimulus makes it difficult to do direct tests to physical reality leading to subjective 
uncertainty; uncertainty generates dependence on others to obtain valid information; 
informational dependence causes receptiveness to influence, people conform to other’s 
opinions considered as evidence about reality (e.g., Festinger, 1950; Jones & Gerard, 
1967). The classic examples are Sherif’s (1936) studies. These studies represent the 
typical situation of informational influence leading to internalization (cf. Allen, 1965). 
Normative influence corresponds to the type of influence, in which individuals 
conform in appearance, but not necessarily in private, to others’ expectations. It is, 
specifically, a group process, of conformity to social pressures, based on others’ power 
to reward and punish. It is motivated by a desire of acceptance and approval. The 
individual is more concerned with the consequences of their actions in terms of how the 
group will react, than with the content of the action per se; it is ‘conformity’ in the sense 
of submission to the group pressure but, in essence, it is tactic and instrumental more 
than irrational and emotional  (e.g., Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Thibault & Strickland, 
1956). Some specific ‘conformers’ may have an irrational and emotional urge to belong, 
but in general, group attraction is based on interdependence to achieve shared goals. 
Conformity is assumed functional for the group to achieve its goals.  
The causal structure initiates in others’ power to reward and punish (for instance, 
accepting or rejecting the individual in the group), which generates the need of social 
approval and the fear to be different; therefore, under conditions of surveillance, in 
which, one may be identified and being held liable for non-conformity, the individual 
tends to meet the expectations, producing conformity to the group norm; dependence on 
others, gives them the power to control the individual’s public behavior (e.g., Jones & 
Gerard, 1967; Kelman, 1958). The base of influence is not the need to validate beliefs, 
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but a social relation of power and the need to be socially accepted. The classic example 
is Asch’s (1951) conformity paradigm, in which participants give erroneous responses 
in order to agree with the group.  
Multi-process models. The dual-process model expands to three or more 
components. Kelman (1958) distinguishes three influence processes: compliance, which 
is based on others’ power to mediate rewards and costs; identification, which is based in 
attraction to others and may lead to acceptance of others’ values, provided the 
relationship is maintained; internalization, which corresponds to informational 
influence of the dual-process model. French and Raven (1959) distinguish five 
influence processes, reflecting different forms of dependence and power: power to 
reward (capacity to mediate the distribution of positive and negative outcomes), 
coercive power (capacity to apply punishments to those that not obey to requirements), 
reference power (influence based in identification, attraction or respect for the power 
holder), expert power (power deriving from the assumption that the power holder 
possesses superior capacity and knowledge) and legitimate power (authority deriving 
from the power holder legitimate right to demand obedience).  
The differences between dual-process and multi-process models relate to the 
degree of specification of the types of dependence and to the characteristics of the 
influence process rather than to the conception of influence. All models see influence as 
a process involving power and dependence and all models make distinctions between 
normative and informational processes. The general tendency is to distinguish between 
strictly social (normative) and cognitive (informational) motives.  
Objections to the Traditional Model of Influence 
Normative and informational processes are rarely separable in empirical results. 
Several variables, such as, group interdependence, cohesiveness, and unanimity, exert 
their effects in conformity by both processes. The first type of objections to the 
traditional model is metatheoretical. The distinction between ‘normative’ and 
‘informational’ influences, is individualistic by nature because it tends to equate the 
former as group pressure, compliance or non-informative conformity (a passive and 
irrational process) and implies a continuous ‘conformity conflict’ between the (correct) 
individual and the (incorrect) group (cf. Turner, 1991). Informational influence, similar 
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to Festinger’s (1950) test of social reality, is seen as a secondary process, a surrogate to 
individual tests to reality. Contrarily to Sherif’s (1936) approach, influence is not seen 
as a group process, but the average of individual movements to each other, in the 
exchange of their private knowledge. In sum, individual perception is seen as primary, 
valid, and normal, whereas social influence is indirect, coercive and useful only when 
the former fails. 
Second, for Turner (1991), the model has failed in (1) dealing with minority 
influence, (2) providing a simple explanation to group polarization, and (3) accounting 
for some results of Asch’s (1951) paradigm of conformity. 
On the first aspect, the traditional model bases on the principle that influence 
was always exerted by the majority. For Moscovici & Faucheux (1972; cf. also, 
Moscovici, 1976), the traditional model suffers from a conformist bias adopting the 
majority point of view, and assuming that all conformity implies conformity or 
deviance. The function of social influence is to shape the individual to the social 
system, to its roles and norms. This model is unable to explain social change and the 
influence of marginal groups, subversive elites or oppressed minorities.  
As for the second aspect, the traditional conception of group norm as the average 
of the individual opinions is irreconcilable with the phenomenon of group polarization. 
Indeed, evidence consistently shows that the group norm is often more extreme than the 
average of individual opinions in the same direction (Myers & Lamm, 1976). To 
explain the phenomenon, traditional theories have argued either for the existence of 
socially valued positions (e.g., Baron & Roper, 1976), or for the existence of a cultural 
pool of pro and con arguments (e.g., Burnstein & Vinokur, 1977). However, none of the 
two models is able to account for the phenomenon in all its dimensions.  
Finally, concerning the third objection, Turner (1991) considers that Asch’s 
(1951) paradigm refutes the hypothesis that subjective uncertainty reflects the 
ambiguity of stimuli. As the author argues, uncertainty arises from disagreement, or 
anticipated disagreement, with similar others (cf. also Moscovici, 1976). Stimulus 
ambiguity produces subjective uncertainty, which leads to informational dependence 
from others, to mutual influence and to the formation of shared norms. Perceptual 
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ambiguity originates uncertainty to the extent that individuals expect similar others to 
perceive a stimulus as ambiguous as they do.  
The Social Identity Approach to Social Influence 
The concept of self-categorization allows a more simple and holistic explanation 
of social influence phenomena, such as conformity, minority influence and polarization. 
The Self-Categorization Theory approach to social influence phenomena is based on the 
idea that social interaction induces the formation of psychological groups. 
Psychological group formation. For Self-Categorization Theory, the shift to a 
categorized perception of the social environment corresponds to the formation of 
psychological groups (cf. Turner, 1984). In the process of group formation, individuals 
change from personal to group behavior and relate to others not as unique individuals 
but as in-group or out-group members. Psychological group formation is in the origin of 
social relations rather than its consequence. Groups may emerge from social 
interactions but, this is not a necessary condition and in some circumstances, it may 
even not be sufficient (cf. Turner, 1984). In a social categorization perspective, the 
group is defined as “a collection of people that share the same social identification or 
define themselves in terms of the same social category membership” (Turner, 1984, p. 
530). This definition applies to small, interactive groups of friends or work teams, as 
well as to large social categories such as nationalities, races, gender and age groups. 
Referent Informational Influence 
Self-categorization is the basic process of conformity and other social influence 
phenomena (cf. Turner, 1987; Hogg & Turner, 1987). Perceiving the self and others as 
members of their respective categories implies thinking and action in accordance with 
the attributes associated with the category. In Self-Categorization Theory, categories’ 
attributes correspond to group norms in the same way as to perceive oneself as 
embodying the categories’ attributes is equivalent to perceive oneself as a normative 
member of the in-group (cf. Hogg & Turner, 1987). This process is dubbed Referent 
Informational Influence and is described in three stages (cf. also Turner, 1982):  
“First, individuals categorize and define themselves as members of a 
distinct social category or assign themselves a social identity; second, they form 
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or learn the stereotypic norms of that category. They ascertain that certain ways 
of behaving, perceiving and believing are criterial attributes of category 
membership; that certain appropriate, expected or desirable behaviors are used to 
define the category as distinct from other categories, and, finally, they assign 
these norms to themselves and thus their behavior becomes more normative 
(conformist) as their category membership becomes salient.” (Hogg & Turner, 
1987, p. 149) 
The theory’s central assumption is that agreement with identical others in 
relevant aspects in a given situation creates subjective validity, 
“Subjective validity (Festinger, 1950; Kelley, 1967), one’s confidence in 
the objective validity of one’s opinions, attitudes, beliefs, etc. (also termed 
subjective certainty, competence, correctness, etc.) is a direct function of the 
extent to which similar people (in relevant aspects) in the same stimulus 
situation are perceived, expected, or believed to agree with one’s own response.” 
(Turner, 1987, p. 73) 
Conversely, subjective uncertainty “is a direct function of the extent to which 
similar others are not perceived, expected, or believed to respond similarly to oneself in 
the same stimulus situation” (Turner, 1987, p. 73). Through consensual validation, 
uncertainty about reality is reduced (cf. McGarty, Turner, Oakes & Haslam, 1993). 
Moreover, consensus tends to lead to external attributions and to the reification of 
beliefs (Kelley, 1967; cf. also, Asch, 1952; Moscovici, 1976; Sherif, 1936). As Hogg 
and Turner (1987) put it, “social consensus or agreement leads to the external 
attribution of the shared response – that is, it is perceived to reflect some external public 
invariance in the object of perception and is thus perceived to be ‘objectively’ valid, 
correct, appropriate, required, demanded, etc.” (p. 149). 
Conformity as Assimilation to In-Group Representations 
Referent Informational Influence refers to conformity to a representation of the 
in-group rather than to actual behavior of in-group members.  
“While overt behavior provides cues concerning the normative tendency 
of a group or social category, the self-categorization process ensures that what 
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one conforms to is a cognitive representation of the in-group norm, not 
necessarily the overt behavior of in-group members.” (Hogg & Turner, 1987, p. 
150) 
Hogg and Turner (1987) examined the above idea adapting the procedure 
designed by Asch (1951). In their experiment, the stimuli were not lines whose relative 
length had to be judged but personality traits to be judged on social approval scales. In 
addition, participants were previously categorized into two groups purportedly based on 
similarity of answers to a previous test. Participants were informed that their group’s 
judgments of the traits tended to the ‘social approval’ half of the scale, whereas the out-
group tended to the ‘social disapproval’ half of the scale. This information intended to 
generate a distinctive group norm based on the participants’ natural position because all 
stimuli traits were socially approved, as determined by a pre-test. Finally, participants 
were informed that they were answering together with four other individuals belonging 
either to the in-group or to the out-group depending on the conditions. Participants were 
isolated from the other members communicating (or not) with each other via the 
experimenter.  
There were 12 trials in alternated public and private responses, i.e., participants 
heard the other participants’ responses and thought their own was conveyed to them, in 
public trials, or did not receive feedback from the other participants and merely wrote 
down their own response, in private trials. Furthermore, the feedback of others in public 
trials was for half of the subjects consistent with the groups’ norm (i.e., social approval 
in the in-group and social disapproval in the out-group), or inconsistent (i.e., social 
disapproval in the in-group and social approval in the out-group). The results showed 
that, in consistent conditions, participants’ private judgments tended more to the social 
approval end of the scale when the source was the in-group than when it was the out-
group. This result suggests that whereas in-group sources affect individuals’ private 
opinions and judgments, out-group sources do not have such an effect. As Hogg and 
Turner (1987) put it, “the categorization of the self and others as identical, in the context 
of a stimulus situation which is perceived to be shared or identical, is precondition for 
effective social influence.” (p. 148). 
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Prototypicality and influence. The idea that conformity is conformity to a 
representation of the group and not necessarily to group members’ overt behavior 
implies that the more in-group members are representative the more they are influential 
(cf. below, Hogg, 2001a; van Knippenberg, Lossie & Wilke, 1994; van Knippenberg & 
Wilke, 1992).  
“The behavior of this individual or subgroup (the prototype) is by 
definition the most ‘informative’ in the double sense of both conveying the 
relevant or appropriate in-group norms, and thus confirming the valid, correct, 
appropriate behavior. The fundamental point is that information is persuasive 
(creates conformity) by virtue of being normative – the yardstick of valid and 
correct perception, judgment, opinion, etc.” (Hogg & Turner, 1987, p. 150) 
The influence of prototypical in-group members is based on the group distinct 
position that they stand for, close to other in-group members and distant from out-group 
members. Their influence, as prototypical members, thus entails an extremization of 
other members’ opinions.  
Informational and Normative Nature of Group Influence 
The theory rejects the traditional distinction between normative and 
informational influences. Reality is socially constructed so that any information is, 
above all, intrinsically normative. In-group’s norms, beliefs, points of view, etc. are 
simultaneously normative and informative because its influence is mediated by 
perceptions of adequacy and correction. 
“The theory explains the ‘informational value’ of a response (not the 
direct informational content but the degree to which that content is perceived to 
provide evidence about is attributed to reality, i.e., its perceived validity or 
correctness) as a direct reflection of the degree to which it is prototypical of an 
in-group consensus (i.e., a norm) and the subjectively ‘normative’ aspect of a 
response, the feeling that one ought to so act, as deriving from its perceived 
correctness.” (Turner, 1987, p. 76) 
A message is ascribed informational credit only when receiver and source 
perceive the situation similarly.  
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“What is perceived as evidence about reality, as having informational 
value, is a function of the shared in-group norm, of the degree to which some 
response is attributed externally to an entity. In-group norms are assumed to be 
subjectively prescriptive, producive of the feeling that one ought to see, think, or 
act in a certain way, because they provide information that particular responses 
are valid and appropriate. The informational value/validity of a response and the 
degree to which it is in-group normative /consensual are hypothesized to be 
subjectively equivalent.” (Turner & Oakes, 1989, p. 254) 
Social Influence Phenomena from a Social Identity Perspective 
Based on the above postulates, the Referent Informational Influence model 
presents a distinct interpretation of several social influence phenomena, such as, the 
impact of experts, compliance and public conformity, minority influence or group 
polarization. 
Experts and credible sources. Traditional research provided considerable 
evidence on the informational power of credible sources: the more the source of 
influence is considered credible or competent, the more it is perceived as conveying 
objectively correct information, and the more the receiver accepts its messages (e.g., 
Croner & Willis, 1961; Crutchfield, 1955; Di Vesta, 1959). Particularly compelling are 
the results supporting the idea that only credible sources are able to exert influence 
when the advocated opinion is highly discrepant from the one sustained by the 
individual (e.g., Aronson, Turner & Carlsmith, 1963; Bochner & Insko, 1966).  
The problem is that the social background, in which the attributions of 
credibility, competence, expertise, etc. are made, has been disregarded. As Turner 
(2005) puts it, “One group’s expert is another’s crank. One does not accept influence 
from experts because of the information they provide (if one is not an expert, how can 
one judge its quality?), but accepts the information as valid because one defines them as 
an expert” (p. 3). As such, sources’ credibility, their persuasiveness, and the conformity 
they can produce may only be understood in the social context in which these influence 
processes operate.  
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“The influence of experts is not due to the fact that they possess 
demonstrably correct information. Their information is perceived as valid 
because they are socially designated as ‘experts’, the legitimate representatives 
of normative cultural institutions and values […] Facts and experts are socially 
designated as such and, like rational demonstration, presuppose cultural 
consensus about rules, procedures, technologies, categories and ‘taken-for-
granted’ knowledge.” (Turner, 1991, p. 151-2) 
To the perceiver, credible, competent, expert sources transmit valid information 
because they have accumulated normative knowledge about it. An analysis of 
credibility, competence or expertise must take into account that these are not intrinsic 
proprieties of the source person but that these attributions arise in specific social 
contexts. The social dimension of credibility is inconsistent with a differentiation 
between informational and normative components of group influence.   
Compliance as Submission to an Out-Group. The influence of in-group opinions 
and beliefs may not to be automatically internalized. However, as Turner and Oakes 
(1989, p. 254) put it, “The readiness to commit oneself behaviorally before full 
internalization has taken place should not be confounded with compliance.” In Referent 
Informational Influence, compliance is associated with out-groups and the power and 
control over sought resources. “Out-groups produce compliance, i.e., it is people with 
whom one does not expect to agree, whom one cannot be influenced by, that must resort 
to coercion, force, and power to change behavior.” (Turner & Oakes, 1989, p. 254). 
Therefore, contrarily to the traditional perspective, compliance does not refer to group 
normative influence. “Compliance and ‘group pressure’ are assumed to reflect not 
‘normative’ influence from an in-group, but ‘counternormative’ influence from a 
psychological out-group, people with whom one would not expect to agree.” (Turner, 
1987, p. 76).  
Recently, Turner (2005) specified that compliance should not be confused with 
control or coercion. The efficacy of group pressures on members and the extent into 
which they may result in internalization depends on whether the members attribute 
authority to the group. The way in which coercion may be perceived as legitimate or 
illegitimate, that is, going against individuals’ will or interests depends on their 
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definition of the situation. If they perceive the source as sharing the same essential 
norms it will perceived as an intragroup situation; if they perceive the source as 
essentially different from them the situation will be perceived as of the intergroup kind.  
Public and private conformity. The theory rejects the traditional dichotomy 
between conformity in private and public contexts and its association with 
internalization and compliance. According to the theory, the social self is not restricted 
to the public self and the private self is not restricted to the personal self (cf. Turner, 
1991). That would be to recognize that the private self is non-social and that 
individuals’ private beliefs are unique. However, public contexts are likely to activate 
social self-categories so that the perceived validity of the group norm in those contexts 
is increased. As Turner (1987) put it, 
“[…] that greater conformity occurs in public than private makes sense 
given that public settings represent ‘shared social fields’, settings where both 
social and stimulus identity are maximized and apparent. [conversely] an effect 
of privatization may be to reduce the influence of others by leading to the 
perception of personal differences” (p. 77).  
Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg and Turner’s (1990) experiment provides 
an example of how a public setting may induce in-group conformity without the 
corresponding influence of private acceptance. The authors used the Asch’s (1951) 
paradigm with the following two variations: (a) the three confederates were presented 
either as students from the psychology department (in-group condition) or students from 
the ancient history department (out-group condition); (b) in an additional condition of 
private responses, the naïve participant (acting as experimenter’s assistant) heard and 
noted down the answers of the confederates and finally its own (that he was not required 
to report verbally to the others). 
The results show that participants made more errors when the confederates were 
in-group members than when they were out-group members in the public conditions of 
responses. In the private conditions of responses, there were no differences in 
conformity as a function of the induced source’s group membership. As the authors 
explained, these results do not invalidate the idea that in-group influences are accepted 
in private. Due to the nature of the task and its irrelevance for the in-group vs. out-group 
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distinction, participants in the private conditions disregarded the initial categorization 
and differentiated themselves from the confederates. As mentioned before, Self-
Categorization Theory predicts that the specific context (in this case, determined by the 
task to be performed) is critical to the categories that individuals invoke and 
consequently to the group into which they self-include.  
Minority influence. For Self-Categorization Theory, the influence of minorities 
is not essentially different from that of majorities. Both types of groups can exert direct 
and indirect influence depending on the way they are perceived. If the minority message 
assumes the core values of the majority, majority members perceive an intragroup 
context, in which minority is a subgroup and they will considered its opinions and 
arguments. If the minority rejects the core values of the majority, its position will be 
perceived as competitive inducing an intergroup context, and its opinions will not be 
considered (e.g., David & Turner, 1992). As Turner (1991) puts it, 
“Minority conversion depends upon the minority being a distinctive, 
consistent, consensual subgroup, not ‘individualized’, ‘psychologized’, or 
categorized as out-group members, and presenting a coherent, alternative norm 
that is congruent with the high-order norms and values of the in-group.” (p. 170) 
Mugny and Pérez’s (1991; cf. also Pérez & Mugny, 1998) perspective on 
minority influence shares the assumption that minority influence is related with 
categorization and identification processes. As these authors argue, “minority influence 
increases when the meanings attached to the source lead to psychosocial identification 
that is compatible with a positive personal identity” (p. 14). However, Mugny and 
Pérez’s (1991) perspective differ from the Self-Categorization perspective concerning 
the relationship between minority’s in-group or out-group status and their ability to 
produce direct and indirect influence. According to Mugny and Pérez (1991), minorities 
categorized as in-group have either high or low direct influence, depending on whether 
identification with the minority implies a positive or negative identity whereas 
minorities categorized as out-groups do not exert direct influence but they may exert 
indirect influence if they are perceived as credible sources. 
Group polarization as conformity to prototypical members. As seen above, 
previous theories of group polarization did not presented an encompassing explanation 
64 
of the phenomenon. The theories emphasize either social comparison or informational 
motives. Self-Categorization Theory proposes an explanation that is based on a single 
process of influence. Specifically, the theory conceives group polarization as 
conformity to prototypical group positions (cf. e.g., Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, 
Hogg & Turner, 1990; McGarty, Turner, Hogg, David & Whetherell, 1992; Whetherell, 
1987). Polarization represents assimilation to in-group positions and differentiation 
from out-group positions: the convergence to the member(s) that hold(s) positions 
simultaneously more similar to those of other in-group members and more distant from 
out-group positions. It is the need for distinctiveness, which leads members to shift to 
an extreme position in the direction opposed to that of the out-group. 
In this perspective, there is a cognitive basis for the idea that extreme positions 
are more attractive than moderate positions, as argued by the theory of value (e.g., 
Lamm & Myers, 1978; Baron & Roper, 1976). Extreme positions are more attractive 
because they contribute to the differentiation of the in-group from the out-group. The 
evidence obtained for persuasive arguments theory is also accounted for (e.g., Burnstein 
& Vinokur, 1973; 1975; 1977): prototypical members are more able than non-
prototypical members are to persuade other members to change their opinions (cf. van 
Knippenberg, Lossie & Wilke, 1994; van Knippenberg & Wilke, 1992). Prototypical 
positions are thus both more attractive and influential leading other members to 
extremize their opinions.  
Conclusion 
Traditional approaches established theoretical distinctions in group influence 
based on the effects of public versus private contexts, or task versus group orientations. 
Often, group norms are depicted as arbitrary, subjective and uninformed opinions 
deviating from objective standards and conformity to the group is associated with public 
compliance rather than with internalization. When group norms and consensus are 
viewed as providing subjective validity to members’ opinions and attitudes, the group is 
viewed as an external device to which individuals resort to when personal testing is 
difficult. The nature of the constructs that are manipulated to produce informational 
influence, such as the recipient’s uncertainty, the source’s credibility or the objectivity 
of the task are rarely questioned.  
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Traditional explanations of group polarization are based on distinct influence 
processes: whereas one model favors social comparison processes, the other model 
favors informational processes. However, none model accounts for the phenomenon in 
the whole. Also, the minority influence model focused on the distinction between group 
influences. Although opposing to some traditional assumptions about conformity, the 
model stresses the existence of two forms of conformity: majority influence is 
associated with compliance and minority influence with internalization. The model also 
claims that minorities are more able than majorities to exert indirect influence, that is, 
the unconscious conversion to their positions. This claim has not obtained consistent 
empirical support. Nevertheless, the minority influence phenomenon has revealed some 
of the inconsistencies of the dominant model namely its assumption about the function 
of group influence in the preservation of social stability. 
Self-Categorization Theory provides an integrated account of social influence 
phenomena. Central to the theory is the concept of social categorization. Social 
categorization is a pervasive process that has effects on social perception and self-
conception. By accentuating the similarities between the members of a category and the 
differences between categories, individuals form a stereotype of each category in which 
the characteristics common to the members of the category and differences to members 
of other categories are accentuated. The assignment of the self to one of those categories 
leads to a change in the self-concept so that individuals perceive themselves not as 
unique individuals but as undifferentiated members of the category. They conform to 
the norms of the in-group, the attributes of the group representation, resulting in 
stereotyped judgments, opinions, and behavior.  
In this perspective, group influence is both normative and informative. It does 
not depend on other members’ surveillance because the in-group opinion is the 
reference for private opinions. Individuals conform to the group norm because it 
conveys the more adequate and objective account of reality. As such, in-group influence 
is a single process, which is responsible for both majority and minority, direct or 
indirect, influence. The extent into which a group is able to exert influence on members, 
directly or indirectly, depends more on how much it represents for members’ identity 
than on its relative size. 
66 
The social identity approach to social influence has further support in research 
on group polarization. The shift to polarized positions subsequent to group discussion is 
explainable by the higher attractiveness and persuasion of prototypical members, 
because these members contribute to the distinctiveness of the group as regards the out-
group. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SOCIAL IDENTITY, IMPLICIT PROCESSING AND GROUP INFLUENCE 
Recent research has focused on automatic processes3 associated with social 
identity. Automatic processes “develop out of frequent and consistent experience in an 
environmental domain” (Wegner & Bargh, 1998, p. 463). Unlike controlled processes, 
automatic processes have the advantage of not requiring attention and not being 
hindered by the overload of the working memory (cf. Kahneman, 1973; Posner & 
Snyder, 1975).  
An automatic response in a usual situation is the prevailing response when 
conscious processes do not intervene to modify the response (cf. Schneider & Shiffrin, 
1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Some automatic processes are not even controllable, 
that is, once there are enough cues to initiate them, they run until completion (e.g., 
Bargh, 1989; 1994; 1996). Thus, only vital and highly adaptive processes become 
automatic (e.g., Bargh, 1989; 1994; 1996; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Bruner, 1992; 
Vigotsky, 1925). The findings showing that social identity processes operate at an 
implicit level indicate their crucial role in the determination of individual behavior. 
Implicit Social Identity Processes 
Research on implicit social identity processes has focused in two major issues: the 
association between the in-group representation and the self-representation; and the 
automaticity of the in-group bias.  
The Association between Self and In-Group Representations 
The social identity approach postulates that the collective self is as much part of 
the self-concept as the personal self (e.g., Simon, 1997; Turner et al, 1987; 1994). As 
such, there should be strong associations between the attributes of an in-group 
stereotype and the self-concept. For instance, Smith and Henry (1996) first asked 
participants to rate 90 traits as a function of their description of themselves, and, 
 
3 As pointed out by Greenwald and Banaji (1995), the pair of terms implicit-explicit is used in some 
literatures, whereas the pairs automatic-controlled, or even unconscious-conscious and indirect-direct, are 
used in other literatures. Like these authors, we assume that the first terms and the second terms of the 
pairs, respectively, are equivalent. Therefore, the terms implicit and automatic, as well as the terms 
explicit and controlled will be used interchangeably. 
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depending on participants’ significant group membership, of Liberal arts and 
engineering majors’ students, or Greeks fraternity/sorority members. Then they were 
asked to respond to the same test in a reaction time test. They should press the button 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ when the trait word appeared in the computer screen, depending on 
whether the trait described themselves or not. 
The authors found that participants were faster in pressing the ‘yes’ button to 
indicate that trait-words were self-descriptive, and also made less errors, when traits 
matched the stereotype of the in-group (as indicated by their initial ratings in the 
conventional measure) than when they did not matched this stereotype. Moreover, the 
effect is not found when the similarity/dissimilarity of self to the out-group stereotype is 
accounted for. The fact that traits on which the self and in-group are similar are readily 
accessible for self-description confirms the Self-Categorization assumption that social 
identities are important components of the self-concept (cf. also, Smith, Coats & 
Walling, 1999).  
In the previous experiment, it was assumed that the stereotypic self-descriptors 
were made salient by the initial task. To confirm the idea that the shifts on self-
perception correspond to shifts on the social context (e.g., Turner et al, 1987; 1994), 
Onorato and Turner (2004) used a modified version of Markus’ (1977). In Markus’ 
(1977) original procedure, participants were classified as a function of their responses to 
a questionnaire in which they had to rate themselves in three scales referring to trait 
description items related to the dependence vs. independence dimension (leader / 
follower, individualist / conformist, independent /dependent). The participants that rated 
themselves in the independent pole of the scale were classified as Schematics 
Independents; participants that rated themselves in the dependent pole were classified as 
Schematics Dependents; and participants that rated themselves in the middle of the 
scale were classified as Aschematic. In a second session, participants were presented 
with several trait-words (some of which related with the independence / dependence 
dimension) on a screen and had to push the yes or no button depending on whether they 
found that the trait presented was or not self-descriptor. The results showed that 
dependent participants responded faster to say that dependent trait-words were self-
descriptors than independent trait-words, and the opposite for the Independent 
participants. 
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To prove that, consistent with self-categorization principles, in some situations 
social identity has a more powerful effect on information processing than personal self-
aspects, Onorato and Turner (2004) formed groups of participants of the same sex and 
same type – Independent, Dependent, or Aschematic. Participants were to reach a 
consensus on the degree to which some independent / dependent traits were more 
typical of men or women thus priming participants with a situation that made salient the 
stereotypical attributes of their own and the other gender group. They then completed a 
modified version of the Markus’ (1977) latency task. Specifically, participants were 
asked to respond whether the trait (independent, dependent, masculine or feminine) 
appearing in the screen was descriptor of him/her as compared to the other gender group 
(‘Us’ or ‘Them’).  
The results showed that irrespectively of their personal schema type 
(Independent, Dependent or Aschematic), both male and female participants were faster 
to respond stereotypically than non-stereotypically confirming the idea that social group 
memberships are as important to self-definition as personal traits.   
Implicit In-Group Bias  
In the origin of in-group bias is the need for a positive social identity (e.g., 
Tajfel, 1978). The recurrence of in-group biases is reflected in the stronger association 
of positive attributes to in-group and stronger association of negative attributes to out-
groups.  
For instance, Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman and Tyler (1990) found that nonsense 
syllables unobtrusively paired with in-group designating pronouns, such as we or us, 
were rated as more pleasant than syllables paired with out-group designators, such as, 
they or them. Moreover, the subliminal exposition to in-group designators decreased the 
reaction time in the classification of positive adjectives whereas the exposition to out-
group designators facilitated the classification of negative adjectives. Finally, the 
subliminal exposition to in-group designators facilitated the classification of positive 
person descriptors as compared to a neutral subliminal prime. The results suggest that 
the use of in-group or out-group pronoun designators in the speech prompts automatic 
positive or negative attitudes towards in-group and out-group targets, respectively.  
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Other research (Otten & Wentura, 1999) showed that group membership even 
when defined through minimal conditions in the laboratory automatically entails 
positive feelings towards the in-group. Otten and Wentura (1999) found that after being 
categorized through a typical minimal group procedure, participants’ classification of 
adjectives was affected by prior subliminal exposure to in-group and out-group labels. 
They made more errors in classifying negative adjectives when primed with the in-
group label and in classifying positive adjectives when primed with the out-group label 
than in the reversed conditions. The results suggest that in-group and its members are 
automatically associated to positive and pleasant feelings and/or the out-group and its 
members are associated with negative unpleasant feelings.  
Implicit Out-Group Derogation  
Consistent with the above-described results, Cameira, Serôdio, Pinto and Marques 
(2002) obtained out-group derogation as an implicit response to a salient intergroup 
situation. In their experiment, the authors manipulated the group membership of the 
experimenter as regard the participants and checked the implicit influence of this 
variable in subsequent choices. Specifically, small groups of Psychology or Social 
Work students interacted with an experimenter that ostensibly presented herself as 
Psychologist or Social Worker conducting a survey on Community Intervention. After 
responding to a questionnaire aimed to increase the salience of their group membership, 
participants were asked to choose between two teams to work with in a second phase of 
the alleged study. The teams were composed by three members whose faces, depicted in 
the questionnaire sheet, and were either similar or different from the first experimenters’ 
face (similarity of the team members’ face to the experimenter’s face had been tested 
earlier). After making their choice, participants were asked to mark among several 
hypotheses the reasons of their choices.  
The predictions were that participants would choose more the similar than the 
different team when the experimenter was an in-group member. The results did not 
meet the predictions but revealed that participants chose the different team more when 
the experimenter was an out-group member than when the experimenter was an in-
group member. This effect increased with in-group identification. The authors 
interpreted these results in terms of group contexts: whereas the out-group experimenter 
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condition portrayed an intergroup context, the in-group experimenter condition 
portrayed an intra-group context. Hence, judgments and evaluations based on group 
membership were more likely in the former than in the latter context. Participants 
attributed to chance or to the attractiveness of the chosen team the reasons of their 
preference. The results suggest that the implicitly learned association biased the choices 
of high-identified participants in the intergroup context. 
Implicit Prejudice 
Research on implicit prejudice provides innumerous examples of automatic in-
group bias or out-group derogation. Most important, this research has shown that 
implicit (non-controlled) attitudes towards discriminated groups are often not correlated 
with explicit (controlled) attitudes. This absence of correlation between the two 
variables has been interpreted as the result of a conscious need to show socially 
desirable non-prejudiced responses affecting solely the controllable measure (e.g., 
Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson & Howard, 1997; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton & 
Williams, 1995; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).  
For instance, Devine (1989) compared the automatic and controlled attitudes of 
White individuals towards Blacks. First, the author showed that both prejudiced and 
non-prejudiced individuals (as determined by their responses to the Modern Racism 
Scale) were knowledgeable of the negative attributes commonly ascribed to Black 
individuals. Subsequently, all participants rated a story character in several 
aggressiveness-related traits after being subliminally primed with words stereotypical of 
the Black group and with neutral words. The results showed that both prejudiced and 
non-prejudiced participants rated the story character as more aggressive when primed 
with Black-related words than when primed with neutral words. Finally, participants 
were asked to list their thoughts about the Blacks racial group under anonymous 
conditions. Results show that prejudiced participants had a marked tendency to generate 
stereotype-congruent responses whereas non-prejudiced individuals showed the 
opposite response pattern, that is, they generate beliefs that contradicted the stereotype 
of Blacks. In addition, most prejudiced participants referred to the aggressiveness or 
violence topic whereas only a minority of non-prejudiced participants did.   
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The author concluded that both prejudiced and non-prejudiced individuals are 
aware of the stereotype of Blacks and are automatically affected by it. However, 
whereas the prejudiced individuals have an explicit attitude congruent with the 
stereotype, non-prejudiced individuals, consciously oppose to this implicit influence, 
responding counter-stereotypically. 
Other research suggests that implicit and explicit attitudes may also be correlated 
when there are no normative reasons to conceal prejudice. Greenwald, McGhee and 
Schwartz (1998) designed the Implicit Association Test drawing on the automatic 
activation of the attitude towards a social group upon the presentation of a stimulus item 
associated with the group. Typically, the procedure has several phases that include the 
classification, in their respective labels, of clearly positive or negative adjectives as 
“good” or “unpleasant” and of words related with two opposing social groups. 
Greenwald and colleagues (1998; Experiment 2) compared the IAT results of Korean 
American and Japanese American participants (ethnic groups with a history of 
antagonism). As expected, the Japanese participants were slower to react when their 
ethnic group label was associated with the “unpleasant” label (and the Korean with the 
“pleasant” label) than in the reversed situation. The opposed pattern of results was 
obtained with the Korean participants. The participants also answered to a series of 
questions measuring their involvement in the Japanese or Korean social networks, 
respectively. The authors found that the results of the explicit measure were positively 
correlated with the IAT results.  
A replica of the above study Greenwald and colleagues (1998; Experiment 3) 
using the Blacks vs. White labels and related stimulus words (typical Black and White 
names), revealed a stronger association, among White participants, between the Blacks 
group and its negative evaluation and lower correlation with the explicit measure than in 
the Korean and Japanese groups. As the authors conclude, these results indicate the 
existence of more concealed hostility between Whites and Blacks as compared with the 
concealed hostility between Koreans and Japanese, which is consistent with existence of 
social norms aimed to protect Blacks from Whites’ prejudice, and that these norms have 
some acceptance among Whites.  
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In sum, the above-described findings indicate that the activation of positive 
attitudes towards in-group members and/or negative attitudes towards out-group 
members tend to be automatic processes.  In our empirical research, we attempted to 
extend the application of non-controlled methodologies to other social identity 
processes. Specifically, in the first four-experiment study, we examined conformity to 
the implicit group norms. 
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Study 1 
Conformity to Implicit Group Norms 
As we argued in Chapter 2, the traditional approach distinguishes between 
normative and informational influences in group influence. This dichotomy entails the 
assumption that informational influence is the true influence, inducing an enduring 
change of opinion (internalization). Thus, it has private acceptance. In contrast, it is 
assumed that normative influence induces only a temporary change of opinion 
(compliance) and requires conscious control, because it is imposed or self-imposed. 
Individuals conform publicly because they wish to show other members their 
compliance to norms.  
In contrast with the traditional perspective, the social identity perspective 
assumes that in-group sources are both informative and normative so that, when group 
membership is a salient aspect in the context, normative and informational influences 
cannot be separated. In salient intergroup contexts, the theory predicts no differences 
between public and private conformity. The predictions of Referent Informational 
Influence have indirect empirical support in previous experiments showing that 
individuals assume the behaviors of the social categories they are assigned to (e.g., 
Barlow, 1981; Minard, 1952; Zimbardo, 1975) or the categories that are more consistent 
with the current context (e.g., Hornstein, 1972; Horwitz, 1954).  
Direct tests of the theory have also obtained support for the idea that individuals 
conform to the norms of salient in-groups (Abrams et al, 1990; Hogg & Turner, 1987). 
For instance, Hogg and Turner (1987) tested the model adapting the procedure designed 
by Asch (1951). Participants, previously categorized into two groups purportedly based 
on similarity of answers to a previous test, judged personality traits on social approval 
scales. Intending to generate a distinctive group norm, participants were informed that 
their group’s judgments of the traits tended to the ‘social approval’ half of the scale, 
whereas the out-group tended to the ‘social disapproval’ half of the scale. In fact, the in-
group norm corresponded to participants’ natural position, because all stimuli traits 
were socially approved, as determined by a pre-test. Finally, participants were informed 
that they were answering together with four other individuals belonging either to the in-
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group or to the out-group depending on the conditions. Participants were isolated from 
the other members communicating with each other via the experimenter.  
The judgment trials alternated public and private responses, i.e., participants 
heard the other participants’ responses and thought their own was conveyed to them, in 
public trials, or did not receive feedback from the other participants and merely wrote 
down their own response, in private trials. The feedback of other members in public 
trials was for half of the subjects consistent with the groups’ norm (i.e., social approval 
in the in-group and social disapproval in the out-group), or inconsistent (i.e., social 
disapproval in the in-group and social approval in the out-group). The results showed 
that, in consistent conditions, participants’ private judgments tended more to the social 
approval end of the scale when the source was the in-group than when it was the out-
group. This result suggests that whereas in-group sources affect individuals’ private 
opinions and judgments, out-group sources do not have such an effect. 
The above research focused on the comparison between public and private 
conformity (cf. also, Abrams et al, 1990) to show that Referent Informational Influence 
depends on the salience and relevance of in-group in the current context and not merely 
on the physical presence of other members (although the physical presence of in-group 
members may bring group membership more salient, cf. Turner, 1987). In the present 
study, we examine the indirect influence of in-groups.  
The relevance of measuring conformity with a non-controlled methodology was 
pointed out by minority influence theory. In this research, indirect influence is assessed 
with non-controlled methods in which participants’ change of opinion is measured in 
items indirectly related with the topic of influence or with a time lag between the 
target’s response and source’s influence (e.g. Clark, 1988; Moscovici & Lage, 1976; 
Moscovici, Lage & Naffrechoux, 1969; Pérez & Mugny, 1987). Indirect influence is 
associated with conversion, that is, the assimilation of the minority group message 
whereas direct influence is associated with compliance (Moscovici, 1985; Moscovici & 
Personnaz, 1991).  
On the other hand, previous research has shown that in-group bias does not 
depend on the deliberate intention to favor the in-group or derogate the out-group. 
Results show that when group memberships are salient they automatically influence 
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individuals’ self-perceptions (Onorato & Turner, 2004; Smith & Henry, 1996), the 
classification of positive and negative adjectives (Greenwald et al, 1998; Otten & 
Wentura, 1999; Perdue et al, 1990), the judgment of a story character (Devine, 1989) or 
the choice of a work team (Cameira et al, 2002). We may thus expect conformity to in-
group or out-group norms to be affected by the tendency to favor the in-group over the 
out-group.  
Group credibility is a major variable in conformity research intrinsically 
associated with informational influence (e.g., Allen, 1965; Crutchfield, 1955; Coleman, 
Blake & Mouton, 1958; Croner & Willis, 1961; Di Vesta, 1959; Fisher & Lubin, 1958; 
Kelley & Lamb, 1957; Samelson, 1957). In social identity terms, group credibility is 
associated with the importance or relevance of a group membership in a task context 
(cf. Abrams et al, 1990). Group credibility was thus controlled for, or manipulated our 
four-experiment study designed to examine conformity to implicit group norms.  
Overview of the Study 
In the first experiment, we checked on the assumption that informational 
influences are implicitly accepted, by exposing participants to the implicit norm of a 
jury of experts in fine arts before assessing their esthetical preferences. In the following 
experiment, the influence sources were the implicit esthetical norms of both Arts and 
Sciences students (stereotypically considered credible and non-credible, respectively, in 
esthetical matters). Depending on the group membership of the participant, the credible 
source was either an in-group or an out-group. In the third experiment, the credible and 
non-credible attributes group sources were manipulated and their respective norms were 
explicit. This experiment was aimed to check on concomitants of conformity related 
with social identification. Finally, the last experiment replicates the previous results and 
compares explicit conformity to implicit conformity to credible and non-credible in-
groups and outgroups.  
Experiment 1 
Acceptance of a Credible Source’s Implicit Norm 
The first experiment was intended to show that the opinion of a credible source 
is implicitly followed. Participants are asked to observe two series of pictures that were 
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allegedly approved or rejected by a jury of experts on fine art. The difference between 
the two series was imperceptible as confirmed by a pre-test. We expect that, in 
subsequent judgments, participants will prefer pictures similar to the approved ones to 
those similar to the rejected ones. Our prediction is based on research showing that 
regularities in the stimulus field are implicitly learned, and affect subsequent related 
responses (e.g., Reber, 1989; Berry, 1997; Stadler & Frensch, 1998). Given that 
participants are unaware of the jury criterion, their preference for approved pictures 
represent an automatic acceptance of the influence.  
To test for participants’ awareness of the difference between the two types of 
pictures, we used the two tests most used in implicit learning experiments (cf. St. John 
& Shanks, 1997): written report and recognition. The written report is the most used 
strategy to control awareness, and depends exclusively on explicit knowledge because 
individuals must be able to state the regularities of the stimuli. Conversely, recognition 
does not depend exclusively on explicit knowledge because implicit memory may also 
contribute to recognition (cf., e.g., Reed & Johnson, 1998).  
Method 
Participants and design. Twenty-six students enrolled in an introductory course 
of Human Resources at a private university of Porto (18 male and six female; ages 
ranging from 18 to 39 years old, M = 24.83, SD = 5.40) volunteered to participate. 
There was a single intra-participants factor, Norm (Approved Pictures vs. Rejected 
Pictures).  
Procedure 
The experiment was presented as a study on the features that make pictures 
pleasant or unpleasant, attractive or unattractive. Allegedly, for that purpose, a set of 
abstract black and white pictures had been randomly created by computer, and then 
submitted to the appraisal of a “jury of experts in fine arts, teachers, critics and artistic 
professionals like painters and sculptors”. Allegedly, the most approved pictures were 
then separated from the most rejected pictures to create two series. After receiving this 
information, the participants were asked to observe a sample of 10 approved pictures 
and 10 rejected pictures. The experiment proceeded in four sessions of 6-7 participants, 
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which sat facing a screen where the pictures were projected always ensuring an even 
distance to the screen. 
Learning phase. The pictures were rectangular abstract compositions consisting 
of black dots and lines with a general appearance similar to the samples shown in the 
two following pages (cf. Figure 1). Despite their resemblance, the pictures were all 
different from each other, except that one half of the pictures contained one vertical 
salience in the right top side of the picture and the other half contained one horizontal 
salience in the left side of the picture. Depending on the balance condition, one type was 
labeled “Approved” and the other type was labeled “Rejected”. Each picture was 
displayed for one second and separated from the next picture by a blank screen for one 
second.  
The material used was pre-tested in order to ensure that there were no biases 
intrinsic to the material (cf. Appendix 1). The results of the pre-test showed that 
participants were unable to recognize and recall the distinction between the two types; 
the pictures of both types were similarly attractive; and the pictures to be judged and the 
pictures to be recognized had a similar level of difficulty to be recognized.  
Implicit learning research found that the motivation to search for a regularity 
hidden in the stimulus field obstructs the learning process leading to poorer implicit 
learning (Reber, 1976). Participants tend to make incorrect inductions about the stimuli 
and to respond according to incorrect rules (cf. also Danks & Gans, 1975; Reber et al, 
1980). In the present experiment, given its scenario, we could expect participants to 
attempt to find out the distinctive features between the two series of pictures and 
obstruct implicit learning. Indeed, a first version of the present experiment suggested 
the existence of that phenomenon (cf. Appendix 2). For these reasons, we manipulated 
the level of attentional resources assigned to the pictures in the learning phase by 
introducing a distraction. A piece of music, familiar to participants, was played audibly 
in the background, with the justification that that was the normal procedure of the 
experiment4. To control for the uneven effect of the music on the two types, we 
 
4 The choice of an auditory distraction is based on evidence showing that implicit learning remains 
unaffected by the introduction of a secondary task of different nature (e.g., Cohen, Ivry & Keele, 1990; 
Reed & Johnson, 1994; Stadler, 1995). Given that our task is visual-perceptive, the use of an auditory 
distraction obstructs participants’ search of the distinctive features of the pictures without interfering with 
the learning process.  
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balanced the labeling of the pictures’ series. In two of the sessions, the vertical type was 
labeled Approved and the horizontal type labeled Rejected. In the other two sessions, 
the vertical type was labeled Rejected and the horizontal type was labeled Approved.  
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Figure 1. Examples of the two types of pictures used in the experiments. The top six pictures are 
examples of the vertical type and bottom six pictures are examples of the horizontal type. 
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Tests of awareness. After observing the sample of pictures, participants were 
told that the experimenters wished to known whether they were able to distinguish 
between approved and rejected pictures. This corresponded to the recognition test of 
awareness. Participants were asked to observe twenty unlabelled pictures that allegedly 
had been extracted from the lot of approved and rejected pictures judged by the jury. 
After observing each picture for five seconds, participants reported whether it had been 
approved or rejected by the jury. The experimenter controlled the presentation of each 
picture after ensuring that the participants have finished with the previous one, although 
mentioning the need for “a somewhat fast rhythm”. The number of pictures correctly 
classified represented the extent to which the respondent was aware of the series’ 
distinctive details. Twenty, or close to twenty, correctly classified pictures meant that 
the respondent had a correct criterion for the classification and was aware of the details. 
None or close to none correctly classified pictures meant that the respondent based on 
an incorrect criterion. Ten or close to ten correctly classified pictures meant that the 
respondent did not used any criterion and answered by chance.  
After this task, participants answered to the question “Have you found any 
distinction between the approved and the rejected pictures?” and, in the affirmative 
case, they were asked to describe the distinction(s). This task corresponded to the 
‘written report’ test of awareness.  
Judgment task. Subsequently, participants were told that, in the present research, 
the experimenters wanted to know “the opinion of common people about this particular 
kind of pictures”. Participants were then asked to judge twenty pictures that allegedly 
had been produced recently and had never been judged. There were 10 vertical and 10 
horizontal pictures and their order of presentation was randomized. Participants 
observed each picture for 5 seconds and then reported their judgment in a 7-point scale 
(1= Do not like it; 7= Like it very much). 
After this task, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. In 
the debriefing, two participants verbally reported the distinction between the approved 
and rejected pictures. The experimenter made sure that they had reported the distinction 
in the questionnaire in order to discard their data from the analysis. 
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Results 
Recognition and recall. The data of two participants that found the graphic 
details of the pictures were removed from the analysis. We computed a recognition 
index by summing the number of pictures correctly recognized (minimum=0; maximum 
= 20). The mean recognition rate is not different from chance, M = 9.41, SD = 2.89, 
t(23) < 1, suggesting that participants were unaware of the distinction between the two 
series of pictures.  
 
No. Approved Pictures Rejected Pictures 
 Balance 1 
1 More undefined and irregular More geometrical 
2 More creative - 
6 Darker Lighter 
 Balance 2 
15 More detailed Less denser, less esthetically organized 
17 Lighter Darker 
18 More interesting, with abstract 
background 
They all have an F; meaningless 
19 Darker More blank spaces, some represent 
letters 
20 More variety of color and curves More black or white color 
21 Less larger with more variations of 
the pattern 
Larger with a more uniform pattern 
22 Less organized pattern More organized patterns 
23 Less “noise” density Opposed to the approved ones 
24 
Better esthetics and straight 
drawings 
No esthetics, no straight drawings 
 
Table 1. Reports on the distinction between the two series of pictures grouped by balance 
condition (Experiment 1). The responses in bold characters refer pictures’ details resembling the actual 
distinction. 
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The analysis of the 12 reports of the participants that reported having found a 
distinction between approved pictures and rejected pictures revealed that one participant 
mentioned a distinction close to the actual one (cf. Table 1 – participant # 18). 
However, the fact that the participant only classified correctly 12 pictures suggests that 
the distinction was not used systematically in the subsequent tasks. The three 
participants reporting differences in the general tonality of the two types of pictures had 
opposite opinions indicating that this difference was not objective. Indeed, the 
differences reported by the participants match previous findings showing that, when 
believing that there is an hidden structure in the stimuli, participants tend to formulate 
rules based on their most obvious features (e.g., Reber, 1976).  
Conformity. We averaged the ratings of approved and rejected pictures into two 
new variables of preference for approved pictures and preference for rejected pictures, 
respectively (Norm). In the context of the task, we assumed that conformity to the 
credible source’s opinion is represented by the preference of accepted pictures as regard 
rejected pictures. Therefore, we conducted a Norm x Balance ANOVA, in which Norm 
was a within-participants factor. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
Norm, F(1, 22) = 4.61, p = .043, η2 = .17; all others effects, highest, F(1, 22) = 2.30, ns. 
As predicted, participants showed higher preference for the approved pictures than for 
the rejected pictures, M = 4.03, SD = .67 and M = 3.78, SD = .595.  
Conformity and recognition. To check on the effect of awareness in the 
participants’ conformity we divided participants by median-split of the recognition 
index and created a new two-level variable. ‘Good recognizers’ recognized an average 
of 12.86 pictures and ‘bad recognizers’, an average of 8.00 pictures. We then conducted 
an ANOVA with the new variable as a between-participants factor and Norm as within-
participants factor. The interaction of the two factors was non-significant indicating that 
the judgments of ‘good recognizers’ did not differed from those of ‘bad recognizers’, 
F(1, 22) < 1.  
 
5 We conducted the same analysis removing the data of participant #18 that reported a distinction similar 
to the actual one. Results still show a preference for approved pictures, M = 4.00 and M = 3.74, F(1, 22) = 
4.46, p = .046, η2 = .17. 
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Discussion 
Confirming the hypothesis, the results suggest that individuals tend to regulate 
their judgments by those of credible sources. After being exposed to pictures that had 
been approved or rejected by a jury of experts, participants preferred pictures that were 
similar to approved ones. Consistent with long lasting evidence showing that people 
follow the opinion of credible sources our results indicate that this acceptance does not 
depend on the capacity to articulate that opinion. It must be stressed that the context 
created in the experiment favored an automatic reliance on the jury’s opinion. 
Participants were asked to make judgments on several very similar pictures, thus, 
involving the implicit demand to differentiate among the pictures in terms of preference. 
Although, esthetical judgments are generally perceived as subjective, the previous 
mention of a jury, and of approved and rejected pictures, may have led to the inference 
that that was an objective task. Judgments perceived as objective prompts a search for 
external validation rather than reliance on internal standards (e.g., Insko, Drenan, 
Solomon, Smith & Wade, 1983) especially when external sources are considered 
competent (e.g., Aronson, Turner & Carlsmith, 1963; Bochner & Insko, 1966; Di Vesta, 
1959; Samelson, 1957). Moreover, the similitude of the pictures is likely to induce the 
perception of lack of agreement in the judgments and consequently more uncertainty 
(cf., e.g., Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner, 1991). Uncertainty also induces the search for 
external information to anchor one’s judgments (cf., e.g., Allen, 1965; Coleman, Blake 
& Mouton, 1958; Croner & Willis, 1961; Crutchfield, 1955; Fisher & Lubin, 1958; 
Kelley & Lamb, 1957; Sherif, 1936). 
Other results show that the knowledge of the jury’s criterion, even if implicit, 
did not contribute for the judgments. The fact that virtually all participants were unable 
to articulate the differences between the two kinds of pictures, and that their respective 
level of recognition did not affected their judgments suggests that these latter were not 
consciously processed. The traditional assumption that informational influence is 
accepted in a relatively automatic way is thus confirmed.  
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Experiment 2 
Conformity to Implicit Norms as a Function of Source’s Credibility and Group 
Membership 
The results of the previous experiment suggest that individuals automatically 
accept informational influences. In the present experiment, we test the general 
hypothesis that automatic conformity applies also to normative influences. In this 
experiment, the credible source is either an in-group or an out-group. Our first 
prediction is that implicit conformity to the credible source occurs only when the source 
is an in-group. However, in the present experimental context, credibility is also a 
relevant attribute of the source given the task participants are to perform. Our second 
prediction is thus that non-credible group members will not conform to any of the 
groups. We assume that, in a situation in which credibility is relevant, non-conformity 
to a credible out-group source is the result of normative influences.  
We took advantage of the fact that students enrolled in the Psychology course 
issue from either Arts or Sciences high-school areas and that this fact corresponds to a 
significant social categorization among sophomores. Compatible with the nature of the 
experimental task, esthetic aptitude is a stereotypical attribute that differentiates the two 
groups: Arts students are normally considered more knowledgeable than Sciences 
students in esthetics matters. To confirm this idea, using an unobtrusive method, we 
conducted two pilot studies in the same population of the main experiment. The first 
pilot study was aimed to establish which personality traits were associated with credible 
appreciations of the abstract pictures used in the experiment; the second pilot study was 
aimed to examine the association of those personality traits to Arts and Sciences 
students and, indirectly, the ascription of credibility in the task to both groups.  
Pilot Study 1 
Forty Psychology and Educational Sciences undergraduate students (28 female 
and 12 male; ages ranging from 18 to 24 years old), after observing a reproduction of 
two of the pictures we used in our experiments (cf. Figure 1), were asked to write, at 
least, five traits of “the people that could have a credible opinion about this kind of 
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pictures”. Respondents produced 73 different traits, 32 of which with more than one 
mention.  
Three categories were formed by aggregating traits with a similar semantic 
meaning. ‘Creative’ (frequency = 26) was aggregated with ‘Creative mind’ (frequency 
= 2); ‘Artistic’ (frequency = 10) was aggregated with ‘Art knowledgeable’ (frequency = 
5) and with ‘Esthetic’ (frequency = 1); ‘Sensitive’ (frequency = 8) was aggregated with 
‘Subjective’ (frequency = 8). The categories received the name of the most frequent 
trait. The analysis of the frequencies of the categories and remaining traits, revealed an 
accentuated decrease between the fifth more mentioned trait, Abstract (frequency = 15) 
and the sixth more mentioned trait (frequency = 8). We thus decided to select the 
following traits: creative (28), imaginative (19), artistic (16), sensitive (16), and abstract 
(15).  
The five selected traits (named ‘Relevant traits’) were embedded in a longer list 
of 14 traits including five traits with an opposed meaning (named ‘Opposed traits’), 
‘realistic’, ‘practical’, ‘objective’, ‘rational’, and ‘concrete’, and four filler-traits, ‘fond 
of nature’, ‘athletic’, ‘lazy’ and ‘active’. The 14 trait-list was pre-tested to ensure that 
Relevant and Opposed traits had identical values for Psychology undergraduates. We 
then proceed with the next pilot study. 
Pilot Study 2 
Fifty-two undergraduate students attending an introductory course to Psychology 
(44 female and 8 male; age range 18-28 years old, M = 19.02, SD = 1.73) and ensuing 
either from the high-school Arts area (23) or from the high-school Sciences area (29), 
were asked to answer a questionnaire about the characteristics of Psychology 
sophomores. Half of the respondents were asked to first think about students ensuing 
from the high-school Arts area and then to mark into what extent they possessed, in 
their opinion, each of the 14 traits, in 7-point scales (1=nothing at all; 7=very much). 
Then they were asked to think about students ensuing from the high-school Sciences 
area and to rate those students on the same 14 traits. For the other half of the 
respondents the target groups order was reversed: they were asked to rate first Science 
area students and then Arts area students.  
87 
                                                
Results 
We first averaged the ratings of the Relevant traits relative to Sciences students 
(Cronbach’s α = .75) and to Arts students (Cronbach’s α = .75) into two new variables, 
Sciences Relevant traits and Arts Relevant traits. Then, we averaged the ratings of the 
opposed traits relative to Sciences students (Cronbach’s α = .80) and to Arts students 
(Cronbach’s α = .74) into two new variables, Sciences Opposed traits and Arts Opposed 
traits. We then conducted an Area x Order x Target Group (Arts vs. Sciences) x Traits 
(Relevant vs. Opposed) ANOVA, in which Target Group and Traits were within-
participants factors. 
The Traits x Target Group interaction revealed significant, F(1, 48) = 188.52, p 
< .001, η2 = .80. Indeed, Arts students were rated higher in relevant traits than Sciences 
students, M = 5.11, SD = .77 and M = 3.31, SD = .80, respectively, F(1, 51) = 112.34, p 
< .001, η2 = .69, and were rated lower in opposed traits, M = 3.56, SD = .76 and M = 
5.65, SD = .77, F(1, 51) = 151.12, p < .001, η2 = .75.   
The analysis of differences across Traits also revealed significant: Arts students 
were rated higher in relevant than in opposed traits, F(1, 51) = 104.61, p < .001, η2 = 
.67, and Sciences students were rated higher in opposed than in Relevant traits, F(1, 51) 
= 182.44, p < .001, η2 = .78. There was no interaction with Area, F(1, 50) = 1.61, ns, η2 
= .007, showing that the respondents rated the target groups similarly independently of 
their respective membership group (cf. Figure 2)6. 
In the whole, the results supported our initial idea; we may assume thus that, in 
the main experiment, Arts students are perceived as a more credible source than are 
Sciences students.  
 
6 The analysis also revealed a significant main effect of Traits, F(1, 50) = 26.68, p < .001, η2 = .35, 
showing that the respondents, evaluated both groups as possessing the opposed traits more than the 
relevant traits, M = 4.21, SD = .48 and M = 4.60, SD = .46, respectively. There were no effects of Target 
Group or Area, F(1, 50) = 1.62, ns, F(1, 50) = 1.31, ns, respectively. The main effect of Traits was 
qualified by an interaction with Area, F(1, 50) = 4.22, p = .05, η2 = .08, showing that although Sciences 
students judged both target groups higher in the opposed items than in the relevant items, M = 4.23, SD = 
.41 and M = 4.48, respectively,SD = .45, t (28) = 2.61, p = .01, Arts Students judgments were more 
extremized, M = 4.19, SD = .59 and M = 4.76, SD =.42, respectively, , t (22) = 4.32, p < .001. Finally, an 
interaction of Area and Target Group, F(1, 50) = 25.71, p < .001, η2 = .34, revealed that Sciences students 
rated their own group higher than the out-group, M = 4.60, SD = .45 and M = 4.11, SD = .45, respectively, 
t (28) = 4.63, p < .001, and the same occurred among Arts students, M = 4.33, SD = .48 and M = 4.62, SD 
= .50, respectively, t (22) = 2.61, p = .02. 
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Figure 2. In-group and out-group evaluations in relevant and opposed traits as a function of 
respondents’ high-school area (Pilot study 2). 
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Main Experiment 
Method 
Participants and design. Thirty-five students of a Psychology introductory 
course (29 female and 6 male; ages ranging from 17 to 20 years old, M = 18.30, SD = 
.80) volunteered to participate. Eighteen ensued from the high-school Arts area, and the 
remaining 17 participants ensued from the high-school Sciences area. We employed a 
2(Group: Sciences vs. Arts) x 2(Norm: In-group vs. Out-group) mixed design in which 
Norm was a within-subject factor.  
Procedure. The procedure was similar to the procedure of the previous 
experiment with the following exceptions. As they arrived to the laboratory, participants 
were asked their high-school area and then indicated to sit at one table of the two 
existing in the room. Three or four Sciences students sat at one table, and three or four 
Arts students sat at the other table. This procedure was aimed to make their group 
membership salient. Each group sat around a large table facing a computer screen where 
the pictures were displayed. The two groups were sitting so that they could see only the 
screen on their table. The experiment was presented as part of a study on the esthetical 
preferences of students ensuing from the Sciences and the Arts school areas. In the 
learning phase, pictures were labeled Sciences or Arts depending on whether they 
allegedly were preferred by large samples of students of each respective area. The 
distractive piece of music, used in the previous experiment, was played in the 
background with the excuse that that was the normal procedure of the experiment.  
Results 
Recognition and recall. As in the previous experiments, we computed a 
recognition index by summing the pictures correctly recognized (minimum = 0; 
maximum = 20). The one-way ANOVA of Group on the recognition index was non-
significant, F(1, 34) < 1, and the mean recognition was not different from chance, M = 
10.07, SD = .65, t(34) < 1.  
In the written report, fifteen participants declared having found a distinction 
between the two types of pictures, but none reported the actual graphic details. 
Furthermore, one participant reported a distinction, vertical as opposed to horizontal 
90 
pictures (cf. participant # 1 in Table 2), which resembled the actual difference between 
the pictures but her recognition index indicates that she classified the pictures at chance 
(10.75). Therefore, her data were kept in the analysis. The reports mention features of 
the pictures, e.g., dark vs. light or compact vs. sparse, that were not consensual across 
balance conditions (cf. Table 2). 
 
 
No. Group Sciences Pictures Arts Pictures 
Balance 1 
1 Scie More horizontal lines More vertical lines 
5 Arts Very dense  More abstract and bigger 
16 Scie Darker and more geometrical Lighter and less geometrical 
17 Scie More rigid and cubic Have waves with softer lines 
18 Scie More abstract More objective 
19 Scie More abstract Less abstract 
21 Arts More abstract More concrete with landscapes 
Balance 2 
10 Scie More consistent  - 
11 Scie Abstract, indefinable More objective 
12 Arts More compact, closer - 
13 Arts More abstract and geometrical - 
14 Arts More detailed, with no affective 
associations 
- 
22 Arts - Human figures, less defined and 
less filled 
23 Arts Darker Lighter 
28 Scie More subjective - 
 
Table 2. Reports on the distinction between the two series of pictures ordered by balance 
condition and participants’ group (Experiment 2). The responses in bold characters refer pictures’ details 
resembling the actual distinction. Note: Scie = Sciences. 
 
91 
Conformity. We averaged the ratings of the pictures into two new variables of 
conformity to in-group norms and conformity to out-group norms (Norm). As in the 
previous experiment, we began by examining the two new variables jointly for two 
reasons: the first reason is that conformity in the present intergroup context is 
represented by preference for one group preferred pictures and rejection of the other 
group preferred pictures; the second reason is that the two kinds of pictures to be judged 
were intermingled (it is more likely that the two types of pictures affect each other’s 
judgments). We, thus, conducted a Group x Norm ANOVA, with Norm as within-
participants factor. Consistent with our predictions, a Group x Norm interaction, F(1, 
33) = 6.28, p = .017, η2 = .16, revealed that whereas Arts participants preferred in-group 
pictures to out-group pictures, M = 4.01, SD = .64 and M = 3.69, SD = .60, respectively, 
F(1, 33) = 10.10, p = .003, Sciences participants did not preferred one type of pictures 
to the other, M = 3.74, SD = .76 and M = 3.79, SD = .90, respectively, F(1, 33) < 1. All 
the other effects were non-significant, highest, F(1, 33) = 3.70, ns (cf. Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Means of conformity to in-group and out-group norms as a function of participants’ 
group (Experiment 2). 
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The scores of preference for each kind of pictures, analyzed separately, did not 
differed as a function of Group, F(1, 34) = 1.19, ns, and F(1, 34) < 1, for in-group and 
out-group pictures, respectively. The difference of mean ratings of in-group and out-
group pictures from the middle of the scale (testing preference or rejection of pictures in 
absolute terms), showed a single effect in Arts participants’ rejection of out-group 
pictures, t(17) = 2.16, p = .05; all other effects, highest, t(16) = 1.37, ns.  
Conformity and recognition. Similar to the previous experiment, we examined 
the relationship between conformity and recognition dividing the participants into 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ recognizers by median-split of the recognition index, M = 9.51, SD = 
.39 and M = 10.60, SD = .30, respectively. We then entered the new variable as a 
between-participants factor in the Group X Norm ANOVA. There were no significant 
effects involving the new variable, highest, F (1, 31) = 2.61, ns. These results suggest 
that the level of recognition of the group norms did not affected significantly 
participants’ judgments. 
Discussion 
The results supported our predictions. Whereas Arts participants’ judgments 
were affected by the implicit norms, Sciences participants were not. In the case of Arts 
participants, in-group influence led to the rejection of out-group norm not to a 
significant adoption of the in-group norm. However, given the fact that in-group and 
out-group pictures were evaluated in random order, it seems reasonable to assume that 
these participants’ judgments were influenced by their group membership. In contrast, 
Sciences participants appeared to be unaffected by both group norms. We did not 
introduce measures indicating whether non-conformity was due to lack of relevance of 
their group membership in the current context (understandable given its lack of 
competence in the task), to an automatic rejection of out-groups’ norms, or to the 
concurrence of both reasons. The experiment missed these identification measures as 
well as a check of participants’ perception of groups’ credibility in the task. The two 
next experiments were aimed to fulfill these lacunae.  
Nevertheless, the present results are hardly explainable by the traditional model 
of group influence. The model maintains that individuals tend to internalize 
informational influences and to comply with normative influences (e.g., Deutsch & 
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Gerard, 1955; Kelman, 1958). Assuming that internalization corresponds to automatic 
conformity and compliance to controlled conformity (cf. e.g., Moscovici, 1980; 1985), 
why did our Arts participants differentiate between the two groups implicit norms, 
especially if the credibility of the in-group in the task was not call in? If Arts 
participants preferred Arts to Sciences’ norms, because they were sensitive to their 
different informational influence, why were Sciences participants not sensitive to the 
same difference? In contrast, the results are consistent with the assumptions of Referent 
Informational Influence (Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner, 1987; 1991), which assumes 
that the group informational influence is inseparable from the normative component. 
The norm is internalized depending on the importance of group membership, and its 
relevance in the current situation.  
The Referent Informational Influence model holds that individuals routinely rely 
on the standards of meaningful in-groups to make sense of situations, reducing 
uncertainty, to form opinions and attitudes, and to regulate their actions. Our results, 
showing that Arts students were sensitive to in-group and out-group implicit preferences 
even if the credibility of the in-group was not salient, support this idea.  
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Experiment 3 
Conformity to Explicit Norms as a Function of Source’s Credibility and Source’s Group 
Membership 
Although confirming our predictions, the previous experiment did not elucidate 
on the motives underlying participants’ conformity or non-conformity. Furthermore, in 
the previous study, we used natural groups whose stereotypes were opposed in what 
concerns the attributes of credibility relevant for the task. We assumed that the nature of 
task would invoke these attributes, but we did not assessed participants’ perceptions of 
groups’ credibility. The present experiment is aimed to cover some of these lacunae by 
using artificial groups and by measuring variables associated to conformity.  
To ensure that all participants had the same information about the groups and 
that credibility was a salient aspect of the experiment, we designed an experiment, in 
which participants, after being randomly categorized into artificial groups (cf. above, 
Tajfel et al, 1971), were told that their group was either more or less competent than the 
out-group in the task that they were to perform subsequently. Participants were asked, at 
the end of the experiment, about perceptions about the in-group and the out-group 
competence in the task. We expected that participants categorized in the non-competent 
group, given the importance of this dimension in the situation, would misrepresent the 
experimenter’s information so that the out-group would not be perceived as more 
competent than was the in-group. This prediction is consistent with the idea that 
correctness is not an objective attribute of reality and credibility is not an objective 
attribute of sources but the result of social agreements (cf. Moscovici, 1976; Turner, 
1991).  
In this experiment, we also measured participants’ identification with the in-
group and with the out-group. This assessment had two goals: the first goal was to 
check if members of non-competent group identify more with the in-group than with the 
out-group (due to the attractiveness of the out-group, out-group identification was a 
possibility that should be checked); the second goal was to check on the relationship 
among identification, perceived credibility and conformity. Specifically, we 
hypothesized the three variables to be highly correlated. 
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Finally, we examined participants’ explicit conformity to the group by calling 
participants’ attention to the distinctive norms of the two groups before the learning 
phase. We could thus compare the results with those of the previous experiment in 
which conformity was implicit.  
Our final predictions for the present experiment are the same of the previous 
one. We expect conformity to in-group norms and rejection of out-group norms in the 
case of competent group members and non-conformity to any of the norms in the case 
of non-competent members. Consistent with the Referent Informational Influence 
model, we expect thus that the tendencies of explicit conformity would be identical to 
those of implicit conformity. According to the model, group influence is single process 
with a direct and indirect impact in members’ opinions (cf. David & Turner, 1992; 
Turner, 1991). However, calling participants’ attention to the distinctive norms of the 
in-group enhances the prescriptiveness of those norms (e.g., Cialdini, Kallgren & Reno, 
1991; Marques et al, 1998a; 1998b) and induces the need for a distinctive representation 
of the in-group (cf. Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner et al, 1987; Turner, 1991). We thus 
expect more clear patterns of conformity than those obtained in the previous 
experiment. That is, we do not expect explicit norms to increase simply conformity to 
the in-group. That would indicate that controlled conformity concerns only to normative 
influences. Instead, we expect control to increase Referent Informational Influence. In 
the case of the competent group, given that the in-group provides a satisfactory social 
identification, control increases in-group conformity and the rejection of the out-group 
norms. In the case of the non-competent group, which does not provide a relevant 
reference in the current context, control will not change the tendency to non-conformity.  
Method 
Participants and Design. Thirty-seven undergraduate students enrolled in a 
Social Work course (28 females and 9 male; ages ranging between 20 and 41; M = 
24.76; SD = 4.39) volunteered to participate in the experiment. The design was a 
2(Group: Competent vs. Non-competent) X 2(Norm: In-group vs. Out-group) in which 
Group was a between-participant factor and Norm a within-participant factor.  
Procedure. The experiment was conducted in two sessions. The first session was 
aimed to prepare a convincing context for the subsequent categorization of participants 
96 
                                                
into two groups. Participants were told that: “Recent research has found the existence of 
an important dimension of personality that can be detected by a simple perceptive test. 
In the present session, you will complete this test. We will not say more about this 
personality dimension now except that it is the origin of two very distinct perceptive 
types. Your results will be communicated to you in the next session as well as an 
explanation of this personality dimension.” The bogus test that participants were asked 
to complete, consisted in the observation of briefly presented ambiguous pictures, after 
which participants had to describe the first figure they saw in each picture 7.  
One week later, participants were randomly distributed by three sessions of 11-
13 participants each. As they arrived, they were asked to sit facing one of two screens 
existent in the room. The two groups were disposed in the room back to back, so that 
they could not see each other. Participants were then given the feedback of their results. 
Half of the participants were randomly assigned to the Proficient type and the other half 
was assigned to the Progressive type. Participants also read the characteristics of both 
perceptive types: Proficient were described as “creative, imaginative, artistic, sensitive 
and abstract” and Progressive were described as “realistic, objective, practical, concrete, 
and rational”. We used the traits obtained in Pilot Study 2 to ensure that the description 
of one of the artificial groups matched the characteristics valued in the esthetic 
judgment of the pictures and that the description of the other group matched the 
characteristics with the opposed meaning.  
To reinforce the credibility of the Proficient type in the task, participants were 
also told that, “The two perceptive types differ in several aspects. Differences in various 
aptitudes are currently being investigated. The present investigation is aimed to study 
the esthetic taste of Proficient and Progressive. Previous results have shown that the 
esthetic taste of the Proficient persons is, in general, of high quality, similar to that of 
experts in fine art, whereas the taste of Progressive persons is, in general, of low 
esthetic quality.” Participants observed a graph of bars depicted in their booklets 
reinforcing the idea of Proficient’s superior esthetic taste as opposed to Progressive’s 
inferior esthetic taste. 
 
7 The procedure to create artificial groups was based on Marques and colleagues (2001a; Experiments 2 -
3). 
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The subsequent procedure was identical to the one of the previous experiment 
with the following exception: To ensure that participants became aware of the group 
norms, when introducing the learning task, the experimenter noticed that: “Interestingly, 
the pictures preferred by Proficients present always this detail (the graphic detail was 
pointed out in a sample picture displayed on the screen), and the pictures preferred by 
Progressives present always this other detail (the other graphic detail was pointed out in 
another sample picture displayed on the screen).”  
Finally, participants were asked to register their group membership and to 
answer a brief questionnaire including the following questions: “To what extent do you 
think that Proficients are competent in the just finished task?” and “To what extent do 
you think that Progressives are competent in the just finished task?”. Participants also 
answered the following six questions aimed to measure their identification with in-
group and out-group. The questions were extracted from recent research on social 
identity (e.g., Hogg & Hains, 1996; Marques, Abrams & Serodio, 2001), and included, 
“To what extent do (would) you like to have your (the other) perceptive type?”, “To 
what extent do you feel similar to the characteristics of your (the other) perceptive 
type?”, “To what extent do you define yourself as Proficient / Progressive?” All items 
were answered in 7-point scales with labeled ends (1 = Absolutely nothing; 7 = Very 
much). In the end of the session, participants were thoroughly debriefed, ensuring that 
every participant clearly understood that the perceptive test and perceptive types were 
false.  
Results 
Group identification. All participants were aware of their group membership and 
of the norms of the two groups. The items referring to in-group identification were 
averaged into a single index of in-group identification (Cronbach’s alpha = .80), M = 
6.46, SD = 1.31. The items related with identification to the out-group could not be 
averaged (Cronbach’s alpha = .57). Therefore, we retained the item “To what extent do 
you feel similar to the characteristics of the other perceptive type?” because it had the 
highest inter-item correlation, r = .50 (all the others, highest, r = .37). We subsequently 
conducted a Group (Competent vs. Non-competent) X Identification (In-group vs. Out-
group) ANOVA with the latter as within-participants factor. The results show that all 
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participants identified more with the in-group than with the out-group, M = 6.46, SD = 
1.31 and M = 3.03, SD = 1.30, respectively, F(1, 35) = 167.48, p < .001, η2 = .83. The 
significant interaction with Group, F(1, 35) = 28.90, p < .001, η2 = .45, indicates that 
members of the competent group identified more with the in-group relatively to the out-
group, respectively, M = 7.25, SD = .97 and M = 2.55, SD = 1.00, respectively, F(1, 35) 
= 182.57, p < .001, than members of the non-competent group, respectively, M = 5.53, 
SD = 1.00 and M = 3.59, SD = 1.42, respectively, F(1, 35) = 26.47, p < .001. 
Perceived competence of the groups. To examine the differences in perceived 
competence of the two groups, we conducted a Group (Competent vs. Non-competent) 
X Perceived Competence (In-group vs. Out-group) ANOVA, with the latter as within-
participants factor. The results showed a main effect of Perceived competence, M = 
5.30, SD = 1.15 and M = 4.46, SD = 1.63, respectively, F(1, 35) = 6.08, p = .02, η2 = 
.15. The Group x Perceived competence interaction, F(1, 35) = 21.73, p < .001, η2 = 38, 
revealed that, whereas members of the competent group perceived the in-group as more 
competent than the out-group, respectively, M = 5.70, SD = .86 and M = 3.60, SD = .43, 
respectively, F(1, 35) = 27.64, p < .001, members of the non-competent group did not 
perceive one group more competent than the other, M = 4.82, SD = 1.29 and M = 5.47, 
SD = 1.23, respectively, F(1, 35) = 2.23, ns.  
Conformity. We averaged the ratings of the pictures into two new variables of 
conformity to in-group norm and conformity to out-group norm (Norm). As in the 
previous experiments, we began by conducting a Group x Norm ANOVA, with Norm 
as a within-participants factor. The analysis revealed a main effect of Norm, F(1, 35) = 
18.89, p < .001, η2 = .35, qualified by an interaction with Group, F(1, 35) = 18.90, p < 
.001, η2 = .35. In general, participants preferred in-group pictures to out-group pictures, 
M = 4.71, SD = .80 and M = 3.87, SD = 1.04, respectively. As expected, the Group x 
Norm interaction indicates that in-group conformity was significant among the 
participants who had been categorized in the competent group, M = 4.99, SD = .72 and 
M = 3.43, SD = .86, respectively, F(1, 35) = 41.12, p < .001, but not among those who 
had been categorized in the non-competent group, M = 4.39, SD = 1.02 and M = 4.39, 
SD = .79, respectively, F(1, 35) < 1.  
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Competent                      Non Competent 
Participants’ group 
 
 
 
 Figure 4. Means of conformity to in-group and out-group norms as a function of groups’ 
competence in the task (Experiment 3). 
 
Competent group members conformed more to in-group norms than non-
competent group members, F(1, 35) = 5.93, p = .02. Conversely, non-competent group 
members conformed more to out-group norms than competent group members, F(1, 35) 
= 9.63, p = .004 (cf. Figure 4). Comparing the rates of in-group and out-group pictures 
with the middle of the scale, competent participants preferred in-group pictures, t (19) = 
6.18, p < .001, and rejected out-group pictures, t(19) = 2.97, p = .008, whereas non-
competent participants did not preferred or rejected in-group or out-group pictures, 
highest t (16) = 2.03, ns.  
Conformity, identification and perceived groups’ competence.  To examine the 
relationships between the three variables we first computed three indexes. The index of 
Relative In-Group Competence was obtained by subtracting the score of perceived 
competence of the out-group from the score of perceived competence of the in-group so 
that the more positive the more the participant perceives the in-group as superior to the 
out-group. The index of Relative In-group Identification was obtained by subtracting 
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identification from the out-group from identification to the in-group so that the more 
positive the more the participant identified to the in-group relatively to the out-group. 
Finally, the index of Relative In-group Conformity was obtained by subtracting out-
group conformity from in-group conformity so that the more positive the more the 
participant conforms to the in-group relatively to the out-group.  
Relative In-group Conformity was significantly correlated to Relative In-group 
Identification, r = .57, p < .001, and to Relative In-Group Competence, r = .36, p = .03. 
Relative In-group Identification was marginally correlated to Relative In-Group 
Competence, r = .28, p = .09. We also correlated the three indexes within each Group 
condition. Relative In-group Conformity was correlated to Relative In-group 
Identification in the competent group condition, r = .52, p = .02, n = 20; other 
correlations, highest, r = .28, ns. 
Discussion 
The results support the idea that informational influence is inseparable from 
normative influence and that both aspects concur to conform to in-group norms: 
identification is associated with conformity directly, thus increasing normative 
influences, and indirectly because it relates to the perceptions about the validity of 
group norms, thus increasing informational influences.  
However, the results also indicate that the above relationship is stronger when 
in-group credibility is externally recognized. When group’s credibility is questioned by 
external sources the relationship among in-group identification, perceived competence 
and conformity decreases. Several aspects may have contributed for this result namely 
the conflict between opposed motives. This conflict is also reflected in the perceptions 
of in-group and out-group competence. Indeed, even if the ascriptions of credibility 
came from a neutral or impartial source, the experimenter, non-competent members 
distorted the information and perceptually leveled the two groups. The perception of 
leveled credibility is consistent with their non-preference for one of the two group 
norms. 
If compared with the results of Experiment 2, competent group members 
displayed more in-group conformity as well as rejection of out-group norms. The fact 
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that the same did not occurred in non-competent group members suggests that explicit 
norms do not boost exclusively normative influences. The larger influence of explicit 
in-group norms as regards implicit norms seems to depend mainly on its perceived 
validity, not of self-imposed pressure to comply.  
It could be argued that there were some noticeable differences between 
Experiments 2 and 3 preventing the comparison of their respective results. In the next 
experiment, we search further validation of our hypotheses by comparing directly the 
implicit and explicit influence of competent and non-competent groups.  
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Experiment 4 
Effects of Sources’ Credibility and Group Membership on Conformity to Explicit and 
Implicit Norms 
In the present experiment, we categorized the participants in two artificial 
groups with different competence in the task, using the same procedure as in 
Experiment 3, and added a condition in which participants were unaware of the groups’ 
norms. Our predictions are the same of the previous experiments: competent group 
members will conform to in-group norms and non-competent group members will not 
conform to any of the group norms, that is, there will be no differences between the 
patterns of implicit and explicit conformity. As argued before, explicit norms are more 
prescriptive (Marques et al, 1998) and enhance the need for positive distinctiveness 
(Turner et al, 1988). Consequently, we expect an increase of in-group conformity from 
the implicit to the explicit condition in the case of competent group members for whom 
the in-group is a valid reference. In what concerns the relationships of in-group 
identification, perceived competence with conformity we expect positive correlations, at 
least, when norms are explicit and the group is competent.  
Method 
Participants were 57 high-school pupils (37 female and 20 male; M = 16.61, SD 
= 2.65) that volunteered to participate. We used a 2(Norm Type: Explicit vs. Implicit) x 
2(Group: Competent vs. Non-competent) x 2(Norm: In-group vs. Out-group) design, in 
which the latter factor was within-participants. The procedure was the same as in the 
previous experiment with the exception that, whereas participants in the explicit norm 
condition were called attention to the distinctive graphic details of the two groups’ 
preferred pictures, participants in the implicit norm condition were not informed of the 
details.  
Results 
Identification. All participants recalled their correct perceptive type. To inspect 
on the participants’ in-group identification we averaged the three items on identification 
to the in-group into an index of in-group identification (Cronbach’s alpha = .85), and 
averaged the items on identification to the out-group into an index of out-group 
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Competent                    Non-Competent 
Participants’ Group 
identification (Cronbach’s alpha = .82). We then conducted a Group x Norm Type x 
Identification (to the in-group vs. to the out-group) ANOVA in which Identification was 
a within-participants factor. The analysis yielded a single significant effect of the 
within-participants factor, F(1, 53) = 45.91, p < .001, η2 = .46; all the other effects, 
highest, F(1, 53) = 2.90, ns, η2 = .05. Participants identified more with the in-group than 
with the out-group independently of the fact that they belonged to the credible or to the 
not credible group, M = 5.28, SD = 1.27 and M = 3.37, SD = 1.34, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 5. Means of attribution of competence in the task for in-group and out-group as a function 
of the categorization in the competent or in the non-competent group (Experiment 4). 
 
Perceived groups’ competence. We then inspected the responses to the two 
items that measured the perceived competence of the two groups in the task. A Norm 
Type x Group x Perceived Competence (of the in-group vs. of the out-group) ANOVA, 
in which Perceived Competence was a within-participants factor, revealed a significant 
effect of Group, F(1, 53) = 10.82, p = .002, η2 = .17. All the other effects were non-
significant, highest, F(1, 53) = 3.70, ns. Whereas competent participants evaluated the 
in-group as more competent in the task than the out-group, F(1, 55) = 14.44, p < .001, 
η2 = .21, M = 5.42, SD = 1.31 and M = 3.68, SD = 1.33, respectively, non-competent 
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participants did not evaluate the in-group as more competent than the out-group, F(1, 
55) < 1, M = 4.77, SD = 1.61 and M = 4.31, SD = 1.59, respectively (cf. Figure 5).  
Recognition and recall. We computed a recognition index by summing the 
number of pictures correctly recognized (minimum = 0; maximum = 20). The Norm 
Type x Group ANOVA on the recognition index yielded a significant main effect of 
Norm Type, F(1, 56) = 67.31, p < .001, η2 = .56. Other effects were all non-significant, 
highest effect, F(1, 56) = 3.46, ns. In the implicit condition, recognition was not 
different from chance, t(28) < 1, M = 10.14, SD = 2.59, whereas in the explicit 
condition, recognition was superior, t(27) = 9.87, p < .001, M = 17.54, SD = 4.04.  
In the implicit condition, 23 participants reported having found a distinction 
between the two series of the pictures but none was able to articulate the actual 
difference, or a distinction close to the actual difference. Five participants reported that 
Proficient pictures were lighter than Progressive pictures, but three were in one balance 
condition and two were in the other balance condition (cf. Table 3). One participant 
reported that the Progressive pictures were darker than the Proficient pictures. In the 
explicit condition, all participants mentioned the graphic details except for eight 
participants that, as revealed in the debriefing, thought they should mentioned other 
features apart from the details. 
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No. Group Proficient Pictures Progressive Pictures 
Balance 1 
16 Progr More creative but hardly 
comprehensible 
More comprehensible 
17 Progr Very complicated More comprehensible 
18 Progr Clearer more blank spaces Darker 
19 Progr Composed by smaller objects Composed by larger objects 
21 Progr With smaller characters With larger characters 
25 Progr Lighter with more blank spaces Darker 
27 Progr Funnier and more elaborated More simple 
20 Profic More declarative and comprehensible Harder  to understand 
22 Profic More explicit, show creativity More practical (abstract) 
23 Profic Explicative, interesting, enhance the beauty of the pictures and of reality 
More practical, simple and 
abstract 
28 Profic With beautiful figures with imagination 
More practical and uglier 
Balance 2 
5 Progr More round and complex More abstract and simpler 
6 Progr Simpler More complex 
7 Progr More complicated and artistic Simpler 
9 Progr Black dots are more concentrated More white spaces 
12 Progr More abstract With some figures like 
animals, etc. 
13 Progr Lighter Darker 
14 Progr Lighter with more dots Darker with more squares 
1 Profic - More realistic with real forms 
3 Profic - Smaller 
4 Profic More varied texture Less varied texture 
10 Profic More irrational, e.g., with waves, 
oscillations  
Less irrational 
11 Profic Lighter Darker 
 
Table 3. Reports on the distinction between the two series of pictures in the implicit norm 
condition ordered by balance condition and participants’ group (Experiment 4). Note: Profic = Proficient; 
Progr = Progressive. 
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Conformity. We first averaged the ratings of the pictures into two new variables 
of conformity to the in-group norm and conformity to the out-group norm (Norm). Then 
we conducted a Norm Type x Group x Norm ANOVA, with Norm as a within-
participants factor. According to our hypothesis, we expected a main effect of Norm, 
showing that participants conformed more to in-group than to out-group norms, and a 
Group x Norm interaction showing that this effect was significant only in participants 
categorized in the competent group.  
 
  In-Group Pictures 
Out-Group 
Pictures 
 
t-test 
4.20a 3.70 a 2.21 
Competent Group 
0.85 0.67 .04 
4.25 a 3.85 a 1.72 
Implicit 
Non-competent Group 
0.82 0.98 ns 
4.75 a 3.25 a 3.38 
Competent Group 
1.08 0.86 .005 
3.66 b 3.54 a < 1 
Explicit 
Non-competent Group 
0.92 0.91 - 
4.47 a 3.48 a 3.77 
Competent Group 
0.99 0.79 .001 
3.96 b 3.69 a 1.52 
Non-competent Group 
0.91 0.94 ns 
4.23 a 3.77 a 2.84 
Implicit 
0.82 0.81 .008 
4.24 a 3.38 a 2.90 
Sub-totals 
Explicit 
1.13 0.88 .007 
4.23 3.58 3.90 
Total 
0.98 0.86 < .001 
 
Table 4. Means of conformity to in-group and out-group norms (standard deviation in italics) as 
a function of groups’ competence and type of norm, and t-test of differences (significance in italics). Pairs 
of means in column with different superscripts are different at p < .05, using t-tests (Experiment 4). 
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The analysis revealed a main effect of Norm, F(1, 53) = 21.85, p < .001, η2 = 
.29, qualified by an interaction with Group, F(1, 53) = 7.39, p = .009, η2 = .12. In 
general, participants conformed more to the in-group than to the out-group norms (cf. 
Table 4). As expected, the Group x Norm interaction indicates that this effect was 
significant among the participants categorized in the competent group, F(1, 55) = 26.16, 
p < .001, η2 = .32, but not among those categorized in the non-competent group, F(1, 
55) = 1.59, ns, η2 = .02.  
Also consistent with our predictions, the Norm Type x Norm interaction was 
non-significant, F(1, 53) = 1.74, ns, η2 = .03, suggesting that conformity to the in-group 
norm did not depend on participants’ awareness of the norms. Specifically, participants 
conformed more to the in-group than to the out-group norm, both in the explicit 
condition, F(1, 55) = 16.73, p < .001, η2 = .22, and in the implicit condition, F(1, 55) = 
4.93, p = .03, η2 = .06.  
The overall interaction was significant, F(1, 53) = 5.65, p = .021, η2 = .10, 
indicating that the Group x Norm interaction was significant in the explicit condition, 
F(2, 53) = 16.41,  p < .001, η2 = .36,  and marginally significant in the implicit 
condition, F(2, 53)  = 2.98,  p < .06, η2 = .07. However, the Group x Norm interaction, 
within the implicit and explicit conditions, respectively, depicts identical patterns of 
responses that differ only in magnitude (cf. Table 4 and Figure 6). In the explicit 
condition, competent participants preferred in-group to out-group pictures F(1, 53) = 
32.63, p < .001, more than non-competent participants, F(1, 53) <1. Similarly, in the 
implicit condition, competent participants preferred in-group to out-group pictures, F(1, 
53) = 3.87, p = .05, more than non-competent participants, F(1, 53) = 2.09, ns (cf. 
Figure 9). All the other results were non-significant, highest F(1, 53) = 1.62, ns. 
Comparing conformity to in-group and out-group norms separately across 
conditions shows that conformity to the in-group norm was generally higher among 
competent than non-competent participants, but this effect revealed significant only in 
explicit conditions. In contrast, conformity to the out-group norm did not differed as a 
function of either Norm Type or Group. (cf. Table 4). 
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Figure 6. Means of conformity to the in-group and out-group norm as a function of groups’ 
competence in the task in the explicit and implicit norm conditions (Experiment 4). 
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The tests of difference from the middle of the scale revealed that only competent 
participants in the explicit condition preferred in-group pictures and rejected out-group 
pictures, t(14) = 2.69, p = .02 and t(14) = 3.39, p = .004, respectively; other results, 
highest, t(12) = 1.83, ns. 
Conformity and recognition. To check on the relationship between awareness of 
norms and conformity in the implicit norm condition, we divided participants of this 
condition into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ recognizers by median-split of the recognition index, M 
= 12.42, SD = 2.11 and M = 8.53, SD = 1.42, respectively, creating a new two-level 
variable, Recognition. We then performed a Group x Recognition x Norm ANOVA, 
which yielded a significant Norm x Recognition interaction, F(1, 25) = 4.61, p = .04. 
The decomposition of the interaction revealed that whereas ‘bad’ recognizers did not 
differentiate between in-group and out-group pictures, M = 4.07, SD = .95 and M = 
3.83, SD = .79, respectively, F(1, 27) = 1.95, ns, ‘good’ recognizers preferred in-group 
to out-group pictures, M = 4.44, SD = .52 and M = 3.68, SD = .91, respectively, F(1, 27) 
= 13.93, p = .001. This effect was not qualified by a full interaction, F(1, 25) = 1.68, ns. 
Norm 
Type Group  
Perceived 
Competence Conformity 
Identification .16 .11 Competent 
n = 16 Perceived Competence - -.07 
Identification .82** 
Implicit  
Non-
competent 
n = 13 Perceived Competence  - 
.46 
.52 
Identification  .46 .55* Competent 
n = 15 Perceived Competence - .78** 
Identification  .47 -.07 
Explicit  
Non-
competent 
n = 13 Perceived Competence - -.42 
 
Table 5. Correlations between Relative In-Group Identification, Relative Perceived Competence 
and Relative In-Group Conformity within each between-participants cell (Experiment 4). Note: * p < .05; 
** p < .001 (two-tailed) 
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Conformity, identification and perceived groups’ competence. To examine the 
relationships between these three variables, we proceeded as in the previous experiment, 
by first computing three indexes: Relative In-Group Conformity, Relative In-Group 
Identification and Relative In-Group Competence. All correlations revealed significant:  
Relative In-Group Conformity was correlated to Relative In-Group Identification, r = 
.27, p = .05 and to Relative In-Group Competence, r = .36, p = .006; Relative In-Group 
Identification was correlated to Relative In-Group Competence, r = .49, p < .001. We 
then performed the same correlations within each between-participants cell (cf. Table 
5). 
Consistent with the previous experiment, Relative In-group Conformity was 
correlated to Relative In-group Identification in the explicit / competent group 
condition. In the present study, conformity was also highly correlated to perceived 
competence. Even though non-significant, the correlations of perceived competence 
among non-competent group members, positive with identification and negative with 
conformity, provide a hint on the dilemmas of low status group members. Conversely, 
correlations in the implicit / non-competent group condition are more consistent with 
our hypotheses. Nevertheless, conformity is not significantly correlated with the other 
variables. 
Discussion 
The results replicate our findings showing that participants’ preferential 
conformity to in-group over out-group norms was independent of their awareness of the 
groups’ norms. Similar to our previous results, this effect emerged only when the in-
group entailed a valid reference in the context. The results also showed that this effect 
was significantly larger when participants were aware than when they were unaware of 
the groups’ preferences indicating that conscious motives and beliefs about the validity 
of in-group norms increases conformity. Clarification of the norms increases their 
prescriptiveness and, consequently, members’ normative behavior (e.g., Cialdini et al, 
1991; Marques et al, 1998a). The motives related with the need for cognitive clarity of 
the in-group (e.g., Turner et al, 1987) and the need for a positive identity (e.g., Tajfel, 
1978) are likely to play also a significant role in this process.  
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However, increased conformity to explicit norms cannot be attributable to the 
exclusive operation of normative influences; otherwise, results would show an 
analogous increase of in-group conformity among non-competent members. The results 
indicate that, although the influence of group norms depends decisively on individuals’ 
awareness of the norms, the traditional assumption that normative influences depend 
more than informational influences on individual control (e.g., Moscovici, 1980; 1985) 
seems unfounded. Instead, the results are consistent with the Referent Informational 
Influence model, which postulates that, when group membership is meaningful, group 
norms are processed as a whole encompassing both normative and informational 
components. 
The results also show an overall positive correlation among perceived in-group 
credibility, in-group identification and in-group conformity. However, this relationship 
between conformity and the other variables prevails only in explicit norms conditions, 
and, similar to Experiment 3, only when the in-group is credible. One possible 
interpretation for the low correlations in the implicit norm conditions is that whereas 
conformity is implicit, identification and perceived competence are explicit, thus, likely 
to reflect conscious motives. Nevertheless, it should be noticed that the results of non-
competent participants were consistent with our hypothesis.  
Conclusion 
Consistent with recent findings showing that social identity processes operate at 
an implicit level (e.g., Cameira et al, 2002; Devine, 1989; Greenwald et al, 1998; Otten 
& Wentura, 1999; Perdue et al, 1990), our results suggest that in-group influence 
operates also at an implicit level. The analysis of implicit conformity seemed also 
relevant to question the traditional theoretical distinction between normative and 
informational influences. Our results showing that when the credible source was 
perceived as belonging to an out-group participants did not conformed more to its norm 
than to that of a non credible in-group, suggest that normative influence is as 
automatically effective as informational influence. The results support the Referent 
Informational Influence model of conformity (Hogg & Turner, 1987; McGarty et al, 
1992; Turner, 1987; 1991).  
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In the second study, we shall examine the operation of implicit processes in 
normative differentiation. The next chapter is dedicated to review relevant literature on 
intragroup differentiation processes that are related with social identity. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SOCIAL IDENTITY AND NORMATIVE DIFFERENTIATION 
Not all members conform to the influence of the group and its norms. The extent 
into which members conform or deviate from group norms is a major cause for 
intragroup differentiation, dubbed normative differentiation in the remaining of the 
chapter8. Normative differentiation was early investigated in the context of small group 
dynamics (e.g., Cartwright & Zander, 1968) and in the context of minority influence 
(e.g., Moscovici, 1976; 1985). We shall briefly review these traditional approaches to 
normative differentiation. 
Traditional Research on Normative Differentiation 
Classical references in the study of reactions to group deviance in small groups 
are Schachter’s (1951) and Festinger, Schachter and Back (1950) experiments. 
Theoretically, Festinger’s (1950) theory of informal social communication is also a 
significant benchmark of this field. We have already tackled some of Festinger’s (1950) 
principles in the previous chapter; therefore, we shall briefly review the hypotheses 
more relevant for the present topic and proceed with subsequent developments.  
Group Pressures towards Uniformity 
Festinger (1950) presents several postulates regarding group deviance and the 
group pressures towards uniformity. The author proposes that three group variables are 
related to the magnitude of pressures to uniformity: the perceived opinion discrepancy 
among group members, the relevance of the issue to the group function, and group 
cohesiveness. Two other variables related with the deviant members are predicted to 
increase pressures to uniformity: The perception of deviants as group members or the 
desire that they will be group members, and the perception that communication pressure 
will change their opinion. The theory also assumes that opinion change in deviant 
members is a function of the magnitude of the group pressure, their desire to remain in 
the group and the perceived support for their opinion in other groups.  
 
8 We use the term proposed by Marques, Abrams, Páez and Martinez-Taboada (1998b)  
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In his classical experiment, Schachter (1951) provided empirical support for 
some of Festinger’s (1950) postulates. The author asked participants to participate in a 
group discussion, allegedly, aimed to form a club. There were 32 groups in four 
experimental conditions: high or low group cohesiveness and relevance or irrelevance 
of the issue of discussion. The participants were asked to discuss the treatment that 
should be given to Johnny Rocco, a juvenile delinquent. The case was presented in a 
sympathetic way to induce participants’ favoring of a kindhearted treatment as opposed 
to punishment. Clubs were formed of five to seven participants and three confederates: 
the mode, which agreed with the group during all the discussion; the slider, which 
initially disagreed with the group, defending a harsh punishment of the delinquent, but 
allowing to be gradually persuaded by the group; and the deviant, which disagreed with 
the group during all the discussion, defending a harsh punishment of the delinquent.  
Relevance was manipulated by the relevance of the discussion topic to the 
purpose of the club. For half of the participants, the purpose of the club was either 
editorial, to advise national magazines on articles and policy, or case study, to advise a 
group of lawyers, judges and social workers on the treatment of delinquents. For the 
other half of the participants, the club was aimed to form a local theatre company or a 
local radio station. The discussion of the juvenile delinquent case was made relevant for 
the former two clubs but not for the two latter clubs. Cohesiveness was manipulated by 
the attractiveness of the club to the members. The case-study club was formed by 
participants that previously showed high interest in joining the club, and the editorial 
club was formed by participants that previously showed high interest in joining the 
case-study club. The theatre club was formed by participants that previously showed 
high interest in the theatre activity, and the radio club was formed by participants that 
previously showed high interest in joining the theatre club. 
The analysis of communications during the discussion revealed that 
communications to deviants increased linearly during the discussion and were stronger 
in the high relevance and high cohesiveness conditions than in the low relevance and 
low cohesion conditions. In the high cohesiveness / high relevance condition, there was 
a slight decline by the end of the discussion. Communications to sliders increased in the 
beginning of the discussion; when sliders shifted to the group position, communication 
decreased steadily until the end of the discussion. Finally, communications to modes 
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were insignificant during all the discussion. The results also show that, among the 
confederates, modes received more sociometric choices than sliders and these latter 
more than deviants did. A similar pattern emerged in the assignment to three committee 
positions in the club: modes received more nominations to the position with an 
intermediate prestige; sliders received nominations to either the most prestigious or the 
least prestigious of the three positions; finally, deviants received most nominations for 
the less prestigious position except in the low cohesiveness and low relevant condition. 
The results obtained by Schachter’s (1950; cf. also, Festinger & Thibaut, 1951) 
confirmed those of Festinger et al’s (1950) field study concerning the unpopularity of 
members that deviate from the group standards and do not contribute to the group, 
especially in cohesive groups.  As referred in the previous chapter, Festinger (1950) 
postulates that groups allot time and energy communicating with members that deviate 
from the group consensus and, ultimately, reject them because deviant members 
jeopardize the validity of the group consensus about social reality and the possibility 
that the group reaches its goals. In contrast, normative members uphold the validity of 
group consensus and contribute for group locomotion. Normative members endorse the 
group opinions and goals, consequently, they are more attractive and are assigned to 
more prestigious positions than are deviant members. Normative members also change 
their opinions less than deviant members, and communicate more to deviants members 
than to other normative members (Festinger, Gerard, Hymovitch, Kelley & Raven, 
1952).  
Differential Reactions to Deviance 
Israel (1956) and Collins and Raven (1969) presented relevant contributes to the 
study of group reactions to deviance. Israel (1956) pointed out that, reactions to 
deviance could not be reduced to a general negative reaction. The author distinguished 
between inclusive reactions, including attempts to change the deviant’s opinion, and 
exclusive reactions, including isolation or expulsion of the deviant from the group (cf. 
also Orcutt, 1973). Israel (1956) also argued that individuals do not always seek 
corroborating support for their beliefs. Often individuals are motivated to evaluate the 
objectivity of their opinions and choose to compare with opinions different from them. 
Collins and Raven (1969) also contemplated the instances in which individuals are 
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motivated to re-evaluate their own opinions upon disagreement with others. The authors 
distinguish between different strategies aimed to deal with disagreement: Individuals 
may change their own opinions; attempt to persuade the other; minimize the importance 
of the disagreement; rejecting or derogating the other; and distinguish the other as a 
person from his or her opinions.  
Status and Deviance 
Another perspective, which tackles the issue of group deviance, is that of 
Hollander (e.g., 1958; 1960). Hollander (1958) argues that members acquire status in 
the group by the accumulation of positive impressions in other members, what the 
author dubbed ‘idiosyncratic credit’. These credits result from positive contributes of 
the member to the group in the form of competent performance, guiding the group in 
successful directions, etc. Idiosyncratic credit allows the member to show 
nonconformity to the group consensus and to be influential to change the group norms. 
As Hollander (1960) argues, ‘A person gains credits, i.e., rises in status, by showing 
competence and conforming to the expectancies applicable to him at the time. 
Eventually his credits allow him to nonconform with greater impunity’ (p. 365). The 
model was applied to understand how leaders are able to change the group norms 
without the resistance from the followers (e.g., Hollander, 1985).  
An important specification of the model is that for a competent member to earn 
idiosyncratic credit for nonconformity is that s/he must previous show conformity to the 
norms of the group. In an experiment aimed to confirm the model, Hollander (1960) 
formed groups of six participants that were to work in 15 trials on a complex matrix in 
order to obtain the maximum payoff for the group. Each group had to agree previously 
on the rules for the procedure in the trials. One confederate deviate from the group in 
following conditions: he contested and opposed, or not, the group in this preliminary 
phase; and later in the experiment, he contested and violated, or not, the rules 
established by the group to the procedure. In all conditions, the confederate proved to be 
highly competent in the task thus contributing for maximizing the group payoff.  
The results showed that groups accepted the (competent) opinion of the 
confederate the most when he conformed to the group before and during the trials and 
accepted it the least when he contested the group in the two moments. More 
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importantly, the group was more influenced by the member’s opinion when he violated 
the rules but had previously agreed with the group, than when he opposed to the group 
in the preliminary phase and conformed to the rules during the trials. Hollander’s (1958; 
1960) model was subjected to several tests that refined its predictions relatively to the 
deviant’s status or existence of formal punitions (e.g., Wahrman, 1970) or the degree of 
non conformity of the deviant (e.g., Wiggins, Dill & Schwartz, 1965). 
Positive Differentiation of Minorities 
Another field of research that is relevant for the issue of normative 
differentiation is that of minority influence. As described in the previous chapter, 
minorities can produce opinion change as effectively as majorities (e.g., Moscovici & 
Lage, 1972; Moscovici, Lage & Naffrechoux, 1969; Mugny, 1982; Mugny & Pérez, 
1991; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1974). Although it is assumed that, in general, they provoke 
negative feelings in majority members, “a minority is bound to be rejected and disliked” 
(Moscovici, 1976, p. 199), minorities’ opinions and arguments, conveyed in particular 
modes of communication, are positively considered and evaluated by majorities’ 
members. As Moscovici (1976) proposes, whereas majority influence is accepted 
because majority sources are attractive and therefore liked, minority influence is 
accepted because minority sources are admired and recognized for their assurance. For 
Moscovici (1976), attractiveness and influence are two independent aspects that are 
correlated in the case of majorities and uncorrelated in the case of minorities.  
For instance, in the second part of Moscovici, Lage and Naffrechoux’s (1969) 
experience, in which two confederates consistently diverged from the majority of four 
naïve participants (cf. previous chapter), the authors asked participants to judge the 
other five members regarding their competence, assurance, preference to integrate a 
future experiment and capacity to lead the group in a future experiment. The results 
showed that the judgments of the deviant/minority members did not differed from those 
of the majority in all respects except in assurance, in which the first of the pair of 
deviants scored higher than did all the other members.  
Nemeth and Wachtler (1973) simulated a trial with a five person-jury, in which 
one confederate (to be deviant in the forthcoming interaction) either chose to sit in the 
head chair or was assigned to the head chair at the beginning of the session. The 
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confederate was able to change the group consensus in the first but not in the second 
condition. In a post-experimental questionnaire, the ‘willful’ deviant (but not the 
‘forced’ one) was judged as more consistent, more independent, more strong-willed, to 
have induced them to think more and reassess their own positions than the other 
members of the group. The deviant was also considered less perceptive, less warm, less 
reasonable and fair, and was less liked than the other members were.   
The minority influence research (see also, Levine & Ranelli, 1978; Nemeth & 
Wachtler, 1974) showed that deviant members are evaluated negatively in dimensions 
traditionally used to measure differentiation within majorities, such as, sociometric 
choices, appointment to leading positions, but they may be positively evaluated in 
dimensions relevant for the change of consensus, such as, respect, independence, 
certainty or influence.  
We have succinctly reviewed traditional approaches to normative differentiation, 
which addressed processes occurring in small interactive groups. We shall now focus on 
social identity models of intragroup differentiation, whose principles apply to large 
social groups as well as to small interactive groups.  
Social Identity Approaches to Normative Differentiation 
As seen in Chapter 1, the social identity approach tends to stress the role of 
intergroup differentiation and intragroup assimilation, rather than intragroup 
differentiation (e.g., Doise, Deschamps & Meyer, 1978; Eiser & Stroebe, 1972; Tajfel, 
1959; cf. Chapter 1). However, several aspects mediate the perception of differentiation 
within in-group or out-group, such as, the relative status of the groups, and the 
relevance and valence of the comparative dimension (cf. Simon, 1992). For instance, 
Simon and Pettigrew (1990) manipulated the size of the in-group as regards the out-
group in artificially created groups and found that participants perceived more in-group 
variability in the case of majorities and more out-group variability in the case of 
minorities. Participants also perceived the behavior of minority out-group or in-group 
members to be more predictable than that of majority members (cf. also, Simon & 
Brown, 1987; Simon & Mummendey, 1990). These results are consistent with the idea 
that minorities reveal stronger in-group identification than majorities, resulting in a 
higher level of self-stereotyping (e.g., Brewer, 1991; 1993; Mullen, 1991). Other 
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research related to group status (e.g., Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1998; Lorenzi-Cioldi, Eagly & 
Stewart, 1995) and power (e.g., Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Stevens & Fiske, 2000) revealed 
that low status or powerless group members tend to self-stereotype more than high 
status and powerful group members.  
The above evidence opposes the prevailing idea that the tendency to differentiate 
among in-group members and to homogenize out-group members leads the processing 
of information on groups (e.g., Ostrom, Prior & Simpson, 1981; Quattrone & Jones, 
1980) and in the formation of group representations (e.g., Linville, Fischer & Salovey, 
1989; Judd & Park, 1988; Park, Judd & Ryan, 1991). As Simon (1992) pointed out, the 
perception of relative group homogeneity is socially mediated and, as such, a 
‘hypothetically variable process’ that is not reducible to a general cognitive process.  
More important for our present concerns, the above results indicate that social 
identity plays a decisive role in the differentiation within the in-group (cf. also, Simon, 
Pantaleo & Mummendey, 1995). Indeed, research on several intragroup phenomena has 
revealed that social identity processes are also relevant in the intragroup context (cf. 
Hogg & Hardie, 1991; 1992; Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988; Marques & Yzerbyt, 
1988). As Hogg (1996) pointed out, the social identity view on intragroup processes 
distinguishes from the traditional view because it is based on distinct assumptions, 
namely: 
“(1) A group is a collection of people who categorize themselves in terms 
of the same social categorization; (2) interpersonal processes are conceptually 
separate from group processes; (3) the intergroup social comparative context is 
an integral feature of the analysis; and (4) a complete explanation requires 
articulation of cognitive and social processes.” (p. 71) 
One of the former social identity approaches to intragroup differentiation was 
that of Hogg and colleagues (e.g., Hogg, Cooper-Shaw & Holzworth, 1993; Hogg & 
Hardie, 1991; 1992). These authors investigated the effect of members’ prototypicality 
in their social attractiveness (cf. also, Hogg, Hardie & Reynolds, 1995; for reviews, see 
Hogg, 1996a; 1996b). The effects of prototypicality on leadership endorsement were 
also the focus of extensive research (e.g., Fielding & Hogg, 1997; Hains, Hogg & Duck, 
1997; Hogg, Hains & Mason, 1998; for a review, see Hogg, 2001a). Differentiation 
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based on prototypicality matches the scope of the present analysis because, for Self-
Categorization Theory, the group prototype corresponds to the defining norm of the 
group (cf. Chapter 1). 
Intragroup Differentiation as a Function of Members’ Prototypicality 
As seen above, Self-Categorization Theory sustains that individuals are 
motivated to hold a clear perception of their social environment. Individuals feel 
confident when others’ behavior is consistent with their representations of the respective 
groups. Certainty about one’s representations of the social world corresponds to 
certainty about one’s own position in the world and to certainty about others’ behavior; 
the perception that others’ behavior is predictable from the recognition of their group 
membership (cf. Hogg, 2000; 2001; Turner et al, 1987).  
Prototypicality and Attractiveness 
Whereas typical in-group or out-group members affirm the validity of people’s 
beliefs on the social world, atypical in-group or out-group members invalidate them and 
generate uncertainty. A consequence of this need to reduce to uncertainty is that 
members’ social attractiveness varies with their prototypicality, i.e., members will be 
the more socially attractive the more they represent the group both by being similar to 
other in-group members and by differentiating from out-group members (cf. Hogg, 
1992; 1996; Whetherell, 1987). Hogg, Cooper-Shaw and Holzworth (1993) measured 
the prototypicality of the self and other members, self-involvement in the group in work 
teams of an Australian organization. The authors also collected the respondents’ 
sociometric choices based on the group or on friendship. The authors found that 
respondents that ascribed more importance to the group were not considered particularly 
attractive, on an interpersonal basis; conversely, those that did not feel the group highly 
important, attracted more choices based on friendship. In general, group-based 
attraction for other members was more related with their prototypicality than with their 
personal attractiveness, whereas interpersonal attraction was not related with group 
variables. 
Categorical salience and identification. Higher attraction to prototypical 
members is associated with the distinction between interpersonal and social attraction, 
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an issue addressed in Chapter 1 (cf. Hogg, 1987; 1992; 1993; Hogg & Turner 1985a; 
1985b). As social attraction is intimately related with the salience of common group 
membership, the positive differentiation of prototypical members should occur in salient 
group contexts rather than in salient interpersonal contexts and should be more evident 
in members highly identified to the group. To inspect these hypotheses, Hogg and 
Hardie (1991) asked the members of an Australian football team to rank their 
teammates in terms of prototypicality, social attraction and personal attraction following 
instructions that made salient their group membership or their interpersonal 
relationships. The results revealed that the members’ prototypicality was more 
associated with liking and popularity under salient team instructions, than in conditions 
that rendered individuality and interpersonal relationships salient. In addition, judgers 
who identified more strongly with the team differentiated more among other members 
based on prototypicality than did less identified judgers. Hogg and Hardie (1992) also 
confirmed the hypothesis that group salience determines the preference for prototypical 
members, using the autokinetic paradigm with four-person groups. In the groups that 
converged more in their judgments of estimates, that is, those in which the in-group 
category was more salient, participants reported more attraction for more prototypical 
members than for less prototypical members.  
Hogg, Hardie and Reynolds (1995) manipulated the dimensions in which the 
participant and the target member were similar. The experiment was presented as a 
study on consumer behavior and participants were first categorized in one of two groups 
of consumer style, ‘Visual’ or ‘Tactile’, as function of their responses to a bogus 
projective test. After testing an alleged new product, participants were led to believe 
that they would continue the testing with another partner (interpersonal condition) or a 
four-person group (group condition). They were then asked to form an impression on 
their partner or a member of the group. The participant and the target member could be 
similar in two dimensions (preferences in appearance and flavor of the product): one 
dimension was stereotypical of the in-group and the other of the out-group. Participants 
were similar to the target in either one or other dimensions, in both or neither. 
The results showed that the more strongly participants identified with their group 
the more they favorably evaluated the in-group target when the target was similar in the 
in-group stereotypical dimension, thus being in-group prototypical. This relationship 
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decreased with prototypical dissimilar targets and with targets similar in the dimension 
stereotypical of the out-group. In addition, participants made more favorable ratings of 
in-group prototypical targets in the group than in the interpersonal condition. The results 
also showed that the preference for prototypical members was mediated by the 
accentuation of perceived similarity in the prototypical dimension. As the authors argue, 
in group contexts, the relationship between similarity and attraction or favorability is 
determined by the relevance of similarity for the salient categorization.  
Prototypicality and Leadership Endorsement 
Members’ prototypicality is also determining of their potential for leadership 
and leadership appointment is, in fact, a form of intragroup differentiation. The social 
identity theory of leadership (e.g., Hogg, 2001a) proposes three processes concurring to 
increase the influence of prototypical leaders: prototypicality, social attraction, and 
attributional processes. As seen above, prototypical group members are more socially 
attractive than are non-prototypical members (e.g., Hogg & Hardie, 1991; 1992; Hogg 
et al, 1993; 1995). Prototypical members are also influential to polarize group positions 
away from out-group positions thus contributing for group distinctiveness (cf. e.g., 
Abrams et al, 1990; McGarty et al, 1992; Whetherell, 1987). Prototypical members are 
more persuasive than are non-prototypical members: their arguments are more recalled 
and they induce more opinion change than those of non-prototypical members (cf. van 
Knippenberg, Lossie & Wilke, 1994; van Knippenberg & Wilke, 1992). Furthermore, 
the positive characteristics of prototypical members encourage dispositional attributions 
of charismatic leadership. As Hogg (2001) puts it,  
“The consequence is a tendency to construct a charismatic leadership 
personality for that person that, to some extent, separates that person from the 
rest of the group and reinforces the perception of status-based structural 
differentiation within the group into leader(s) and followers.” (p. 190) 
Endurance of prototypical leaders. The leader’s prototypicality also determines 
the endurance of his or her leadership (Hogg, 2001a). By occupying an influential 
position in the group, the leader is more effective in changing the group norms, thus 
obtaining increased group prototypicality and consequently more influence. Contextual 
shifts cause shifts of the group position as regards out-groups and, consequently, 
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changes in the characteristics of prototypical members. Contextual changes bear an 
important impact on how leaders are perceived by followers. Specifically, they may be 
seen as less group prototypical and, consequently, to be less influential. Leaders may 
then try to manipulate their own prototypical position by activating or encouraging, in 
the followers, feelings of threat that external groups or internal factions may represent 
to the group, thus, reinforcing the prominence of the leader’s position.  
Empirical evidence. Empirical research supports the above assumptions (e.g., 
Fielding & Hogg, 1997; Hains, Hogg & Duck, 1997; Hogg, Hains & Mason, 1998; 
Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001; for reviews, cf. Hogg, 2001a). For instance, Hains, 
Hogg and Duck (1997) conducted a study with minimal groups in which participants 
anticipated a small discussion group. Three variables were manipulated: salience of the 
group, prototypicality and congruence of the appointed leader with a leader schema. 
Results showed that participants endorsed more the prototypical than the non-
prototypical leader, in the salient group condition, whereas, participants in the low 
salience condition endorsed the two leaders similarly.  
The above experiment was also aimed to compare the impact of prototypicality 
with that of leadership-schemas in the leadership endorsement. The congruence of 
leaders with the followers’ implicit theories or schemas about leadership has proven to 
determine their acceptance (e.g., Lord, Foti & De Vater, 1984). Hains and colleagues 
(1997) found that the congruence to a leader schema was not predictive of leadership 
endorsement in the high salience condition. In the whole, results suggest that when the 
in-group is highly relevant, the extent into which leaders are representative of their 
group is a predominant criterion of their endorsement. 
More recently, Platow and van Knippenberg (2001) investigated the effects of 
leader’s prototypicality and intergroup fairness on endorsement. Among members who 
identified less with the group the norm of fairness prevailed, whereas among high-
identifiers leaders’ prototypicality prevailed. In addition, high-identifiers endorsed non-
prototypical leaders when they displayed an in-group favoring unfair behavior.  
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Differentiation as a Function of Members’ Contributes for Positive Social Identity 
Another social identity approach to intragroup differentiation focuses on 
members’ reactions to other members that deviate from group norms, Marques and 
colleagues’ Subjective Group Dynamics model (e.g., Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 
2001b; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Martinez-Taboada, 1998b). Before addressing the 
model, we shall first briefly review the empirical work on the black-sheep effect from 
which the model derives.  
The Black-Sheep Effect 
The black-sheep effect consists in the evaluative upgrading of in-group likable 
members and downgrading of unlikable in-group members relatively to equivalent out-
group members (e.g., Marques, 1990; Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988; Marques & 
Yzerbyt, 1988; for reviews, cf. Marques & Páez, 1994). Besides the extreme evaluation 
of in-group members, the black-sheep effect involves in-group bias, that is, the in-
group, as a whole, is more positively evaluated than is the out-group. The co-occurrence 
of these effects suggests that the derogation of in-group deviants is a form of in-group 
favoritism (e.g., Marques & Páez, 1994). The intergroup dimension of the black-sheep 
effect distinguishes it from the traditional approach to reactions to deviance.  
On the other hand, the effect is partially inconsistent with the conventional in-
group bias described in Social Identity Theory. Whereas the upgrading of in-group 
likable members relatively to comparable out-group members stands for conventional 
in-group bias, the downgrading of unlikable in-group members relatively to comparable 
out-group members is at odds with the prediction that in-group members are favored 
over out-group members. As Marques and Páez (1994) argue, the extreme downgrading 
of unlikable in-group members reflects the negative contribute of these members for the 
overall image of the in-group and “the attempt to insure a positive identity when such 
identity is threatened from inside one’s in-group” (p. 38). Therefore, it indirectly stands 
for the need of positive in-group differentiation predicted by Social Identity Theory (see 
above our Chapter 1).  
Several experiments illustrate the effect. For instance, Marques and Yzerbyt 
(1988) asked Law students to evaluate the discursive ability of a Law (in-group 
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member) and/or Philosophy (out-group member) student that performed either a good or 
a bad speech. The results show that the in-group bad performer was rated more 
negatively than the out-group bad performer and the in-group good performer was rated 
more positively than the out-group good performer. The results also showed that both 
Law and Philosophy students evaluated their group as superior in discursive ability. 
Moreover, the effect emerged both when participants evaluated either an in-group or an 
out-group member (intragroup context), and when participants evaluated in-group and 
out-group members (intergroup context).  
In another experiment, Marques, Yzerbyt and Leyens (1988) asked Belgian 
students to evaluate either other Belgian students (in-group members) or North African 
students (out-group members) that either lent or did not lend their notes to fellow 
students (normative and deviant members) or either put amusement behind study 
(normative member) or study behind amusement (deviant member). In the former 
condition the norm was perceived as a general norm, that is, applicable to all students, 
whereas, in the latter condition, the norm was exclusive, that is, applicable only to the 
in-group (it was not expected among out-group members). The results showed that in-
group deviants were worst evaluated than equivalent out-group members and in-group 
normative members were better evaluated than equivalent out-group members were but 
only when the norm was relevant for in-group positive differentiation and its violation 
endangered the value of in-group identity (cf. also Marques, 1990).  
The above results led to the conclusion that the extreme negative reactions to 
unlikable members correspond to a motivated group strategy aimed to protect social 
identity and thus ensuring the validity of its standards (e.g., Marques & Páez, 1994). 
However, contrary to the traditional approach (e.g., Festinger, 1950; Festinger, 
Schachter & Back, 1950) in which reactions to deviance and pressures towards 
uniformity are conceived in the interpersonal context of interactive groups, the black-
sheep effect corresponds to a cognitive-motivational process in which individuals 
subjectively validate the value of the in-group. This process applies to both interactive 
groups (e.g., shameful behavior of a family member) and large social categories in 
which derogation may not imply direct interaction with the deviant member (e.g., 
extremized negative opinions about corrupt own party leaders, dishonorable 
performances of own team, national athletes or artists, etc). 
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Subjective Group Dynamics 
The idea that the black-sheep effect represents a strategy to uphold the validity 
of the in-group standards was developed in the Subjective Group Dynamics model (e.g., 
Marques et al; 1998a; 1998b; 2001). Subjective group dynamics is described as “a 
process by which people maximize and sustain descriptive intergroup differentiation 
while simultaneously maximizing and sustaining the relative validity of prescriptive in-
group norms through intragroup differentiation” (Marques et al, 2001b). The model 
includes a two-step process of intergroup and intragroup judgments (cf. Figure 1).  
“The phenomenon can be explained in terms of a ‘denotative’ meta-
contrast, and corresponds to the intergroup level, which represents the classical 
process of intergroup differentiation and social discrimination. But when an 
intragroup distinction becomes salient and threatens intergroup differentiation, 
subjects will derogate in-group members who do not comply with the in-group 
standards. This corresponds to the intragroup level.” (Marques, Páez & Abrams, 
1998b, p. 139-40) 
As may be seen in Figure 7, the model includes a distinction between denotative 
(or descriptive) and prescriptive norms. This distinction is an essential aspect of the 
model. Whereas denotative norms operate at the intergroup level to establish in-group 
distinctiveness, prescriptive norms operate at the intragroup level.  
Denotative and prescriptive norms. Contrarily to the Self-Categorization 
perspective, in which group norms are assumed to be generally prescriptive for group 
membership, so that the more members conform to group norms the more they are 
group prototypical, Marques, Páez and Abrams (1998a; cf. also, Marques et al, 1998b; 
Marques et al, 2001b) distinguish between denotative and prescriptive group norms.  
The authors define denotative norm as “a descriptive principle of intergroup 
differentiation, or cognitive clarity concomitant with social categorization” (Marques et 
al, 1998a, p. 129). Group denotative norms define the group prototype so that 
conformity to denotative norms would lead to group prototypicality. In contrast, 
prescriptive norms are defined as standards “on which members anchor their judgments 
about other in-group members in order to ascertain, not intergroup distinctiveness, but 
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rather the legitimacy of the in-group’s superiority” (Marques et al, 1998a, p. 129). 
Whereas conformity to denotative norms indicates one’s group membership, conformity 
to prescriptive norms contributes to the positive value of group identity.  
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Figure 7. Subjective group dynamics model. In J. M. Marques, D. Abrams, D. Páez & M. A. 
Hogg (2001) (p. 414). Social categorization, social identification, and rejection of deviant group 
members. In M. A. Hogg & R. S. Tindale, (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Group 
processes. Oxford, UK: Blackwell  
 
Awareness of the norms. Marques and colleagues (2001b) also distinguish 
denotative and prescriptive norms in terms of awareness. Whereas denotative norms are 
implicit, and conformity is likely to be relatively automatic, prescriptive norms are 
explicit and conformity is likely to be deliberate.  As the authors argue, generally, 
members align their behaviors to match certain standards in a relatively informal way. 
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Therefore, group members often are not fully aware of the existence of norms until the 
norm is violated.  
The different characteristics of denotative and prescriptive norms entails that 
their violation is differently considered. In-group members that conform to prescriptive 
norms uphold the value of the group whereas members that deviate from these norms 
undermine this value. This idea is consistent with results obtained by Marques and 
colleagues (1998b) concerning reactions to deviance from high-salient and low-salient 
norms. The authors conducted an experiment allegedly about decision making in juries. 
In a first session, participants examined a murder case involving six suspects and asked 
to rank the suspects according to their responsibility in the crime. They were also 
informed that there were two patterns of decision making that could be diagnosed 
through their responses. In the second session, participants received their results 
informing them as being typical of one of the decision patterns. The salience of the 
norms was manipulated in the following way. In the high-salience condition, 
participants were told that to belong to a pattern people should present a specific 
ranking of responsibility. The in-group typical ranking (in-group norm) matched exactly 
the participant’s ranking whereas the out-group typical ranking (out-group norm) was 
the opposite of the participant’s sequence. The participants then read the answers given 
by five individuals belonging either to same or other pattern. The responses of four 
individuals matched their own pattern and those of the fifth individual were close to the 
out-group norm. In the low-salience condition, participants were simply shown the 
members’ responses and no information was given regarding the group norms. 
The authors found that participants upheld in-group normative members and 
downgrade in-group deviant members, significantly more than equivalent out-group 
members, only when norms were high salient. When norms were low salient, 
participants did not differentiate between normative and deviant members and showed 
an overall preference for in-group members in detriment of out-group members. In 
another experiment using the same general procedure, Marques and colleagues (1998b) 
further found that the extremized intragroup differentiation found within the in-group 
when norms were perceived to be prescriptive, was accentuated when participants 
believed their judgments of members were to be seen by a typical in-group member and 
were attenuated when they believed the examiner was a typical out-group member. 
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Together, these results suggest that group norms become prescriptive as members 
become more aware of their importance for in-group identity, leading to strategic 
evaluation of in-group members.  
Relevance of the prescriptive norm. Deviance from prescriptive norms leads to 
subjective group dynamics if the norm is perceived to be meaningful for a positive 
group identity. For instance, Marques, Abrams and Serôdio (2001a) first ensure that 
students were generally supportive of student initiation practices. Then, they asked 
Psychology and Law students to state their opinion on a continuum of seven statements 
from totally support to totally rejection of student initiation practices, and to indicate the 
position above which they would disagree.  They were then showed a bogus distribution 
of responses of a sample of Psychology or Law students that either validated or 
undermined the generic norm. Then, they were asked to evaluate Psychology or Law 
students (depending on their own course, in-group or out-group members) that agreed 
with their own opinion (what the authors dubbed, subjective normative members) and 
another in-group or out-group member whose opinion was above their rejection 
threshold (subjective deviant member). The results showed that when the norm was 
validated, deviant members were derogated and normative members were upgraded but 
evaluations did not vary with the targets’ group membership. However, when the norm 
was undermined, in-group deviant members were more derogated than similar out-
group members were, and normative members were more upgraded than similar in-
group members were. As the authors affirm, when the norm was generally upheld, 
deviant behavior was likely to affect the norm validity and consequently the value of in-
group identity (cf. also, Marques 1990). 
Relevance of group membership. Extremized differentiation among in-group 
members depends not only of the relevance of the norm, but also of the relevance of 
group membership either circumstantially or as a chronic self-defining attribute. 
Branscombe, Wann, Noel and Coleman (1993) showed that when the group is not 
meaningful, individuals extremize their evaluations of normative and deviant members 
more in the out-group than in the in-group. Participants were asked to evaluate the 
author of an article about a basketball game between participants’ own university team 
and a rival university team. The author was either a fan of the participants’ in-group or 
out-group team and was either a loyal fan (supporting the team in all occasions) or 
130 
disloyal (supporting the team only when it succeeded). In the game reported in the 
article, the in-group team either lost or won the game representing a threat or not to the 
group identity.  
The results showed that participants extremized their evaluations of the out-
group loyal and disloyal authors as regards the in-group authors when their level of in-
group identification was low. High identifiers presented the reversed pattern of 
evaluation: they extremized their evaluations of the in-group loyal and disloyal author 
relatively to the comparable out-group authors. The extremized evaluations of loyal and 
disloyal in-group targets were more evident when the in-group team had lost the game 
in the report. As Branscombe and colleagues (1993) claim, when the target’s actions 
have few or no implications for the judger’s identity, out-group extremization occurs, 
whereas when the target represents a threat to the judger both contextually and because 
this identity is a meaningful reference, the judgments of in-group members are 
extremized as regards those of out-group members.  
The results above, taken as a whole, suggest that the importance of the 
dimension in which members evaluate deviant members and the importance of the 
group for them are determinant of the motivation to protect the group. More evidence 
for this idea comes from results indicating that prototypical deviant members are more 
rejected than their non-prototypical counterparts (Serôdio & Marques, 2005). 
Specifically, members that deviate from norms that are important to define a positive 
group identity (prescriptive norms) are more derogated when these members are 
denotatively more typical of the group than when they are atypical. Conversely, group 
members that endorse prescriptive norms are more upgraded when they are perceived as 
more typical of their group than when they are not. In a similar vein, Pinto and Marques 
(2005) showed that ‘full members’ (i.e., members that have long joined the group, and 
learned and assimilated in-group norms) are more derogated when they deviate from 
prescriptive norms than ‘novices’ (i.e., members that are just entering the group and 
have not assimilated in-group norms). Taken as a whole, these results suggest that the 
more members are descriptive of the group as a whole the more they will be rejected 
when they deviate from prescriptive norms. In other words, the more members are 
perceived as representative of the group, the more they have the responsibility to 
convey a positive image of the group, the more their deviant behavior endangers the 
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positivity of the group, and the more it is difficult for the group to differentiate from the 
deviant behavior, by recategorizing them as out-group members (Marques et al, 1998a; 
1998b).  
Derogation of deviants and increased identification. The aim of the subjective 
group dynamics process occurring at the intragroup level is to reestablish a positive 
group identity and to obtain again subjective validity for the in-group norms 
undermined by deviant behavior. This would imply a reinforcement of in-group 
identification after the derogation of the deviant member. Marques and colleagues 
(1998a) presented supporting evidence for this hypothesis. Using the same general 
procedure described above, the authors, after categorizing participants into two 
decision-making patterns as regards a murder case, measured their identification to the 
in-group before and after they evaluate in-group or out-group normative and deviant 
members. Results showed that participants reported more in-group identification after 
than before the judgments and that normative differentiation predicted post in-group 
identification. In other words, the more they distinguished between normative and 
deviant in-group members the more they subsequently identified with the group.  
The Development of Sensitivity to In-Group Deviance 
Extreme intragroup differentiation as a strategy to uphold the validity of in-
group norms seems to appear later in individuals’ development. Support for this idea 
comes from evidence presented by Abrams, Rutland, Cameron and Marques (2003b), 
suggesting that older children are more sensitive than are younger children, to the 
implications of in-group deviance. Specifically, the authors compared evaluations of 6-7 
years old to 10-11 years old children of same Summer School (in-group) and other 
Summer School (out-group) children, that either praised their own Summer School 
(normative member) or praised the other Summer School (deviant member). The results 
show that whereas younger children showed simple in-group bias, favoring in-group 
over out-group members, but did not differentiate between normative and deviant target 
members, older children also showed in-group bias while differentiating between in-
group normative and deviant members.  
However, the result showing that younger children were less sensitive to 
deviance than older children must be pondered against the differential importance that a 
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norm such as that of loyalty has for younger and older children. As the authors 
recognize, “It is conceivable that in the case of strongly socially prescribed norms (e.g., 
gender- or age-related behavioral norms), younger children might be more adept at 
recognizing deviance and its implications” (p. 172). Notwithstanding, Abrams, Rutland 
and Cameron (2003a) obtained similar results with norms whose relevance for 
participants was assumedly independent of their age strata – the norm of supporting 
national against foreign football team. Taken as a whole, evidence indicates that, 
contrarily to in-group bias, intragroup differentiation depends on an increased 
consciousness of social norms and the negative impact that in-group deviance may have 
on group identity. 
In sum, the research on the black-sheep effect and on the Subjective Group 
Dynamics model distinguishes from the traditional approach to reactions to deviance by 
its focus on social identity processes. Subjective Group Dynamics model also 
distinguishes from Self-Categorization Theory because it focuses on the role of norms 
to establish a positive social identity additionally to clear-cut group boundaries. A 
consequence of this focus is that the model postulates that intragroup norms may be 
salient in intergroup contexts, without the re-categorization of the social situation as 
function of these norms. Whereas for Self-Categorization Theory a salient norm defines 
the significant categorization in the contexts, for the Subjective Group Dynamics model 
group norms have, at least, two functions: One function is the differentiation between 
social categories (denotative or descriptive norms) and the other is the establishment of 
a positive group identity (prescriptive norms). Other research on group norms is 
consistent with this distinction. 
Emotional Consequences of Own Normative and Deviant Behavior 
The distinction between in-group descriptive and prescriptive norms (cf. also, 
Cialdini, Kallgren & Reno, 1991) was addressed by Christensen and colleagues (2004) 
in terms of the emotions induced by conformity to or deviance from these norms. In one 
experiment, the authors manipulated the descriptive or prescriptive nature of the 
violated or endorsed norm, and the salience or non-salience of the group to which the 
norm referred. The experiment was presented as a study on the causes for good and bad 
performance. The task consisted in obtaining the best performance in a Rubik’s Cube 
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puzzle. Each participant worked in two separate desks with one confederate that 
simulated to be unable to perform the task successfully. Participants then read the 
instructions before reporting their feelings on the task. They were recalled that they had 
worked separately from the partner (the data of participants that offered help to the 
confederate were not included) and, depending on conditions, they were informed that 
most people did or did not offered help (violation or conformity of descriptive norm) or 
that they had not supported the idea of helping others or that they had supported the idea 
of not cheating (violation or conformity of prescriptive norms). These were the 
instructions of the non-group condition. In the salient in-group condition, the 
instructions were the same but instead of ‘most people’, they referred to ‘most students 
of the participant’s university’.  
As expected, the results indicated a general tendency to feel more positive 
emotions after conforming to, than after deviating from, the norm. This difference was 
significant only when the norm referred to a salient in-group revealing its relation with 
social identity processes. Moreover, the difference was significant only when the norm 
was prescriptive suggesting its higher meaning for the value of group identity as regards 
that of descriptive norms. The results also reinforced the relation between the reported 
emotions and group identity by revealing an interaction with level of in-group 
identification. Whereas high identifiers reported more positive emotions when they had 
conformed to the in-group prescriptive norm than they had deviated from it, the reports 
of low identifiers do not show such effect. The results of the descriptive in-group norm 
condition revealed no such effects (cf. also, Costarelli, 2005).  
The above results suggest that a salient group membership entails the need to 
present in-group prescriptive but not the need to present in-group descriptive behavior. 
The results are consistent with the Subjective Group Dynamics’ postulate that deviance 
from in-group prescriptive norms threatens the value of the group identity. 
The effect of the context on norms prescriptiveness. In the experiments described 
above, Marques and colleagues’ (1998b) results suggest that descriptive norms may 
become incidentally prescriptive. In some contexts, irrelevant descriptive norms may 
become important to assert the group identity. Specifically, the authors found that 
participants reacted more extremely to a deviant from a norm when it was perceived as 
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important for the in-group definition, than when it was perceived as an undifferentiating 
attribute of the group. Christensen and colleagues (2004; Exp. 2) obtained results 
consistent with these, in the following conditions: in one situation, a norm described the 
in-group and the out-group behavior; in another situation, the same norm was 
descriptive only of the in-group, as opposed to another norm that described the out-
group. In the latter situation, the descriptive norm became prescriptive to differentiate 
the group from the out-group. 
Participants completed an initial bogus task, selecting the most needed items to 
survive after a plane crash. The responses allegedly revealed different survival 
strategies. In one condition, participants were told that students of their own University 
and those of another rival University had opposed task strategies and that their own 
strategy was typical of the in-group. Another condition was similar to the previous one 
but participants were told that their own strategy was typical of the other University 
students. In another condition, participants were told that the student of both 
Universities used the same strategy and their own strategy was identical to it. In the 
fourth condition, participants were told that their responses differed from the one used 
by the students of both Universities. There were thus four experimental conditions: 
conformity or deviance from differentiating or non-differentiating descriptive norms.  
The results showed that participants reported more positive emotions when they 
conformed than when they deviated from the norm. The effect was significant only 
when the norm was differentiating and increased from low to high-identified 
participants. These results again support the Subjective Group Dynamics model’s 
assumption that the prescriptive character of group norms derives from its role in 
upholding the positive distinctiveness of group identity. 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter, we reviewed research and theory on intragroup differentiation 
related to group norms. We began with a reference to traditional research relevant for 
this field focusing mainly in small group processes. In contrast with this research, the 
social identity approach focuses on the role of social categorization and social 
identification in differentiation within groups.  
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We reviewed two social identity approaches of intragroup differentiation. One 
approach emphasizes individuals’ need for cognitive clarity and the positive 
differentiation of prototypical members, which contribute for the distinctiveness of the 
in-group. Differentiation based on prototypicality applies to perceptions of members’ 
social attractiveness (e.g., Hogg et al, 1993; 1995) or endorsement to leadership 
positions (e.g., Hogg, 2001a).  
The other approach emphasizes individuals’ need for positive social identity. 
According to the Subjective Group Dynamics model (e.g., Marques et al; 1998a; 1998b; 
2001), group norms accomplish two functions: the description of the expected group 
behavior and the maintenance of the group positive value. The former are denotative 
norms whereas the latter are prescriptive norms. Normative differentiation within the in-
group is more likely to emerge as function of prescriptive norms than as function of 
descriptive norms. Moreover, differentiation between in-group normative and deviant 
members is more extreme than that between the equivalent out-group members, 
suggesting the importance of prescriptive norms for group identity. 
The model postulates that the salience of group prescriptive norms does not 
imply the decreased salience of the intergroup context. Members may be aware of their 
group membership while differentiating between in-group members that conform and 
those that deviate from the group norms. The findings of research on the emotions 
induced by own normative and deviant behavior (Christensen et al, 2004), are consistent 
with the model. 
136 
Study 2 
 Implicit Normative Differentiation of Group Members  
In our second study, we explore the hypothesis that, in intergroup contexts, 
individuals differentiate between members that conform and those that deviate from the 
implicit group norms. We base our predictions on the Subjective Group Dynamics 
model (e.g., Marques et al, 1998a; 2001b). According to the model, normative 
differentiation within the in-group is a strategy aimed to protect a positive social 
identity. Individuals upgrade in-group normative members that contribute for a positive 
group identity, and downgrade deviant members that undermine this identity. 
Normative differentiation is thus more extremized in the in-group than in the out-group. 
Consistent with these assumptions, the model holds that derogation of in-group deviants 
does not correspond to a re-categorization of the deviant member as a function of the 
violated norm (Marques et al, 1998b). Normative differentiation occurs simultaneously 
with intergroup differentiation: The derogation of in-group deviants occurs when both 
group membership and group norms are salient in the context.  
Marques and colleagues’ Experiment 3 (1998b) provides evidence for the above 
idea. The experiment was presented as part of a larger research on jury decision-
making. After ranking the characters involved in murder case according to their 
responsibility in the crime, participants were informed about the existence of two 
decision-making patterns. In the next session, participants were categorized into one of 
these two patterns. Participants were then asked to analyze the rankings of five other 
persons. However, before this task, half of the participants were informed that previous 
studies demonstrated that members of the participant’s decision pattern made the same 
ranking as the participant’s and that for the opposed decision-making pattern the typical 
ranking was opposed to that of the participant (salient norm condition). The other half 
of participants was not informed about the group norms (non-salient norm condition). 
Participants observed then the rankings of five other persons. In the in-group condition, 
four persons presented exactly the same ranking as the participant’s (in-group normative 
members) and one person presented the opposed ranking (in-group deviant member). In 
the out-group condition, four persons presented the ranking opposed to participant’s 
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(out-group normative members) and one person presented the same ranking (out-group 
deviant member).  
The results showed that participants evaluated the in-group, as a whole, more 
positively than they evaluated the out-group. In the non-salient norm condition, the 
evaluation of members reflected the same in-group favoritism and in-group members 
were better evaluated than were out-group members independently of being normative 
or deviant. However, in the salient norm condition, the in-group normative member was 
upgraded relatively to the out-group normative member and the in-group deviant 
member was downgraded relatively to the out-group correspondent member. These 
results suggest that extremized normative differentiation involves the salience of both 
categorization and of the in-group norm. When solely the categorization is salient, 
conventional in-group bias emerges with the typical accentuation of intergroup 
differences and intragroup similarities of salient intergroup contexts (e.g., Doise, 
Deschamps & Meyer, 1978; Simon, 1992). 
Previous evidence showed that in-group favoritism is an implicit response in 
salient intergroup contexts (cf. Cameira et al, 2002; Devine, 1989; Dovidio et al, 1997; 
Fazio et al, 1995; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Otten & Wentura, 1999; Perdue et al, 
1990). In the present study, we aim to check on whether intragroup normative 
differentiation possesses the same implicit features, that is, if participants upgrade 
members that conform over those that deviate from implicit group norms. Consistent 
with the Subjective Group Dynamics model, we expect differentiation between 
normative and deviant members to be extremized within the in-group relatively to the 
out-group, revealing the need to protect in-group identity. Despite the discontinuity 
between the first and the present study in dependent variables, for the sake of clarity, we 
numbered the two experiments, Experiments 5 and 6, respectively. 
Experiment 5 
Method 
Participants and design. Thirty-one high school pupils (23 females and 8 males; 
ages ranging from 17 to 21 years old, M = 17.65, SD = .88) volunteered to participate. 
The design was a 2(Group: In-group targets vs. Out-group targets) x 2(Member: 
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Normative vs. Deviant) mixed design, in which Member is a within-subject factor and 
Group is a between-participants factor.  
Procedure. The initial phases of the procedure were identical to those of 
Experiment 4. Specifically, one week after responding to the bogus Perceptive 
Proficiency Test, participants received their results indicating that they possessed a 
Deductive perceptive style, as opposed to an Inferent perceptive style. The report of 
results included also some lines of vague information about the characteristics of each 
of the two styles. The participants read, “In deductive reasoning, perception flows from 
the interaction with the world around, their subjectivity, their values and expectations; 
Inferents internalize external stimuli in a global way and the self-concept is accentuated 
by a general vision of the world.”9 Participants were then told that the two groups 
differed in several dimensions, namely, their esthetical preferences.  
Participants were then asked to observe the pictures preferred by a sample of 
persons possessing the Inferent style and by a sample of persons possessing the 
Deductives, which had been collected in a previous study. The pictures (the same used 
in the previous experiments, cf. Figure 1) were labeled Inferent or Deductive as a 
function of the group that preferred them. All the Inferent pictures possessed the 
horizontal graphic detail, and all the Deductive pictures possessed the vertical graphic 
detail.  
After seeing the pictures, participants were told that the present study 
investigated the differences between the two styles in what concerns the way they made 
impressions of other people. They were then asked to make an impression of two 
persons, based solely on these persons’ preferences for the abstract pictures, Persons A 
and B. The two targets were presented as belonging both either to the Deductive group 
(in-group targets condition) or to the Inferent group (out-group targets condition). 
Participants then observed five pictures allegedly preferred by Person A. All the 
pictures possessed the graphic detail characteristic of Person A’s own group (normative 
member). In the in-group condition, the target’s choices matched participants’ in-group 
norm whereas in the out-group condition, the choices matched participants’ out-group 
norm. Participants then answered to two questions concerning Person A: “What 
 
9 The description of the groups was based on Marques and colleagues (2001a; Experiments 2 -3). 
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impression did this person made on you?”, answered in a 7-point labeled ends scale in 
which 1=Very bad impression and 7=Very good impression, and “To what extent do 
you agree with this person?” answered in 7-point labeled ends scales in which 
1=Nothing at all and 7=Very much. Participants were then asked to evaluate the same 
person in eight traits – kind, creative, intelligent, dynamic, generous, loyal, interesting, 
and nice – in 7-point labeled ends scales in which 1=Nothing at all and 7=Very much10. 
Participants were then asked to observe the five pictures preferred by Person B, which 
possessed the graphic detail characteristic of the target’s out-group (deviant member). 
In the in-group condition, the target’s choices matched participants’ out-group norm 
whereas in the out-group condition, the target’s choices matched participants’ in-group 
norm. Participants were asked to answer to eleven questions concerning Person B, the 
same as those concerning Person A. The preferences of persons A and B were reversed 
for half of the participants to balance the order in which participants rated normative 
and deviant members. 
Finally, participants were asked to perform the recognition task used in the 
previous experiments, that is, classify 20 unlabeled pictures, 10 possessing the vertical 
detail and 10  possessing the horizontal detail, as a function of, in their opinion, they 
had been preferred by the sample of Deductive or that of Inferents. Participants were 
also asked to describe the regularities eventually found in Deductive and Inferent 
pictures. After confirming their own perceptive style, participants responded to the in-
group and out-group identification items, ‘I (would like) like to belong to my (the other) 
perceptive style’, ‘I consider myself similar to my (the other) perceptive style profile’, 
and ‘I feel strong ties with my (the other) perceptive style’, in 7-point scales with 
labeled ends (1=Nothing; 7= Very much). During the debriefing, two participants 
revealed having found the distinction between the two kinds of pictures. Their 
answering sheets were traced to be excluded from the analysis. 
Results 
Identification. All participants recalled their correct perceptive type. The three 
items of in-group identification were not correlated, highest r = .23. All the three items, 
similarity, liking, and feeling ties with the in-group, presented means above the middle 
 
10 The traits used to evaluate targets were adapted from Marques and colleagues (1998b). 
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of the scale, lowest M = 5.44, SD = .96, indicating a generally high level of in-group 
identification, which did not varied between conditions, highest F(1, 30) = 1.15, ns. The 
items of out-group identification were more correlated (Cronbach’s alpha = .77) and 
were averaged into a single out-group identification index, M = 3.00, SD = .82, which 
did not vary between conditions, F(1, 30) = 1.67, ns. 
Recognition and recall. The analysis of the reports concerning the regularities 
found in the pictures revealed that none participant correctly recognized the graphic 
details (cf. Table 6). The recognition index, obtained by summing the number of 
pictures correctly classified (minimum=0; maximum = 20), indicated that the average 
recognition did not differ from chance level, M = 9.81, SD = 3.18, t(30) < 1. 
Recognition did not vary between conditions, F(1, 30) = 8.95, ns.  
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No. Deductive Pictures Inferent Pictures 
1 Sharper, with some meaning More confuse, meaningless 
3 More open spaces More concentrated in color and area 
5 Clearer and meaningful Less clear, one part of the picture is 
alike to the other 
6 More concentrated, denser black lines More white spaces 
7 More dynamic, combination of colors 
is not so significant, more interesting 
Less dynamic, interesting, white is 
significant, more distributed squares 
8 More white spaces, nicer Darker 
11 More filled with black areas More filled with white areas 
13 Darker, white spaces on the top Clearer, white spaces on the bottom  
14 Darker, concentrated black spaces  Clearer, more white spaces 
15 More filled with black Clearer, more white spaces 
16 More familiar, alike to our world More abstract 
17 More creative, less white spaces Many white spaces, clearer 
18 Clearer, more spaced drawings Darker, more closed 
19 More dynamic, more distinguished 
and contrasted. Separable elements 
Differentiation among elements is 
more confuse 
20 More open, more expanded and 
spaced 
More objective, and concrete, more 
filled in 
21 More dynamic, better understood, 
more interesting 
Broader 
22 More perceptible, more dynamic, less 
compact we can imagine things  
More condensed, it is more difficult to 
understand 
23 More creative, abstract Less creative, generalized 
24 Articulated with geometrical forms More filled, clearer 
25 More open white spaces Darker and concentrated 
26 More white spaces, looking wider More filled with black, more packed 
29 More complex More simple 
30 More abstract, with less geometrical 
forms 
More linear, with few white spaces 
31 More open spaces, more subjective More concentrated, more concrete 
 
Table 6.Reports on the distinction between the two series of pictures (Experiment 5). 
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Evaluation of members. We first averaged participants’ ratings of normative and 
deviant members in eight traits, Cronbach’s alpha = .86 and .87, respectively, to form 
evaluation indexes of both targets. The evaluation indexes were highly correlated with 
both ‘impression’ and ‘agreement’ measures, lowest r = .65, p < .001 and r = .65, p = 
.003, respectively, for normative and deviant members. We thus averaged the evaluation 
index, and the ‘impression’ and ‘agreement’ measures into a single index of 
Favorability regarding the members, Cronbach’s alpha = .88 and .80, respectively, for 
normative and deviant members. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Evaluation of normative and deviant members as a function of group membership 
(Experiment 5). 
 
A Group x Member ANOVA conducted on Favorability, with Member as 
within-participants factor, revealed significant effects of Group, F(1, 29) = 13.43, p = 
.001, η2 = .32, and Member, F(1, 29) = 11.11, p = .002, η2 = .28. Participants favored 
in-group over out-group members, M = 4.53, SD = .64 and M = 3.71, SD = .59, 
respectively, and deviant members over normative members, M = 4.49, SD = .86 and M 
= 3.83, SD = 1.06, respectively. The Group x Member interaction was significant, F(1, 
29) = 4.33, p = .046, η2 = .13. Whereas participants did not differentiated between the 
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normative and deviant in-group members, F(1, 29) < 1, M = 4.67, SD = .75 and M = 
4.40, SD = .97, respectively, they rated the deviant out-group member more favorably 
than the normative member, F(1, 29) = 13.36, p = .001, M = 4.29, SD = .97 and M = 
3.14, SD = .68, respectively. The normative in-group member was rated more favorably 
than was the out-group member, F(1, 29) = 16.66, p < .001, η2 = .30, but in-group and 
out-group deviant members were not differently rated, F(1, 29) = 1.54, ns. In-group 
normative members were not differentiated from out-group deviant members, F(1, 30) < 
1, and in-group deviant members were favored over out-group normative members, F(1, 
30) = 26.90, p < .001, η2 = .48 (cf. Figure 8). 
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Figure 9. Evaluations of high and low similar participants as a function of group membership 
and normative vs. deviant status of the target (Experiment 5). 
 
Evaluations of members and in-group similarity. To examine whether similarity 
to the in-group moderated the evaluations of the targets, we first divided participants by 
median-split of the item ‘I consider myself similar to my perceptive style profile’ 
creating a new two-level variable, Similarity. ‘Low-similar’ participants reported an 
average similarity to the in-group of 4.94 and ‘high-similar’ participants, 6.21. We then 
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conducted a Group x Member x Similarity ANOVA on Favorability. The analysis 
revealed a significant full interaction, F(1, 27) = 13.63, p = .001, η2 = .34.  
The decomposition of the interaction indicated that the Group x Similarity 
interaction was significant only relatively to normative members, F(1, 27) = 10.93, p = 
.003, η2 = .29 whereas the evaluations of deviant members did not differ significantly, 
F(1, 27) = 2.32, ns. Further analysis showed that only in-group normative members 
were differently rated by high and low similar participants, respectively, F(1, 16) = 
15.01, p = .001, η2 = .50; out-group normative members were not differently rated by 
the two types of participants, F(1, 13) < 1 ns (cf. Figure 9). In addition, among high-
similar participants, the in-group normative members were upgraded relatively to 
normative out-group members, F(1, 13) = 24.21, p < .001, η2 = .67, whereas low similar 
participants did not differentiated between the two targets, F(1, 16) = 1.87, ns.  
Evaluations of members and recognition. To inspect the role of recognition in 
the ratings of the targets, we divided participants into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ recognizers by 
median-split of the recognition index, M = 12.60, SD = 1.80 and M = 7.19, SD = 1.42, 
respectively, creating a new two-level variable, Recognition. A Group x Recognition x 
Member ANOVA on Favorability did not revealed effects involving Recognition, all 
effects, F(1, 27) < 1. 
Discussion 
The results did not support the idea of implicit normative differentiation. 
Contrary to expected, participants differentiate more within the out-group than within 
the in-group, favoring the deviant over the normative out-group member. The result 
may have been due to the high salient categorization suggested by several other results. 
For instance, participants’ evaluations were in-group biased, favoring in-group over out-
group members as a whole. Similarity to the in-group significantly moderated this 
tendency. Participants that reported high similarity to the in-group favored in-group 
normative members more than did participants that reported less similarity to the in-
group. Seemingly, participants evaluating in-group members were more concerned in 
differentiating the in-group from the out-group than in differentiating within the in-
group. As such, they presented in-group bias and assimilated in-group members. 
Participants evaluating out-group members also presented a form of in-group bias by 
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positively differentiating supporters of the in-group norm from supporters of the out-
group norm.  
The next experiment was conducted experiment individually, not in group 
sessions, with a more involving scenario in order to increase the focus on the norms as 
regards the categorization. 
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Experiment 6 
The results of the previous experiment did not support the hypothesis of implicit 
intragroup differentiation suggesting more concern of participants in differentiating the 
in-group from the out-group than in differentiating normative from deviant members. 
An explanation ventured to these results was that the salience of norms was reduced 
relatively to that of the categorization. In the present experiment, we introduced several 
changes to the procedure and material to deal with this possibility. To increase 
participants’ (first-year Psychology students) interest in the group norms we told them 
that the second session was part of a study aimed to prepare educational material for 
kindergarten children. The stimuli used to convey the group norms were thus changed 
to fit the new cover story. In addition, participants completed the experiment 
individually and the instructions and stimuli were administered through an interactive 
computer program.  
Method 
Participants and design. Twenty-five students enrolled in an introductory course 
of Psychology (23 females and 2 males; ages ranging from 17 to 21 years old; M = 
18.16, SD = .80) volunteered to participate. The design was again a 2(Group: In-group 
targets vs. Out-group targets) x 2(Member: Normative vs. Deviant) mixed design, in 
which Member is a within-subject factor and Group is a between-participants factor.  
Procedure. The experiment occurred in two sessions. The first session, aimed to 
prepare a convincing context for the subsequent categorization of participants into two 
groups, was identical to that of the previous experiment. Three days later, participants 
arrived alone at a scheduled time to the laboratory. They were then handed their 
personal report including the results of the perceptive test with their perceptive style 
(Deductive or Inferent), an index showing that they possessed most of their style 
characteristics (90%), and the information about the characteristics of each of the two 
styles described in the previous experiment.  
The second part of the experiment was presented as part of larger study whose 
results were to be used in the preparation of educational material for kindergarten 
children. Participants were asked to step into a soundproof box and sit at a table with a 
PC monitor and keyboard. They were informed that all they needed to proceed was 
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presented in the screen and that, except when instructed otherwise, responses were 
given on the keyboard. After starting the program, which would also save the 
participant’s answers, the experimenter left the box. Participants read “Previous studies 
have ascertained that the two perceptive styles have different esthetic preferences even 
among very similar images. In one of these studies, a group of Deductives and a group 
of Inferents separately agreed on the best among several versions of the same picture to 
include in a book for kindergarten children. The versions chosen by each group were 
always different from the ones chosen by the other group.” Participants then observed 
the versions purportedly preferred by Deductives and the versions preferred by 
Inferents. 
  
 
 
Figure 10. The three pairs of pictures presented to participants (Experiment 6). Each pair 
presents only one single difference. The pair at the left differs in the position of the ball; the pair at the 
center differs in the girl positioned at the right of the picture; the pair at the right differs in the position of 
the second ‘o’. 
 
The two versions of three pictures, depicted in Figure 10, were presented 
sequentially for two seconds with a two-second blank interval in between the two, and 
labeled with group that had preferred it. Participants were then asked to write down the 
differences they had found between the two versions.  
Subsequently, participants were informed that the present study was aimed to 
investigate the way the two styles made impressions of persons. They were then asked 
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to form an impression of two persons that had taken part of the alleged groups, based 
solely on the pictures they had personally chosen after the respective group arrived to 
consensus, Person A and Person B. The two targets were presented as belonging both 
either to the Deductive group (in-group targets condition) or to the Inferent group (out-
group targets condition). Person A’s choices, presented sequentially for two seconds 
each, were the three versions preferred by participant’s in-group, thus, depending on 
whether it was presented as an in-group or out-group member, Person A was either 
normative or deviant, respectively. They were then asked to register from 1 to 9 the 
impression produced by the person, in which 1= Very bad impression and 9= Very good 
impression. The same procedure was used for Person B. Person B’s choices were the 
three versions preferred by participant’s out-group, thus depending on whether it was 
presented as an in-group or out-group member, Person B was deviant or normative, 
respectively. To control for order effects in the evaluations of normative and deviant 
members, the normative choices of Person A and Person B were balanced evenly across 
conditions.  
Subsequently, participants were asked to register whether, in their opinion, each 
of the six versions, presented again for two seconds each, was preferred by Deductives 
or Inferents. This task corresponded to the test of recognition. Finally, participants were 
asked to complete a questionnaire measuring in-group and out-group identification in 
the same items as those of the previous experiments. In the end of session, participants 
were fully debriefed. 
Results  
Identification. All participants recalled correctly their perceptive type in the end 
of the experiment. To examine participants’ identification, we first averaged the items 
of in-group identification creating an in-group identification index, Cronbach’s alpha = 
.86, and averaged the items on out-group identification creating an out-group 
identification index, Cronbach’s alpha = .82. We then conducted a Group x 
Identification (with the in-group vs. with the out-group) ANOVA, in which 
Identification was a within-participants factor. The analysis yielded a single significant 
effect of Identification, F(1, 23) = 43.20, p < .001, η2 = .65, all the other effects, F(1, 
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23) < 1. Participants identified more with the in-group than with the out-group, 
respectively, M = 5.42, SD = 1.03 and M = 3.20, SD = 1.17. 
 
No. Group Deductive Pictures Inferent Pictures 
1 Infer More movement 
More centered and 
balanced 
2 Deduc Out of focus - 
5 Infer More disorganized - 
10 Deduc Different positions of the objects in 
the two versions 
- 
11 Deduc More brilliant - 
15 Deduc  - Less defined, more confuse 
17 Deduc - Dance: more movement 
20 Infer - Sharper pictures 
21 Infer Clearer - 
22 Infer More organized - 
 
 
Table 7. Reports on the distinction between the two series of pictures (Experiment 6). Responses 
in bold mention aspects close to the actual distinctions. Note: Deduc= Deductive; Infer= Inferent 
 
Awareness tests. We first computed a recognition index by summing all the 
correctly recognized pictures, that is, the number of pictures of which the participant 
recognized the two versions. Thus, the index varied between 0 and 3. In average, 
participants recognized less than one picture, M = .80, SD = .82, and the recognition 
index did not vary across condition, F(1, 24) < 1. In what refers to recall of the 
distinctions, the analysis of the written reports indicate that none participant could 
describe any of the distinctions (cf. Table 7). One participant reported a distinction 
referring two of the three actual distinctions (# 10). However, the participant was not 
able to precise the distinctions; moreover, she could not classify correctly none of the 
three pairs of pictures in the recognition task indicating that the participant had only a 
vague notion of the distinction. 
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Figure 11. Impression of normative and deviant members as a function of their group 
membership (Experiment 6) 
 
Impression of members. To examine the differences in the item measuring the 
impression of members, we conducted a Group x Member ANOVA in which 
represented the impression made on normative and deviant target-members. There was 
a single effect, the Group x Member interaction, F(1, 23) = 16.01, p < .001, η2 = .41, 
highest other effect, F(1, 23) = 1.98, ns. The analysis of the interaction revealed that in-
group normative targets were better evaluated than in-group deviant targets, M = 7.23, 
SD = 1.01 and M =6.15, SD = 1.14, respectively, F(1, 23) = 8.29, p < .008, and out-
group normative targets were worst evaluated than out-group deviant targets, M = 5.58, 
SD = 1.31 and M = 6.67, SD = 1.37, respectively, F(1, 23) = 7.74, p < .01 (cf. Figure 8). 
The in-group normative member was better evaluated than the out-group equivalent, 
F(1, 24) = 12.48, p = .002, η2 = .35, and deviant in-group and out-group members were 
similarly evaluated, F(1, 24) = 1.04, ns. All members were evaluated significantly 
above the middle of the scale except for the normative out-group member, t(11) = 1.54, 
ns, all other members, lowest, t(12) = 3.64, p = .003 (cf. Figure 11). 
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Impression of members and in-group identification. To examine the impact of 
in-group identification on impression, we divided participants by median-split of the in-
group identification index, M = 4.81, SD = .73 and M = 6.50, SD = .35, respectively for 
‘low’ and ‘high identifiers’, creating a new two-level variable, Identification. We then 
performed a Group x Identification x Member ANOVA. There were no effects 
involving Identification, all effects, F(1, 21) < 1, suggesting that in-group identification 
did not played a significant role in the judgments of the targets.  
Impression of members and recognition. To examine the role of recognition of 
the norms, we proceeded similarly, dividing participants by median-split of the 
recognition index into two groups, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ recognizers, with a average 
recognition of M = .42 , SD = .51 and M = 2.00, SD = .00, respectively, creating a new 
two-level variable, Recognition. We then performed a Group x Recognition x Member 
ANOVA, which did not yield significant effects involving Recognition, highest effect, 
F(1, 21) = 1.52, ns, suggesting that recognition of the norms did not played a significant 
role in the judgments. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
With the changes to the experimental procedure aimed to increase the 
importance of the group norms, the results partially supported the hypothesis of implicit 
normative differentiation. Specifically, participants favored members who endorse 
implicit in-group norms over those who support equivalent out-group norms. However, 
this result cannot be interpreted as the result of Subjective Group Dynamics. The 
Subjective Group Dynamics model postulates that the need to protect group identity 
derives from the simultaneous salience of social self-categorization and of the violated 
group norm (cf., e.g., Marques et al, 1998a; 2001b). The simultaneous salience of group 
and norm is revealed by the extremized evaluations of in-group normative and deviant 
members as regards their out-group equivalents. Our results present only one aspect of 
the expected effect: in-group normative members were favored over out-group 
normative members but in-group deviants were not downgraded relatively to out-group 
deviants.  
Other results suggest that, in the present experiment, the initial categorization 
was less salient than in the previous experiment. For instance, in-group targets were not 
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favored over out-group targets, as a whole, as in the previous experiment. Moreover, the 
level of in-group identification did not affected judgments, as in the previous 
experiment. Jointly, these two results suggest that the intergroup context before the 
judgments was less salient than in the previous experiment. The isolated conditions in 
which the tasks were completed as well as the more involving scenario seemed to have 
induced, as intended, an increased salience of the group norms but at costs of a 
decreased salience of the initial categorization. Participants seemed to be more 
concerned in differentiating as a function of the norms than as a function of the groups. 
Given the scarce indications of the initial self-categorization at the time of judgments, a 
re-categorization explanation could also apply to the results. The salience of the norms 
could have led participants to interpret implicitly the situation as the opposition between 
two new categories, derogating targets that endorse the in-group norm over those that 
endorse the out-group norm independently of their initial group membership. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
Previous research has shown that attitudes, opinions and judgments are 
implicitly affected by group memberships. Our aim, in the present work, was to extend 
this investigation on social identity implicit processes to group influence and normative 
intragroup differentiation. We shall now review our major results, outline some of their 
implications and draw some prospects for future research.  
Group Influence 
Group influence is a major social-psychological field of research. Classical 
experiments in Social Psychology, such as those of Sherif (1936) and Asch (1951), 
addressed the influence that group norms have in individuals’ judgments. It is therefore 
a significant field to examine implicit processes. In addition, implicit processing is a 
relevant issue in the theory of group influence. Minority influence theories emphasize 
the distinction between direct and indirect influence (e.g., Moscovici, 1976; 1980; 1985; 
Mugny & Pérez, 1991; Pérez & Mugny, 1998), and compliance is often associated to 
deliberate behavior whereas internalization is associated to implicit assimilation (e.g., 
Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Kelman, 1958; Moscovici, 1976; Wood, 1999).  
Sherif (1936) examined the way individuals achieve collective frames of 
reference, social norms, and how these norms become objective stimuli. His study is 
paradigmatic of a Social Psychology aiming to understand the social processes 
generalized to small groups and large social groups such as societies or cultures. Norms 
are seen as social products, which cannot be reduced to the average of the individual 
contributes. Social influence is considered a genuine group phenomenon not an 
accumulation of interpersonal influences.  
Subsequent research did not pursue Sherif’s wide-range purpose and became 
more concerned with influence phenomena that emerge in small interactive groups. 
Traditional social influence literature is characterized by an individualistic bias because 
it places the individual at the center of the influence process. For instance, Moscovici 
(1976) remarked that, by distinguishing social reality from physical reality, Festinger’s 
(1950) assigns the predominance in testing reality to individuals’ personal means; 
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others’ opinions appear as an auxiliary means to obtain certainty about reality when 
personal means fail to reduce subjective uncertainty.  
According to Turner (1991), the individualistic conception of group influence 
led to several ‘dual-process’ models of social influence. One of the most paradigmatic 
of these models is Deutsch and Gerard’s (1955) distinction between normative and 
informational influence. Although the model holds that groups may also represent 
informational sources, it considers group influence typically normative and is 
intensified with the physical presence of other members. The dichotomization of group 
influences is reinforced in minority influence theory (Moscovici, 1976; 1985). 
According to this theory, whereas majorities exert only direct influence inducing mainly 
compliant behavior, minorities exert their influence also indirectly leading to conversion 
or internalization.   
The social identity approach presents a different view on group influence. 
Contrarily to the dual-process model, the Referent Informational Influence model (Hogg 
& Turner, 1987; Turner, 1987; 1991; McGarty et al, 1992) conceives group influence as 
a single process encompassing informational and normative components. Distinctions in 
the conformity process such as those in terms of private vs. public settings, or of direct 
vs. indirect influences are theoretically superfluous because conformity represents an 
assimilation of the self to the group norm. The distinction based on the opposition 
between private and public conformity has already been addressed (Hogg & Turner, 
1987; Abrams et al, 1990); thus, the distinction based on the opposition of direct vs. 
indirect influences (or conformity to explicit vs. implicit norms) appeared as a relevant 
aspect to address.  
Assumed in-group membership of credible sources. We began by examining 
conformity to the implicit norm of a credible source. We considered this test important 
for two reasons: First, it would test the assumption that informational influences are 
automatically accepted, and second, because it would provide a basis to compare the 
results of the next experiments in which the group membership of the credible source 
was manipulated. Experiment 1 supported the idea that individuals automatically 
conform to the opinion of sources whose credibility is relevant in the current context. 
We then hypothesized that the norm of credible sources is automatically accepted 
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because receivers assume the in-group membership of the sources (cf. Turner, 1991). 
Experiments 2 and 4 confirmed this hypothesis. When the credible source was presented 
as an out-group source, participants did not conformed more to it than to a 
comparatively less credible in-group.  
Implicit and explicit conformity. The results of Experiment 2 did not show, even 
when the in-group was a credible source, an actual preference for the in-group pictures, 
in absolute terms. Absolute preference, that is, the rating of the pictures significantly 
above the middle of the scale, represents an important leap from irresolute judgment to 
committed judgment. Instead, their conformity to in-group norms was preferential 
relatively to that of out-group norms. Actual conformity to in-group norms emerged 
when these norms were made explicit: In Experiment 3 and in the explicit condition of 
Experiment 4, participants conformed to the in-group norm both relatively to that of the 
out-group and in absolute terms, corresponding to actual assimilation to the in-group 
norm.  
Despite actual assimilation to the in-group norm was processed consciously, but 
not unconsciously, there were no divergences between implicit conformity and explicit 
conformity regarding the norms preferred. The results of the non-credible group 
members, showing that in-group conformity did not increased from implicit to explicit 
conditions, confirmed the idea that increased explicit in-group conformity does not 
correspond solely to an increase of normative influence. Instead, this rise in conformity 
corresponds to the larger referent informational influence of the group, thus involving 
normative and informational components. This idea was also reinforced by the distorted 
perceptions of non-credible group members concerning the relative competence of the 
two groups in the task, indicating that in-group members adjusts eventual negative 
information about the in-group such that they perceive the in-group at the least negative 
light as possible and the out-group at the least positive light as possible. This normative 
adjustment of the informational value of the groups, confirms the idea that the two 
components of group influence are indistinguishable.  
Source credibility. The manipulation or control for the source credibility variable 
in all experiments had both a practical and a theoretical value. In one hand, it was useful 
in Experiments 3 and 4 to generate meaning to the categorization in artificial groups. 
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The categorization in artificial groups, inspired in Tajfel and colleagues’ (1971) 
procedure had the advantage of creating a situation, as the authors put it, “devoid of the 
usual trappings of in-group membership and of all the vagaries of interacting with the 
out-group” (p. 173). However, artificial categorization is effective in producing group 
behavior to the extent that, in the created situation, it entails some meaning to 
participants (e.g., Diehl, 1990; Oakes et al, 1994). The opposition between credible and 
non-credible groups helped us to produce such meaning, reproducing the habitual 
asymmetries in status of natural groups (e.g., Tajfel, 1978). On the other hand, the 
presence of the source credibility variable in all the experiments reinforced the 
metatheoretical standpoint of the referent informational influence concept: That 
credibility, expertise, and useful information, are not abstract concepts but concepts 
strongly anchored in specific social realities (cf. Turner, 1991; 2005).  
Implications for research on the heuristic processing of persuasive messages. 
The present results may also be read at the light of persuasion literature. Previous 
research found that the in-group membership of the source may serve either as a 
heuristic to form or change an opinion and as a cue to systematically process one 
message. Heuristics are low-effort cognitive strategies (cf. Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) 
that may be used to ascertain promptly the validity of a persuasive message based on 
source-related cues (cf. Chaiken, 1980). For instance, Mackie, Gastardo-Conaco and 
Skelly (1992) reminded their participants about the in-group position on a particular 
issue either before or after reading a persuasive message issuing from either an in-group 
or an out-group source. The results showed that the in-group message generated more 
change of opinion than did that of the out-group. More importantly, when they were 
reminded of the in-group position after the message, participants spend the same 
amount of time analyzing in-group and out-group arguments, whereas when they were 
reminded before, participants spent more time reading in-group than out-group 
arguments. These and other results (e.g., Fleming & Petty, 2000; Haslam, McGarty & 
Turner, 1996; Mackie, Worth & Asunción, 1990; van Knippenberg, Lossie & Wilke, 
1994; Wilder, 1990) indicate that the group membership of the source may serve as a 
heuristic to evaluate the credibility of a message. In-group messages induce more 
opinion change than do out-group messages even if their content is not systematically 
analyzed. 
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As Chaiken and colleagues (Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken, Liberman & Eagly, 1989; 
Chen & Chaiken, 1999) remarked, heuristics often operate automatically due to the 
repeated verification of the reliability of the source’s messages (e.g., ‘expert sources are 
reliable’, ‘if everybody approves it, it must be right’). We may thus conjecture that the 
results of our Experiment 1 may be interpreted as the automatic operation of a credible 
source heuristic. However, the results of Experiments 2 and 4 also indicate that the 
automatic use of a credible source heuristic applies only when an intragroup context is 
assumed, and the source is deemed to share the receiver’s group membership. When the 
source is believed to belong to an out-group, the credible source heuristic is not used 
neither consciously not automatically.  
Finally, the results of our study, suggesting that group norms may have an 
implicit effect on members, do not imply that members mechanically adopt in-group 
norms or that they do not allot time and energy to question these norms. Instead, they 
suggest that, when social identity is satisfactory, individuals are more receptive to in-
group norms than to out-group norms (or more unreceptive to out-group than to in-
group norms). Nevertheless, as the results of our last experiment show, for members to 
adopt unambiguously in-group norms, they must be conscious of them. 
Some questions for future research. Several questions left unanswered by the 
present experiments deserve attention. One of these questions is the lack of relationship 
of in-group conformity with both the perceived credibility of groups and in-group 
identification in non-credible group members. Why are these correlations, even so, 
stronger in implicit conditions than in explicit conditions? Another potentially 
interesting aspect deserving to be pursued is the role of the personal self in implicit 
group conformity. Should a decrease of implicit group conformity be expected when the 
participant is described to be typical of the out-group rather than of the out-group, thus 
violating the assumed prototypicality of the self (e.g., Codol, 1975)? Specifically, what 
should we expect if participants are previously led to believe that, despite their group 
membership, their personal competence in the task is typical of the out-group? If the 
self is described as non-competent and the in-group as competent, should we 
expect‘opportunistic’ in-group conformity? Conversely, if the self is described as 
competent and the in-group as non-competent, should we expect an increase of out-
group conformity? If, for social desirability reasons, this increase emerged only in 
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implicit conformity, that would be an instance, in which, controlled and non-controlled 
measures of conformity provided divergent results similar to those frequently found in 
research on implicit prejudice (e.g., Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson & Howard, 
1997; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton & Williams, 1995; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Such 
divergence would reveal the salience of the personal self rather than of the collective 
self in conformity. 
Normative Intragroup Differentiation 
Normative differentiation relates directly to group influence because both have 
groups norms at the center of phenomena. Festinger’s (1950) theory of group influence 
is also a theory of group reactions to deviance. Until recently, the research focused on 
the dynamics occurring in interactive groups, such as work and sport teams, 
committees, task forces, etc. However, people do not have to interact actually with 
deviant members to endure the negative consequences of in-group deviant behavior at a 
social identity level. This phenomenon was tackled by Marques and colleagues with 
their research on the black-sheep effect (e.g., Marques et al, 1988). The obtained data 
suggested that the derogation of deviant members corresponds to a group strategy to 
protect the value of the social identity (Marques & Páez, 1994). Members that violate 
cherished group norms endanger not only the external image of the group but also the 
validity of the violated norms (Marques et al, 1998a; 2001b). The black-sheep effect 
involves the extremized derogation of in-group deviants relatively to their out-group 
counterparts and the extremized upgrading of in-group normative relatively to their out-
group counterparts. This phenomenon conflicts with the general tendency to assimilate 
group members in salient intergroup contexts (Doise, Deschamps & Meyer, 1978; 
Simon, 1992). However, there is repeated evidence that extremized intragroup 
differentiation, as a function of group prescriptive norms, is a concomitant of increased 
commitment to the in-group (Marques et al, 1998b; 2001a). 
The goal of our second study was to examine whether the extremized reactions 
to in-group deviance could be automatic or whether they required conscious processing. 
Previous research has established the automatic nature of in-group favoritism (Devine, 
1989; Dovidio et al, 1997; Perdue et al, 1990). The in-group and its members tend to be 
more associated with positive feelings or the out-group and its members tend to be more 
159 
associated with negative feelings (Cameira et al, 2002; Otten & Wentura, 1999). Could 
this tendency automatically shift to derogation when the target member is presented as 
deviant? Our results presented mixed evidence for this possibility.  
In Experiment 5, in-group normative and deviant members were assimilated and 
out-group members that endorsed the in-group norm were upgraded. Several results 
suggested that the need for the positive differentiation of the in-group prevailed over 
normative intragroup differentiation. In Experiment 6, where the focus on the norms 
was promoted, the upgrading of members supporting the in-group norms over those that 
supported the out-group norm indicates an indirect form of in-group favoritism. 
However, the results present no definitive indications that judgers were protecting their 
identity as group members. The results could be interpreted as intergroup differentiation 
following a re-categorization rather than actual intragroup differentiation.  
One possibility to unravel the above question would be to redesign the 
experiment to avoid its symmetry in what concerns the norms supported by target-
members and their respective group membership. Specifically, the introduction of a 
third norm belonging neither to the in-group nor to the out-group but endorsed by both 
in-group and out-group deviants would inform: (1) whether our participants favored 
out-group deviants relatively to normative members due to their support to the in-group 
norm and not to their rejection of the out-group norm, and (2) whether our participants 
favored in-group normative members relative to deviants because the deviants 
supported the out-group norm. Our conjecture is that whereas differentiation within the 
in-group will occur when a member deviates from the in-group norm, differentiation 
within the out-group occurs only when a member is an in-group convert; when the norm 
followed by the deviant is unrelated with the perceiver’s group, out-group members will 
be derogated as a whole. Such a design would help to clarify the intergroup vs. 
intergroup nature of implicit normative differentiation. 
However, there is also the possibility that some forms of normative intragroup 
differentiation require conscious processing. Previous results have shown that in-group 
favoritism is a predominant response in salient intergroup contexts (Perdue e tal, 1990; 
Otten & Wentura, 1999). Because implicit processes are relatively inflexible processes 
(Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Bruner, 1992), they might not include sophisticated 
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responses such as that of in-group protection through the derogation of one (or some) of 
its members. Abrams and colleagues’ (2001a; 2001b) studies are consistent with this 
idea, showing that whereas in-group favoritism is a tendency showing relatively early in 
the development, intragroup normative differentiation appears later when individuals 
are more conscious of the threat that in-group deviant behavior may represent to group 
identity. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that deviant behavior that 
blatantly threatens individuals’ values would trigger an automatic derogatory reaction 
more extreme when the perpetrator is an in-group member than when it is an out-group 
member. This is a possibility to explore in future studies using a procedure different 
from the present one. 
To conclude, implicit processes associated with social identity appear as a 
promising path for research that may contribute to a better understanding of how in-
group standards are internalized and group behavior is automatized. Social behavior has 
traditionally been associated with strategic self-presentation and with public 
performance (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Turner et al, 1987). This perspective suggests that 
the private self is intrinsically different from the public self (Abrams, 1994; 1996; 
1999). We believe that the demonstration of the routine and automatic, not exceptional 
and controlled, character of the social processing of environment will contribute to 
approach social phenomena at a group level and not only at an interindividual level of 
explanation. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Pre-test of the material used in Experiments 1-5 
Participants and design. Thirty-nine students enrolled in an introductory 
Psychology course (twenty-seven females and twelve males; ages ranging from 18 to 27 
years old; M = 20.28, SD = 2.42) volunteered to participate in an experiment on 
perception and esthetic judgment. In order to check on the maximum features of the 
material that could interfere in the main experiments we planned the following design: 2 
(Series Order: Series 1 first vs. Series 2 first) x 2 (Task Order: recognition task first vs. 
judgment task first) x 2 (Type: Type XXX vs. Type YYY). The latter factor was a 
within-participants factor and the remaining were between-participants factors.  
Procedure and material. The experiment proceeded in four sessions of 9-11 
participants each. Participants sat facing a screen where the pictures were projected 
ensuring an even distance to the screen. Participants were told that several computer-
generated abstract pictures had been classified into two types: XXX and YYY. The 
pictures were the same described in Experiment 1 (cf. Figure 1). First, participants were 
asked to observe a sample of ten labeled pictures of each of these two types (learning 
phase). In the second phase, participants were asked to classify 20 unlabelled pictures 
into type XXX or type YYY, as a function of the examples they had observed before 
(recognition task), and to describe systematic differences between pictures Type XXX 
and pictures Type YYY (written report). Finally, participants were asked to rate their 
preference for 20 new unlabelled pictures (judgment task). They observed each picture 
for 5 seconds and then reported their judgment in a 7-point scale (1= Do not like it; 7= 
Like it very much). 
Participants were randomly assigned to four experimental conditions. In one 
condition, participants judged Series 1 - 20 pictures including 10 type XXX and 10 type 
YYY - and classified Series 2 – other 20 pictures also including 10 type XXX and 10 
type YYY. In the other condition, the distribution of the two series of the pictures in the 
two tasks was reversed: Series 1 was classified and Series 2 was judged. The third 
condition was similar to the first condition but the recognition task preceded the 
judgment task. Finally, the fourth condition was similar to the second condition but the 
recognition task was before the judgment task.  
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Results 
Recognition and recall. A Series Order x Task Order ANOVA conducted on the 
recognition index yielded no significant effects, being the highest, F(1, 38) = 3.84, ns. 
Participants were unable to classify correctly the pictures at a level different from 
chance. In the whole, the average number of pictures correctly classified, M = 10.59, SD 
= 3.39, was not different from the result obtained if the classification was made 
randomly, t(38) = 1.09, ns.  
We proceeded with the analysis of the content of the written reports. Four 
participants (10 %) reported differences between the pictures that resembled the 
manipulated distinction. One participant referred to the pictures XXX’s vertical 
structure and to the pictures YYY’s horizontal structure (that could be a mention to their 
respective vertical and horizontal details). Two participants referred to the existence of 
the letter F in the left side of Pictures YYY, and one referred to the regularity of the left 
contour of pictures XXX against the correspondent broken contour in pictures YYY. 
However, the average recognition of these four participants was not above a chance 
level, M = 10.00. Of the remaining participants, 10 gave no explanations and eight 
referred to darkness of pictures XXX against the whiteness of pictures YYY whereas 
five referred the opposite features. The fact that these thirteen participants had opposite 
opinions in terms of the general tonality of the two types of pictures made us confident 
that this difference was not objective. Table 8 displays the answers provided by each 
participant in the written report. 
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No. Type XXX Type YYY 
Tests of awareness in Series 2 
1 Clearer, with various blank spaces Darker, without so many blank spaces 
2 More geometrical forms and some have Fs They have something like animals 
3 Did not recognize nothing in the pictures  
One could recognize human figures, etc. 
4 More dense, heavier Clearer, more “black and white” 
5 Darker, i.e., the black color is enhanced 
Clearer, more blank spaces 
7 Taller and more filled Longer and less filled 
8 More saturated More dispersed 
10 Clearer Darker 
34 Darker, with more black dots With small blanks, the letter F appears 
35 Very abstract  Abstract 
36 Clearer Darker 
37 Less complex More complex 
39 They do not have an F They have an F 
Tests of awareness in Series 1 
11 More compact More dispersed, darker, and letters  
13 Higher load of black color Simpler, with blank spaces 
16 Darker, include more drawings Clearer, include less drawings 
18 More dispersed (white intervals) More compact, some include figures 
19 Darker, less blanks Clearer, more spaces 
20 Clearer, with more squares Darker, with blanks in the middle, some contain the letter F in the bottom left  
21 Less compact with more blanks More compact, more “complex” 
22 More structured Less structured, with a deformed pattern 
24 More deformed More defined 
25 Formed by grouped dots  Formed by dispersed dots 
26 More intense in color Less intense in color 
27 Visually clearer More abstract, did not find anything special 
28 More visible, describe an object, less clearer 
Clearer, with more blanks, more complex  
29 Heavier, darker Lighter, clearer 
30 Left contour with flaws Left contour intact 
31 Too abstract More interesting, w/ logical forms  
 
Table 8. Reports on the distinction between the two types of pictures (Pre-test). The responses in 
bold characters refer to distinctions that resemble the actual distinction. 
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Preferences. We first average the ratings of pictures XXX and pictures YYY 
into two new variables (Type). We then conducted a Series Order x Task Order x Type 
(for pictures XXX vs. for pictures YYY) ANOVA, with Type as within-participant 
factor, which revealed no significant effects, highest F(1, 35) = 2.29, ns. Participants 
reported similar preference for pictures XXX and for pictures YYY, M = 3.48, SD = .92 
and M = 3.49, SD = .94, respectively, independently of the series’ order and the tasks’ 
order. We then analyzed the scores of the two items measuring the preference, in 
general, for pictures XXX and for pictures YYY. A Series Order x Task Order x Type 
ANOVA, with Type as within-participant factor, revealed no significant effects, all F(1, 
35) < 1. Participants reported similar general preference for pictures XXX and for 
pictures YYY, M = 3.46, SD = 1.41 and M = 3.74, SD = 1.47, respectively, 
independently of the series order and the tasks order. 
Conclusion. The pre-test’s results show that the two types of pictures were 
judged similarly attractive and the two series were similarly difficult to be classified, 
independently of the order of presentation of the fact that the judgment was made before 
or after the classification. Four participants reported a distinction that resembled the 
actual distinction between the two types of pictures but the invoked criteria revealed 
insufficiently clear to classify correctly the pictures at a level above chance. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Pre-test to Experiment 1 
The introduction of a distraction in the learning phase resulted from a review of 
implicit learning literature after the failure of obtaining confirming evidence for our 
hypothesis on a first version of Experiment 1. Below we described this first version 
similar to Experiment 1 in all aspects except for the absence of distraction during the 
learning phase. During this pre-test, we noticed that participants show a strong interest 
in the pictures, apparently, trying hard to find an objective feature of the pictures to 
explain the alleged selection of the jury. These attempts were already noticeable in the 
pre-test of the material (see Appendix 1) and in the many written reports of the 
participants. 
Participants. Thirty students enrolled in an introductory Psychology course 
(twenty-seven females and 3 males; ages ranging from 18 to 34 years old, M = 22.47, 
SD = 4.28) volunteered to participate. There was a single intra-participants factor, Type 
of Pictures (Approved vs. Rejected).  
Procedure. The procedure was the same of Experiment 1 except that there was 
no distraction. Specifically, the experiment proceeded in four sessions of 5-7 
participants each. Participants sat facing a screen where the pictures were projected 
always ensuring an even distance to the screen. The experiment was presented as a 
study on the features that make pictures pleasant or unpleasant, attractive or 
unattractive. Allegedly, for that purpose, a set of abstract black and white pictures had 
been randomly created by computer, and then submitted to the appraisal of a “jury of 
experts in fine arts, teachers, critics and artistic professionals like painters and 
sculptors”. Allegedly, the most approved pictures were then separated from the most 
rejected pictures to create two series. After receiving this information, the participants 
were asked to observe a sample of 10 approved pictures and 10 rejected pictures.  
Learning phase. The pictures were rectangular abstract compositions consisting 
of black dots and lines (cf. Figure 1 in Chapter 3). Despite their resemblance, the 
pictures were all different from each other, except that one half of the pictures contained 
one vertical salience in the right top side of the picture and the other half contained one 
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horizontal salience in the left side of the picture. To control for eventual order effects, 
we balanced the labeling of the pictures’ series. In two of the sessions, the vertical type 
was labeled Approved and the horizontal type labeled Rejected. In the other two 
sessions, the vertical type was labeled Rejected and the horizontal type was labeled 
Approved. Each picture was displayed for one second and separated from the next 
picture by a blank screen for one second.  
Tests of awareness. After observing the sample of pictures, participants were 
told that the experimenters wished to known whether they were able to distinguish 
between approved and rejected pictures. This corresponded to the recognition test of 
awareness. Participants were asked to observe twenty unlabelled pictures that allegedly 
had been extracted from the lot of approved and rejected pictures judged by the jury. 
After observing each picture for a maximum of five seconds, participants reported 
whether it had been approved or rejected. The order of presentation of the pictures was 
randomized. The experimenter controlled the presentation of each picture after ensuring 
that the participants have rated the previous one, although mentioning the need for “a 
somewhat fast rhythm”. The number of pictures correctly classified represented the 
extent to which the respondent was aware of the series’ distinctive details. Twenty, or 
close to twenty, correctly classified pictures meant that the respondent had a correct 
criterion for the classification and was aware of the details. None or close to none 
correctly classified pictures meant that the respondent based on an incorrect criterion for 
the classification. Ten or close to ten correctly classified pictures meant that the 
respondent did not used any criterion and answered by chance.  
After this task, participants answered to the question “Have you found any 
distinction between the approved and the rejected pictures?” and, in the affirmative 
case, they were asked to describe the distinction(s). This task corresponded to the 
‘written report’ test of awareness.  
Judgment task. Subsequently, participants were told that, in the present research, 
the experimenters wanted to “know the opinion of average people about this particular 
kind of pictures”. Participants were then asked to judge twenty pictures that allegedly 
had been produced recently and had never been judged. There were 10 vertical and 10 
horizontal pictures and their order of presentation was randomized. Participants 
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observed each picture for 5 seconds and then reported their judgment in a 7-point scale 
(1= Do not like it; 7= Like it very much). 
After this task, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. In 
the debriefing, none participants verbally reported a distinction between the approved 
and rejected pictures similar to the actual one.  
No. Approved Pictures Rejected Pictures 
 Balance 1 
2 Center with filled spaces Center with blank spaces 
3 Lighter with well matched tonalities Darker with less blank spaces 
5 More centered With salient white or black spots 
6 More defined and precise Less defined and irregular 
9 More homogeneous, less “noise” More disorganized, with more scattered patterns 
11 More precise, a bit more geometrical More imperfect, more confusing 
12 No straight limits  Contoured by bounding lines 
14 More expressive, with closer dots Sparse dots, blanks 
16 More balanced between color and 
extremities Black spots more marked 
 Balance 2 
17 Similar to labyrinths, more blank 
spaces 
More homogeneous, darker, less 
mysterious 
18 Lighter, with some delimited space Darker, cannot see any line 
19 Smoother and sharper More abstract with white tonalities 
20 With precise and concrete contents Undefined limits, missing some parts 
21 More rigorous, sharper, with less 
white spaces  
More abstract and subjective, less 
geometrical 
22 More comprehensible Darker, hardly comprehensible 
23 Less definable They say nothing to you 
24 More varied, with various forms More confusing 
27 More beautiful, with more blank 
spaces Formless, very closed 
28 More organized esthetics Less organized esthetics 
30 More structured imagination Less structured imagination 
 
Table 9. Reports on the distinction between the two series of pictures grouped by balance 
condition (Pre-test to Experiment 1).  
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Results 
Recognition and recall. We computed a recognition index by summing the 
number of pictures correctly recognized (minimum=0; maximum = 20). The mean 
recognition rate differed from chance but in the incorrect direction, M = 8.87, SD = 
2.16, t(29) = 2.87, p = .008, showing that participants made more inaccuracies than if 
they were responding at random. One possible explanation for this result is that, as there 
was no distraction, participants obtained some subjective confidence on their respective 
‘theories’ about the pictures (generally congruent with the approved and rejected status 
of the pictures, attributing more positive features to the former or more negative 
features to the latter). As a result, they applied them in the classification task and, likely, 
in the judgment task. However, as may be seen in Table 9, none of the 20 reported 
‘theories’ was close to the actual distinction.  
Conformity. We first averaged the ratings of approved and rejected pictures into 
two new variables of preference for approved pictures and preference for rejected 
pictures, respectively (Picture Type), and then conducted a Picture Type (for approved 
pictures vs. rejected pictures) x Balance ANOVA, in which Preferences was a within-
participants factor. The analysis revealed no significant effects: participants did not 
differentiate between approved and rejected pictures, M = 3.84, SD = .77 and M = 4.02, 
SD = .91, respectively, F(1, 28) = 2.68, ns; all other effects, F(1, 28) < 1.  
 
 
